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KRISTIE N. BRIGGS: Three Essays on Intellectual Property Rights
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(Under the direction of Alfred J. Field, Jr.)
Developing countries today face different international policies and pressures than did
the currently industrialized countries when they were in the midst of the development pro-
cess. Recent external pressures on developing countries to implement intellectual property
rights (IPRs) are just one example. In practice many developing countries have chosen to
implement strong patent policies, despite the fact that these countries have limited capacity
for innovation. Developing countries are instead better characterized as “imitators” that
learn from technology transferred from innovating (industrialized) countries. Therefore, im-
plementing IPRs would seem counterintuitive for developing countries as it restricts their
ability to imitate. Despite the possible costs, many international organizations argue that
developing countries do, in fact, benefit from implementing IPRs via increased trade and
foreign direct investment. However, the true impact of IPR policy in developing countries
remains largely unclear. This dissertation untangles some of the links between IPRs, trade,
and development by focusing on a particular aspect of this issue in each of three essays.
The first essay considers how a country’s choice in IPRs relates to their stage in devel-
opment. The essay is novel in that it brings to light evidence that a country’s choice in
IPRs as it develops (the longitudinal relationship) has a distinctly different IPR-per capita
GDP relationship than it has when considering the IPR choice for a variety of countries in
different stages of development, but at one point in time (the cross-sectional relationship).
The second essay looks at whether IPRs in developing countries stimulate high technology
exports from industrialized countries. By analyzing an array of different high technology ex-
ports to developing countries, it was determined which types of high technology goods were
responsive and which appeared to not be significantly effected when developing countries
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strengthened domestic IPRs. The third essay explores whether stronger IPRs in developing
countries will stimulate their export activity. The acquisition of IPRs in developing countries
is found to have a significantly positive impact on developing country exports, suggesting a
possible link between IPR policies and outward oriented development policies.
iv
To Mom, Dad, and Jen.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my appreciation for my advisor, Alfred Field, Jr. He has provided
me with time, guidance, and encouragement throughout the course of my research. I also
wish to thank my committee members: Scott Baker, Patrick Conway, Neville Francis, and
David Guilkey for their insight and advice. I thank Walter Park for providing data. I also
thank my fellow graduate students, especially Charlie, Tia, and Mike for helping me along
the way. I would like to thank my sister, Jennifer, for her unending support, and both Jen
and Art for never making me pay for a single meal throughout all of graduate school!
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents for all the encouragement and sacrifices they
made that helped me reach where I am today. They have truly shown me value of hard
work, and I am grateful.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Intellectual Property Rights and Development: A Longitudinal vs. Cross
Sectional Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
2.2 Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1 Chen and Puttitanun’s Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2 A Revised Longitudinal Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Linking Theory and Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
2.4.1 The Ginarte-Park IPR Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Exploring the Longitudinal Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.1 Pooled Data Analysis of the IPR-per capita GDP relationship . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 The Fully Specified Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6.1 Estimating IPRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6.2 Endogeneity of IPRs and per capita GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.3 Estimating per capita GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.4 Specification of the System of Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 A Cross-Sectional Explanation for the U-shape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7.1 The Role of International Pressure in IPR Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3 The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights on High Technology Exports to
Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
vii
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.1 Literature on IPRs and Trade in the North-South Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.2 Empirical Research on IPRs and Bilateral Trade Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.3 Review of Literature on Gravity Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 The Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
3.3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.3 What Impacts the Optimal Quantity to Produce and Export? . . . . . . . . . .70
3.3.4 Predictions about the Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
3.4 Empirical Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
3.4.1 The Gravity Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.2 Country and High Technology Good Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4 Do Intellectual Property Rights Increase Export Activity in Developing
Countries? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 Relevant Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
4.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.1 Exports of Newly Innovated Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
4.3.2 Exports of Existing Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.3 Total Export Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4 Empirical Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104
4.4.1 Estimating Equation for Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4.2 Problems with Endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4.3 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
viii
A Appendix for Essay One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.1 Summary of Empirical Results from Past Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.3 Identifying the “Critical” Cross-Sectional Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.4 Stage One Results for the Fully Specified Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.5 Cross-Sectional Results Accounting for Regional Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B Appendix for Essay Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.1 Explanations Proposed by Primo Braga and Fink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.2 Determining “Value Added” Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.3 Analysis of Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
C Appendix for Essay Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142
C.1 USPTO Patent Count Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C.2 First Stage Results for Essay 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
ix
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Group Classification used in Pooled Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Pooled Regression Using Panel Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Correlation Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Choice of IPRs: The Fully Specified Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Cross Section of IPRs for Each Available Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7 Composition of the Critical Cross-Section of Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.8 Critical Cross Sectional IPR Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.9 Composition of Critical Cross-Section: Omitting 1885-1960 . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.10 Critical Cross Sectional IPR Decision: Omitting 1885-1960 . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.1 Composition of Aggregate High Technology Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Value Added Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Developed Country High Tech Exports to Low Income Countries . . . . . . . 86
4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2 Bilateral Exports with Inward FDI in Current Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3 Bilateral Exports with Lagged Inward FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4 Descriptive Statistics: High Income Countries Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5 Bilateral Exports (High Income Countries) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.1 IPR Regression Results from Past Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Preliminary Results for IPR Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.3 Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights: Categories and Calculations . . . . . . 123
A.4 Specification for the ‘Critical” Cross-Sectional Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.5 Stage One Results: log(Per Capita GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.6 Cross-Sectional Results by Year, Including Regional Dummy Variables . . . . 128
x
B.1 Developed Country Exports to Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries . . . . 134
C.1 First Stage Results: Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries . . . . . . . . . . 144
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Legal vs. Effective IPRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Selected Country Specific IPR Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Box Plot of IPRs showing Indonesia as an Outlier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4 Scatter Plot of Critical Cross-Section when Indonesia is Included . . . . . . . 50
2.5 Scatter Plot of Critical Cross-Section when Indonesia is Omitted . . . . . . . 50




Developing countries today face different international policies and pressures than did
the currently industrialized countries when they were in the midst of the development pro-
cess. Recent external pressures on developing countries to implement intellectual property
rights (IPRs) are just one example. In practice many developing countries have chosen to
implement strong patent policies, despite the fact that these countries have limited capacity
for innovation. Developing countries are instead better characterized as “imitators” that
learn from technology transferred from innovating (industrialized) countries. Therefore, im-
plementing IPRs would seem counterintuitive for developing countries as it restricts their
ability to imitate. Despite the possible costs, many international organizations argue that
developing countries do, in fact, benefit from implementing IPRs via increased trade and
foreign direct investment. However, the true impact of IPR policy in developing countries
remains largely unclear. This dissertation untangles some of the links between IPRs, trade,
and development by focusing on a particular aspect of this issue in each of three essays.
The first essay examines the role that a country’s stage of development plays in its choice
of IPRs. The essay is novel in that it brings to light evidence that a country’s choice in IPRs
as it develops (the longitudinal relationship) has a distinctly different IPR-per capita GDP
relationship than it has when considering the IPR choice for a variety of countries in different
stages of development, but at one point in time (the cross-sectional relationship). Past
empirical observations on a panel of countries over time have found a U-shape relationship
between IPRs and per capita GDP and taken it to imply a longitudinal U-relationship within
countries. A longitudinal U-shape, however, does not correspond to historical observation;
countries generally maintain or increase IPRs over time and demonstrate a similar trend as
they progress through stages of development. This paper argues that the well known U-shape
relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP is instead a result of cross country differences
originating in the year that each country first chooses to implement IPRs. Distinguishing
between the longitudinal and cross-sectional relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP
will enable researchers to accurately estimate and interpret the effects of IPRs when using
panel data.
The second essay examines how developed-country exports of high technology goods to
developing countries are stimulated by IPRs in developing countries. One argument for im-
plementing strong IPRs in developing countries is that they attract greater high technology
exports from industrialized countries, which should consequently lead to economic growth.
Past empirical observation using an aggregate of high technology goods, however, has sug-
gested that bilateral exports of high technology goods is not impacted by the level of IPRs in
the importing country. A disaggregated analysis of high technology goods provides a more
precise insight into which high technology goods developed countries export in the presence
of stronger developing country IPRs. The impact of developing country IPRs on high tech-
nology exports from developed countries is contingent on a combination of variables such as
production and adaptation costs and whether innovations in the high technology group can
readily be used in domestic production processes. Innovations in high technology groups
such as potassic fertilizers, synthetic yarn, and artificial fibers are arguably very pertinent
to production in developing countries that specialize in agricultural and textile production.
Therefore, the markup in price for these high technology innovations is relatively high. In
addition, marginal production and adaptation costs of innovated goods in these categories
are expectedly low. The combination of high markups and low marginal costs result in
a dominant market power effect when developing countries increase IPRs, indicating that
an increase in IPRs does not increase developed country exports of these goods. On the
other hand, industrialized high technology exports that have relatively higher production
and adaptation costs (such as electrical machinery and apparatus) exhibit a dominant mar-
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ket expansion effect. In this latter case, stronger IPRs in developing countries lead to an
increased receipt of high technology goods from industrialized countries.
The third essay examines the impact that patent policies have on export activity in
developing countries. Outward looking development policies centered on export promotion
have become increasingly popular strategies for stimulating economic growth in developing
countries. At the same time, many developing countries have adopted IPRs in recent years,
often upon the suggestion of industrialized countries and international organizations. This
paper explores the possible link between export promotion and IPR policies by examining
the impact that patent policies have on export activity in developing countries.
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Chapter 2
Intellectual Property Rights and
Development: A Longitudinal vs. Cross
Sectional Study
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the role that a country’s stage of development plays in its choice
of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Past empirical observations on a panel of countries
over time have found a U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP and taken
it to imply a longitudinal U-relationship within countries. A longitudinal U-shape, however,
is counterfactual. Countries generally maintain or increase IPRs over time and, therefore,
expectedly demonstrate a similar trend as they progress through stages of development.
This paper argues that the well known U-shape is a result of cross country differences
originating in the year that each country first chooses to implement IPRs, rather than a
result of a longitudinal trend. To summarize, the conjecture of this paper is two-fold. First,
the longitudinal relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP is monotonically increasing
(rather than U-shaped). Second, a U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP
exists cross-sectionally, when a variety of countries in different stages of development are
examined at one point in time.
A longitudinal U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP would mean that
IPRs initially decrease and later increase as per capita GDP increases in a given country.
The downward portion of a longitudinal U relationship is generally not obtained as countries
generally do not actively weaken IPRs, barring a regime change or other alteration in their
political economy. The longitudinal U conclusion was largely drawn from the results of panel
data. Although longitudinal extrapolations of panel data are common, they are not always
valid. The significant non-monotonic link empirically discovered using panel data is a result
of cross sectional influences, not longitudinal influences. Interpretation of a cross-sectional
U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP would mean that, in a given year,
least developed countries exhibit stronger IPRs than middle-income developing countries,
while high-income countries again exhibit strong IPRs.
The cross-sectional U-shape between IPRs and per capita GDP can be attributed to
cross country differences in IPRs in the year IPRs were first implemented. In the year that
countries first implemented IPRs, the least developed countries implement stronger patent
rights, partially because these countries are the most vulnerable to international pressures to
do so. Middle-income developing countries exercise more autonomy, however, and implement
weaker patent rights that enable them to greater utilize imitation as a pathway for growth.
Finally, when high-income countries first implement IPRs they implement relatively strong
IPRs as they have innovation related incentives to do so.
This paper contributes to the IPR literature by making a distinction between the longi-
tudinal and cross-sectional relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP, and by demon-
strating that the U-shape relationship observed in panel data is a result of cross sectional
differences in countries at different stages of development. Establishing this will enable
researchers to accurately estimate and interpret the effects of IPRs when using panel data.
2.2 Review of Literature
Three key contributions to the literature on the U-shape relationship between IPRs
and per capita income include Maskus (2000), Chen and Puttitanun (2005), and Primo
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Braga, Fink, and Sepulveda (2000).1 In addition, Ginarte and Park (1997) made ancillary
contributions.
Ginarte and Park introduced their IPR index in 1997. In the same article, they ex-
amined the characteristics that influenced a country’s choice in IPRs. Ginarte and Park
concluded that a country’s level of per capita income, research and development (R&D),
political freedom, openness to trade, and secondary school enrollment rates together deter-
mine a country’s choice in IPRs. While Ginarte and Park concluded a country’s stage in
development significantly impacts its choice of IPRs, they did not consider the possibility
of a U-shape relationship.2 Efforts to pinpoint the exact relationship between these two
variables has since emerged.
Maskus (2000) empirically observed a U-shape link between per capita income and IPRs.
He came to this conclusion in two separate analysis. He found this U-shape link in an
expansion of his work with Penubarti (1995) using a 1984 cross-section of countries and
the Rapp and Rozek IPR Index, as well as in analysis using the Ginarte and Park IPR
Index for a panel of countries in 1985 and 1990. The U-shape link remained significant
even when Maskus expanded the IPR regression equation to include independent variables
such as R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP, secondary school enrollment, political
freedom, openness to trade, and market freedom. (These results can be found in Appendix
A.1.) While Maskus empirically observed the U-shape, and interpreted it longitudinally to
explain a country’s choice in IPRs as it develops, he did not provide a theoretical explanation
for the U-shape.
Chen and Puttitanun (2005) provided the first theoretical explanation for the U-shape
relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP by using a game theoretic approach to
model a country’s choice of optimal IPRs. (This model will be outlined in detail in the
next section.) They then tested their theory using a panel of 62 developing countries for
the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Chen and Puttitanun concluded that countries in
1Most analysis of the U-shape has been explored using panel data for many countries over a series of
years, while some has been strictly cross sectional analysis.
2The data used by Ginarte and Park include a panel of 48 developed and developing countries for the
time periods 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1990.
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the earliest stages of development implement higher IPRs to attract foreign technologies so
that they can imitate and grow. As a country gains access to foreign technologies, however,
stronger IPRs actually hinder its ability to imitate. As a result, Chen and Puttitanun argue
that these countries decrease the strength of IPRs so they can utilize imitation to foster
technological advancement. Once a certain level of development is reached,3 countries are
capable of obtaining benefits from domestic innovation and therefore begin to strengthen
their IPRs.4 Chen and Puttitanun’s theoretical argument for the U-shape is examined
thoroughly in the next section, as this paper suggests a revised longitudinal model for the
IPR-per capita GDP relationship.
In Chen and Puttitanun’s empirical estimation, they incorporate a two-stage regression
in their evaluation of the U relationship where they estimate IPRs in the first stage and then
estimate innovation as a function of IPRs in the second stage.5 (This paper alternatively
argues that per capita GDP directly influences IPRs.) Chen and Puttitanun ultimately
found that there is a significant U-shape link between IPRs and per capita GDP.
Primo Braga, Fink, and Sepulveda (2000) consider the relationship between IPRs and
per capita GDP for a cross section of countries in the year 1975. Although the U-shape is
not a primary focus, the Primo Braga, Fink, and Sepulveda paper is important for a couple
of reasons. First, it finds a statistically significant relationship between IPRs and per capita
GDP using a strictly cross-sectional analysis for the year 1975. This is an important result
as it provides preliminary evidence that the U-shape configuration captured by panel data
could actually be driven by the cross-sectional variation. Secondly, in discussion unrelated
to the U-shape, Primo Braga, Fink, and Sepulveda claim that one determinant of IPRs
in developing countries is the international pressures they feel from more industrialized
3Chen and Puttitanun use development and technological advancement interchangeably in their model.
4Chen and Puttitanun argue that even developing countries benefit from domestic innovation, pointing
out that the number of domestic patent application in 1985-1995 were particularly high in Brazil, India,
South Africa, and South Korea.
5It should also be noted that Maskus and Penubarti (1995) also address the issue of endogeneity. Although
the relationship between per capita income and the strength of IPRs is briefly examined in this paper, the
purpose of the paper was to uncover the influence of IPRs on trade. Thus, the endogenous relationship
accounted for by Maskus and Penubarti was that between the level of economic development and trade
flows.
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countries. In a similar line of thinking, this paper postulates that developing countries’
vulnerability to international pressures are directly related to the cross-sectional U-shape
between IPRs and per capita GDP.
Empirical results for papers discussed in this literature review found in Appendix A.1.
Primo Braga, Fink, and Sepulveda did not provide specific results, but rather a scatter plot
and the associated best-fit monotonic line.
2.3 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model explaining the U-shape link between IPRs and per capita GDP
found in Chen and Puttitanun (2005) is the only theory I could locate addressing the
possible relationship to date. In their model Chen and Puttitanun (CP) find support for
a longitudinal U-shape link between IPRs and per capita GDP. Their model, however,
considers a country’s IPRs written into law and does not explicitly address how enforcement
of these laws may impact perceived IPRs. The Ginarte-Park IPR index, which is most often
used in empirical analysis of IPRs, includes a measure for enforcement. The suggested
revised model for the longitudinal relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP explicitly
considers enforcement of IPRs.
2.3.1 Chen and Puttitanun’s Model
The CP theoretical model takes a game theoretic approach to finding how economic
growth affects optimal IPRs. In their model, the developing (domestic) country chooses its
level of IPR protection, β ∈ [0; 1], where β = 0 indicates no protection and β = 1 indicates
perfect protection. In addition, the parameter θ ∈ (0; 1] is a measure of the country’s level
of development such that higher levels of θ indicate greater development.
The domestic economy has two sectors, A and B. Sector A is comprised of two firms, a
foreign (developed country) firm, F, and a domestic (developing country) firm, D. Sector B
is comprised of two domestic firms, L and M. Each sector produces a different good and has
its own individual set of consumers. In addition, each sector has one innovating firm and
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one imitating firm. Firms F and L are innovators in Sectors A and B, respectively, while
firms D and M are imitators, respectively. Sectors A and B are linked through the shared
IPRs.
In Sector A, the foreign firm sells a product of exogenous quality µF , which is under
a patented technology. Domestic firm D may produce the good in Sector A, but with a
quality level µD(β, θ) = µ0 + µFφ(θ)[1 − α(β)] such that µD < µF by assumption. The
quality of the domestically produced good is dependent on the exogenous quality of the
foreign produced good, as well as firm D’s imitative abilities, represented by the parameter
φ(θ), and the limitation to imitation that results from stronger IPRs, α(β). In addition, for
every θ, 0 ≤ φ(θ) ≤ 1, φ′(θ) > 0, α′(β) > 0, α(1) = 1, and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µF (1−φ(1)). Countries
that are more developed (as identified by higher levels of θ) have greater imitative ability.
Perfect IPR protection (as identified by β = 1) results in no imitative capabilities for firm
D. Finally, all firms in Sector A have a constant unit cost of cA ∈ [0, µ0].
In Sector B, firm L produces a good of quality v(z; θ), where z(β; θ) ≥ 0 represents
firm L’s investment in quality improvement through innovative activities. CP argue that
the function z can also be interpreted as a measure of domestic innovation. For every
θ, vz(z, θ) > 0, vz(∞, θ) = 0, vzz(z, θ) < 0, vθ(z, θ) > 0, and vzθ(z; θ) > 0. Firm M
produces a good in Sector B of quality vM (β; θ) = v(z; θ) − γ(β)(v(z; θ) − v0) such that
vM (β; θ) < v(z; θ) by assumption. Although firm M does not have innovative capabilities,
they can increase the quality of their good by imitating the variety produced by firm L.
For every θ, 0 ≤ v0, γ(0) > (1/vz(0, θ)), γ′(β) > 0, and γ(1) = 1. These assumptions
also ensure that 0 < γ(β) ≤ 1, which results in a non-negative valuation of vM . CP
also assume v0 ≡ 0, arguing that they do so without loss of generality. This assumption
leaves the quality of firm M’s good equal to imitation-dependent fraction of firm L’s variety
vM (β; θ) = v(z; θ)(1 − γ(β)). Finally, all firms in Sector B have a constant unit cost of
cB ≡ 0.
Each sector has its own individual set of consumers. In Sector A, there is a continuum
of consumers of measure 1. Each consumer in A assigns a value to one unit of the good in
A that is equal to the quality of that good. Since each consumer values only one unit of
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the good, additional units receive a valuation of zero. In Sector B, there is a continuum of
consumers of measure N > 0. Each consumer in B assigns a value to one unit of the good
that is equal to the quality of that good. Again, since each consumer values only one unit
of the good, additional units receive a valuation of zero.
All consumers have identical preferences, such that a consumer’s utility from consuming
a good equals the quality of the good minus its price, or
U = µ− p
where µ is the value the consumer assigns to the good (which is equivalent to the quality of
that good) and p is its price. This functional form for consumer utility ultimately ensures
the result that consumers will always purchase the high quality good in equilibrium. (This
fact will be discussed in more detail below.)
In CP’s model, the game is as follows: In the first stage, the domestic government
chooses the level of IPRs, β. In the second stage, firm L chooses research and development
expenditures, z, which is a proxy for the level of domestic innovation. After β and z are
chosen, the product qualities are simultaneously determined. In the third stage of the game,
firms F and D simultaneously choose prices for their good in market A. Similarly, firms L and
M simultaneously choose prices for their good in market B. In the final stage, production by
firms and purchases by consumers are carried out. Backward induction allows the subgame
perfect equilibria to be solved.
Given β and z > 0, each firm chooses its price by maximizing profits subject to the
constraint that consumers’ utility from consumption of their good exceeds consumers’ utility
from consumption of the competing firm’s good in that sector. Since both the low and high
quality firms in each sector face identical unit costs to production, the low quality firms will
drive prices as low as possible to try and achieve a differential between quality and price
that exceeds that of the high quality firm, and therefore “win” the consumer. Thus, the low
quality firm will push prices down so that the price of its good exactly equals its marginal
cost. Given that firm D is the low quality firm in Sector A and firm M is the low quality




The profit maximizing prices of firms F and L are similarly determined by each firm
maximizing its profits subject to the constraint that consumers’ utility from consuming
their good exceeds that of consuming their competitor’s good. Equilibrium prices for firms
F and L are as follows:
pF =µF − µD + pD
=µF − µ0 − µFφ(θ)[1− α(β)] + cA;
pL =v(z; θ)− vM (β; θ) + cB
=v(z; θ)− v(z; θ)(1− γ(β)) + cB
=v(z; θ)γ(β) + cB
CP assume that if consumers are indifferent between purchasing from firm F or D in Sector
A and firm L or M in Sector B, they will choose to buy the respective goods from firms F
and L. Even though equilibrium prices are higher in firms F and firm L, purchasing from
these higher quality firms yields greater (or equal) utility for consumers. It follows that all
consumers purchase from firm F in Sector A and firm L in Sector B.
In the next subgame, firm L chooses z, innovation (as proxied by R&D expenditures),
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such that profits are maximized. Profits for firm L are defined as follows:
piL =N [pL − cB]− z
=N [v(z; θ)γ(β) + cB − cB]− z.
Accounting for the possible corner solution of z = 0,6 the profit maximization equation
implies that the optimal level of z satisfies Nγ(β)vz − 1 ≤ 0. However, when z > 0,
Nγ(β)vz − 1 = 0. Recall the assumption that γ(0) > (1/vz(0, θ)), which implies that
γ(0)vz(0, θ) > 1. This implication violates the Kuhn-Tucker first order condition in which
the optimal z(β; θ) satisfies Nγ(β)vz − 1 ≤ 0. Therefore, it can be concluded that z > 0 and
Nγ(β)vz − 1 = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem (IFT ) on the first order condition Nγ(β)vz−1 =
0 shows how the optimal level of innovation, z, will respond to changes in IPRs, β, and
the level of development, θ. If H is defined by the first order condition for z such that
H = Nγ(β)vz − 1, then

















While the above application of the IFT is not related to the IPR-per capita GDP relationship
of primary concern for this paper, it does provide an important ancillary result; that the
optimal level of domestic innovation increases both as the level of IPRs increase and as the
country develops.
In the last stage of the game in CP’s theoretical model, the domestic government chooses
the level of IPRs, β, that maximizes domestic social welfare. Social welfare in this case
6Therefore, profits are maximized subject to z ≥ 0.
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consists of consumer surplus in Sectors A and B, as well as producer surplus in Sector B.
(Producer surplus in Sector A is not included in domestic welfare since the foreign firm
produces the good in Sector A.)
Domestic Social Welfare (CP’s Model) =CSF + CSL + PSL
=(µF − pF ) +N(µL − pL) +N(pL − cB)− z
=µF − pF +NµL − z
=µ0 + µFφ(θ)[1− α(β)] +Nv(z; θ)− z
(2.1)
where z(β; θ).
Maximizing domestic social welfare in CP’s theoretical model with respect to β yields a
unique, interior solution for the optimal β (such that 0 < β < 1) characterized by the below
first order condition:
µFφ(θ)α′(β(θ)) = [Nvz(z(β(θ); θ); θ)− 1]zβ(β(θ); θ). (2.2)
The left and right hand sides of equation (2.2) are the marginal cost and marginal benefit
to increasing β, respectively. (According to CP, the marginal cost of increasing β is the
cost associated with a country’s decreased ability to imitate the competing firm’s good.
The marginal benefit of increasing β refers to the benefits to the domestic economy from
increased innovation.) Notice that marginal benefits of increasing β are always non-negative.
This can be shown by combining two facts: (1) 0 < γ(β) ≤ 1 and (2) the optimal z satisfies
Nγ(β)vz − 1 = 0. This means that Nvz = 1γ(β) , which implies that Nvz > 1. When this
fact along with zβ > 0 (as previously determined) is applied to the marginal benefit term in
equation (2.2), we can conclude that [Nvzz − 1]zβ > 0.
By this stage in the model, all the tools are available to evaluate the key relationship
between IPRs and development. More specifically, the IFT can be applied to equation (2.2)
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to determine how the optimal β will respond to changes in θ. Given that the partial
derivative of equation (2.2) with respect to β is always negative (since β in the above
equation is the maximum β by definition), CP conclude that the sign of β′(θ) will take the
same sign as the partial derivative of equation (2.2) with respect to θ. In other words, CP
find that
β′(θ)
 > 0 if µ
Fφ′(θ)α′(β(θ)) < [Nvz(z(β(θ); θ); θ)− 1]zβθ(β(θ); θ);
< 0 if µFφ′(θ)α′(β(θ)) > [Nvz(z(β(θ); θ); θ)− 1]zβθ(β(θ); θ).
(2.3)
where µFφ′(θ)α′(β(θ)) represents the effect of a marginal increase in θ on the marginal cost
of increasing β and [Nvz(z(β(θ); θ); θ) − 1]zβθ(β(θ); θ) represents the effect of a marginal
increase in θ on the marginal benefit of increasing β. More generally, the results in (2.3)
imply that there exists a time when increases in per capita GDP, as embodied by θ, will
cause a country’s choice in optimal IPRs, as embodied by β, to fall. CP conclude that this
result provides theoretical justification for the downward portion of the U-shape relationship
empirically observed between IPRs and per capita GDP.
Now that CP’s theoretical model of the relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP
has been presented, a revised longitudinal theory will be proposed.
2.3.2 A Revised Longitudinal Theory
While CP present an interesting explanation for a U-shape link between IPRs and per
capita GDP, the β that they optimize in their model represents a country’s optimal choice
in IPRs as it should be written into law. They assume that these “legal IPRs” are enforced.
The effectiveness of these “legal IPRs,” however, is dependent on the institutional environ-
ment. If institutions are relatively weak, IP protection likely will not be maintained and
corresponding IP laws not effectively enforced.7 Although the optimal level of legal IPRs
7The Ginarte-Park Index of IPRs used in empirical estimation later in this paper accounts for enforce-
ability of patent laws. Although the index does not measure enforceability via institutional quality, the end
result is nonetheless an index of enforced IPRs. This index will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
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may decrease for the least developed countries, as suggested by CP, the level of effectively
enforced IPRs, or “effective IPRs,” is monotonically increasing. The positive relationship
between institutional quality and per capita GDP has been presented by individuals such
as North (1990), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Institutional quality is therefore assumed to be positively related to a country’s level
of economic development. In addition, the effectiveness of IPRs depends on the quality
of institutions in a country. More specifically, “effective IPRs” in a country are a linear
combination of institutional quality and “legal IPRs.” This is demonstrated in Figure 2.1.
So long as the positive influence of institutional improvement on IPRs exceeds any net
imitative marginal benefit from decreasing IPRs as a country develops, the optimal level of
effective IPRs will always increase as a country develops.
Figure 2.1: Legal vs. Effective IPRs
Let β ∈ [0, 1] represent legal IPRs in Figure 2.1 and embody the characteristics previously
outlined by CP. In addition, consider a measure of institutional influence ψ ∈ [0, 1] such that
stronger institutions correspond to larger values of ψ. In other words ψ = 0 means that a
country has no institutional influence and no laws on the books are effective. A value of
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ψ = 1 means there is perfect institutional quality and all laws on the books are completely
effective. As previously stated, institutional quality will increase as a country develops. This
suggests that ψ′(θ) > 0. It is also assumed that |β′(θ)| < |ψ′(θ)|, indicating that an increase
in per capita GDP will have a greater marginal impact on improving institutional influence
in a country than it will have on changing the optimal level of legal IPRs.8 The functional
form for the linear combination demonstrated in Figure 2.1 is represented by β+ψ2 such that
0 ≤ β+ψ2 ≤ 1 captures effective IPRs.
Distinguishing between legal IPRs and effective IPRs, as outlined above, lends to a
theoretical model that is similar in structure to that of CP. Structural differences arise in
the quality of the domestically produced goods, as quality is now dependent not only on
the legal IPRs but also on the institutional influences that impact the effectiveness of these
IPRs. More specifically, in Sector A, firm F continues to supply a good of quality µF while
the quality of firm D’s good is µD(β+ψ2 , θ) = µ0 + µ
Fφ(θ)[1 − α(β+ψ2 )]. The limitation to
imitation that results from stronger IPRs is now captured by α(β − ψ) such that αβ > 0,
αψ > 0, α′(β+ψ2 ) > 0, 0 ≤ α(β+ψ2 ) ≤ 0, α(1) = 1, and 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ µF (1−φ(1)). A combination
of perfect IPR protection and perfectly effective IP laws (as identified by β = 1 and ψ = 1)
results in no imitative capabilities for firm D. Finally, as in CP, all firms in Sector A have
a constant unit cost of cA ∈ [0, µ0].
In Sector B, firm L now produces a good of quality v(z; θ), where z(β − ψ; θ) ≥ 0
represents firm L’s quality improvement through innovation. Firm M produces a good in
Sector B of quality vM (β+ψ2 ; θ) = v(z; θ)−γ(β+ψ2 )(v(z; θ)−v0) such that for every θ, 0 ≤ v0,
γ(0) > (1/vz(0, θ)), γβ > 0, γψ > 0, γ′(β+ψ2 ) > 0 and γ(1) = 1. These assumptions ensure
that 0 < γ(β+ψ2 ) ≤ 1, which results in a non-negative valuation of vM . As in the CP model,
8This assumption is only critical during the downward sloping portion of the legal IPR curve. It should be
noted that much of the literature on institutions and development has considered the impact of institutional
quality on development. The rates of influence given this direction of causality have been examined. (See
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Rodrik and Subramanian (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian,
and Trebbi (2004).) While the reverse causality is often recognized (see Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003),
estimations of the degree or rate of this effect remain to be explored. Validating the assumption that an
increase in per capita GDP will have a greater marginal impact on improving institutional influence in a
country than it will have on changing the optimal level of legal IPRs will require a more in depth exploration of
the impact of development on institutions so that a comparison can be made with the impact of development
on legal IPRs. For the purposes of this paper, this inequality will be assumed.
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it is again assumed that v0 ≡ 0 and constant unit costs cB ≡ 0.
The four stages of the game remain the same as those in CP’s model: (1) the domestic
government chooses legal IPRs, (2) firm L chooses domestic R&D expenditures, (3) all firms
set prices, and (4) production and consumption is carried out in both sectors. Consider the
first stage for a moment, in which the domestic government chooses legal IPRs as embodied
by β. The government chooses legal IPRs given a set of ideologies regarding the decision.
These ideologies may or may not be borne out in practice. Laws are not always written to
correspond to what will necessarily happen, but rather because of what the government’s
ideologies are for making the law. This line of reasoning supports the idea that countries
respond to international pressures to implementing IPRs, which will be discussed later in
the paper. For the purposes of the current theoretical model, however, it is assumed that
the government’s choice in legal IPRs reflects their ideologies for implementing the law and
does not necessarily depend on whether the law can and/or will be enforced. Therefore,
the government still chooses legal IPRs that ideally maximize social welfare (rather than
choosing effective IPRs).
Given these alterations, the prices set by firms in Stage 3 mirror those found by CP in








pL = v(z; θ)γ(β+ψ2 ) + c
B.
The same is true for firm L’s choice in R&D expenditures in Stage 2. In the revised model,
the optimal level of R&D expenditures satisfies the first order condition Nγ(β+ψ2 )vz−1 = 0.
Defining H = Nγ(β+ψ2 )vz − 1, and applying the IFT lends to the following:































Only the result zψ(β, ψ, θ) > 0 is new. It indicates that, as expected, innovation will be
lower the weaker a country’s institutional quality.
Domestic social welfare now accounts for the institutional influence on legal IPRs.
Domestic Social Welfare (Revised Model) = µ0 + µFφ(θ)[1− α(β + ψ2 )] +Nv(z; θ)− z
(2.4)
where z(β+ψ2 ; θ). The domestic government chooses legal IPRs to maximize domestic social
welfare as represented in (2.4). The optimal level of IPRs satisfies
−µFφ(θ)αβ(β + ψ2 ) + [Nvz(z(
β + ψ
2
; θ); θ)− 1]zβ(β + ψ2 ; θ) = 0. (2.5)
where β(θ) and ψ(θ). In (2.5), µFφ(θ)αβ(
β+ψ
2 ) represents the marginal cost to social welfare
of increasing β and [Nvz(z(β+ψ2 ; θ); θ)−1]zβ(β+ψ2 ; θ) represents the marginal benefit to social
welfare of increasing β.
The relationship of primary interest is how the optimal level of effective IPRs (or β+ψ2 )
changes as a country develops (or θ increases). Equation (2.6) embodies this effect. Notice
that the effect of an increase in per capita GDP on effective IPRs can be broken into two
components: (1) the effect of an increase in per capita GDP on legal IPRs and (2) the effect

























Since |β′(θ)| < |ψ′(θ)| the effective level of IPRs is monotonically increasing as a country
develops even when the optimal legal level of IPRs is decreasing.
2.4 Linking Theory and Empirical Analysis
The revised theory provides a theoretical rationale for a monotonically increasing rela-
tionship between effective IPRs and per capita GDP. The next step is to focus on empirical
analysis of the longitudinal relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP. Before doing
so, a few comments should be made about the empirical analysis in this paper compared
to that of CP. Both this paper and CP’s paper use the Ginarte and Park IPR Index to
approximate a country’s level of IPRs. Given the opposing theories captured in Figure 2.1,
it is natural to ask whether the Ginarte and Park IPR Index best captures legal IPRs or
effective IPRs. In order to answer this question, let’s first examine the Ginarte and Park
IPR Index in more detail.
2.4.1 The Ginarte-Park IPR Index
When empirically analyzing intellectual property rights, two indices for the strength of
patent systems have commonly been used. In 1990, Rapp and Rozek developed an IPR
index based on how closely a country’s patent policies mirror those embodied by US patent
laws. In 1997, Ginarte and Park introduced a broader index of patent strength. Specifically,
the Ginarte-Park (GP) Index accounts for; (1) coverage, (2) membership in international
treaties, (3) loss of protection, (4) enforcement, and (5) duration of protection. Since its
introduction, the GP Index is the more common index of choice when conducting empirical
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IPR analysis.9 This is because the GP Index embodies a greater number of countries and
years, and considers a greater scope of categories in its construction (which lends to a more
precise estimate).
This paper utilizes an updated version of the GP Index that contains data for 121
countries at five-year intervals between 1960 and 2000.10 A detailed description of the
construction of the index, as outlined in Ginarte and Park (1997), can be found in Appendix
A.2. However, further analysis of the enforcement component of the GP Index provides
insight as to whether the measure is best approximating legal IPRs or effective IPRs in the
above theories.
The enforcement component of the GP index generates a dummy variable based on
whether the country (1) implements preliminary injunctions to protect the patentee until
a final decision about infringement is made by the courts, (2) protects against third party
induced infringement, and (3) implements burden-of-proof reversals to place the burden
of proving “innocence” on the individual doing the alleged infringement rather than the
patentee. It is important to justify whether or not this enforcement component is sufficient
in capturing the effective level of enforcement of IPRs in these countries. If it does, then
the GP Index measures effective IPRs in a country.
In fact, there is recent evidence to suggest that the GP Index does capture countries’
effectively enforced level of IPRs. This support is provided in a recent comparison between
the GP Index and a newly developed IPR rating created by the World Economic Forum. The
World Economic Forum released an IPR rating in their 2000 Annual Global Competitiveness
Report (GCR) that was based on surveys of opinions and experiences of firms and individuals
in an array of countries.11 Thus, the GCR Index provides information about perceived IPRs,
9For example, this is true in Maskus (2000), Schneider (2004), and Chen and Puttitanun (2005).
10I would like to thank Professor Walter Park for providing me with the updated index. Note that IPR
data is available for 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000.
11The IPR index found in the Global Competitiveness Report does not provide historical data, given that
it is based on a collection of survey and opinion data.
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which implicitly includes their effective enforcement.12 Comparison of the two indices in
the one year (2000) for which overlapping data is available reveals that the GCR rating
and the GP Index are strikingly similar. In fact, the indices have a positive correlation
of approximately 0.8.13 This comparison suggests that there is little difference between
perceived IPRs in these countries and the level of IPRs reported by GP, thereby providing
support that the GP Index approximates effective IPRs.
If the GP Index best captures effective IPRs, then why did CP find a statistically sig-
nificant U-shape link between the GP IPR Index and per capita GDP in their empirical
analysis? The first answer to this question lies in the fact that the GP Index is an approxi-
mation of effective IPRs, meaning that some errors likely exist in the index’s representation
of effective IPRs. Secondly, regional influences on the longitudinal relationship between IPRs
and per capita GDP are carefully examined in this paper and prove to play an important
role in IPR choice. These regional influences were not included in CP’s analysis.
The next section explores the longitudinal relationship, first by focusing on time series
data and then by applying what has been observed in the time series data so to better
analyze the longitudinal relationship between IPRs and per capital GDP using the entire
panel data set.
2.5 Exploring the Longitudinal Data
In general, IPRs for a given country remain the same or increase over time barring any
regime shift or other change in a country’s political economy. Only 14 out of 121 countries
show any decrease in the GP Index over time.14 In addition, only India exhibited a decrease
in IPRs at a point in time when their per capita GDP was at or below the critical US$785
level, which was found to be the level of per capita GDP that corresponds with the minimum
12The GCR Index includes patents as well as other varieties of IPRs such as copyrights and trademarks.
13Economic Freedom of the World: 2001 Annual Report; Chapter 4.
14Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru.
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level of IPRs in a preliminary quadratic regression. (See Table A.2 in Appendix A.1.) The
majority of countries that demonstrate a decrease in their IPR index are middle-income
developing or already developed countries. This is an important point given that previous
theories postulate that it is the least developed countries that decrease IPRs as they grow.
Finally, ten of the fourteen countries with a decrease in IPRs over time are located in Latin
America. This fact suggests that there may be a regional effect coming into play between
IPRs and per capita GDP that may impact Latin American countries differently than the
rest of the world.15
Given the fact that only 14 out of 121 countries ever show a decrease in IPRs over time,
it can be concluded that, in general, IPRs within countries remain the same or increase
over time. Since economic development is embodied by increases in per capita income
over time, the strength of IPRs for a given country would expectedly remain the same or
increase as a country develops. Time series regressions on each country largely reject the
longitudinal U-shape proposed in past literature. Time series analysis is conducted even
though a complete set of time series data contains only eight data points, which is small and
lends to questionable asymptotic properties in estimation. In order to address the problems
brought about by the small sample size in time-series analysis, a longitudinal relationship
between IPRs and per capita GDP is later examined using the entire panel data set.
When time series regressions are run on the 102 countries that have a complete set of time
series data,16 only 24 countries17 report a significant quadratic relationship between IPRs
15Such regional influences may implicitly appear in the theoretical model via the institutional quality
variable. Institutional quality and institutional structure may vary between regions, resulting an a regional
impact in empirical analysis. It is also possible that there are region-wide changes in the political economy
for which a decrease in IPRs may result. Political economy “shocks” are not introduced into the theoretical
model, but they do provide an intuitive caveat for stable or increasing IPRs as a country develops. This
caveat will be emphasized throughout the paper. Nonetheless, there is not an explicit account of regional
influences in the theoretical model. Therefore, the significance of regional effects found in the empirical
longitudinal exploration explain more than what is presented in the theoretical model.
16A complete set of time series data would be data for 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000
as a result of limitations in the GP Index and per capita GDP data. Countries with less than the maximum
number of time series data points (eight data points) are omitted.
17Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, India, Italy, Mauritania, Nepal, New Zealand, Panama, Portugal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, and Tunisia. Note, only 101 of these 121 countries have enough data points
to run time series regressions.
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and logged per capita GDP at the 90 percent level. Only four countries–Bangladesh, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone–indicate a quadratic relationship that is significant at
the 99 percent level. The distinction in levels of significance is important as the quadratic
relationship for the entire panel data set has been consistently found at the 99 percent level
in past research.
The graphical representation of these four countries indicates that only Costa Rica and
Guatemala truly represent any downward swing in the strength of IPRs over time. Coinci-
dentally, the decrease in IPRs in 1970 corresponds with the collapse of the Central American
Common Market (CACM) of which both Costa Rica and Guatemala were members. This
link is significant as the CACM established IPR guidelines for member countries. In ad-
dition, the IPR index increases in both Costa Rica and Guatemala after that CACM was
reinstated in 1991. (Costa Rica shows an increase in 1995 and Guatemala in 2000.) This
suggests that the downward longitudinal swing of IPRs in these countries is a consequence
of a shift in the political economy rather than a consequence of development.
The graphs for Sierra Leone illustrate a curious relationship. While the strength of IPRs
in Sierra Leone remains constant or increases over time, IPRs decrease with respect to per
capita GDP. This suggests that per capita GDP in Sierra Leone is decreasing over time.
When considering the complete data set, thirteen African countries exhibit the anomaly that
per capita GDP is decreasing over time.18 Each of these thirteen countries, however, either
maintain or increase IPRs over time, but never decrease IPRs over time. This suggests that,
in these countries the choice in IPRs is not necessarily driven by their stage in development.
Accounting for sub-Saharan African countries in longitudinal analysis therefore becomes
very important.
While time series analysis supports the claim that individual countries generally maintain
or increase their IPRs as they develop, the small sample size is less than ideal. A maximum
of only eight data points is available for each country to analyze the time series regression
between IPRs and logged per capita GDP. As a result, methods to isolate the time-series
18Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana,
Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia.
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Figure 2.2: Selected Country Specific IPR Graphs
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effect in the panel data provide improved asymptotic qualities of the estimators and are,
therefore, worth exploring. This will be done first by looking at the IPR-per capita GDP
relationship while pooling together countries with similar time series characteristics. Then,
using the full panel of data, the choice in IPRs will be examined in the context of a fully
specified model, where independent variables other than per capita GDP are included in the
regression equation.
2.5.1 Pooled Data Analysis of the IPR-per capita GDP relationship
Most methods to isolate time effects in panel data impose a common per capita GDP
slope coefficient for all countries. There are regional specific characteristics, which were
discussed in the previous section, that suggest slope coefficients likely vary between certain
regions. Therefore, in this study countries in regions with similar characteristics are pooled
together, and slope coefficients vary between each pooled group.
To be more specific, the entire panel data set is divided into four pooled groups. The first
group includes countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean. As previously
stated, ten of the fourteen countries showing a decrease in the IPR Index over time were
from this region. Therefore, the pooled group of Latin America and the Caribbean will
capture the similarities in this geographical region. Countries in this region were specified
using the regional classifications of the United Nations.19
The second pooled group includes sub-Saharan African countries. Over a third of the
countries in this region exhibit a dominant downward trend in per capita GDP over time.20
Many of these countries continue to increase IPRs despite the decrease in per capita GDP.
This effect was exhibited in the graph of Sierra Leone presented in the previous section. As
with the regional classification of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the United Nations’
classification was used to identify countries to the sub-Saharan region. In this classification,
sub-Saharan Africa is designated as all of Africa except northern Africa, with the Sudan
19http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.
20Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana,
Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia.
25
included in sub-Saharan Africa.
The third pooled group consists of those countries for which there exist only two data
points: 1995 and 2000. These are mostly transitional, Eastern European economies, but also
include China and Vietnam. Specifically, only two data points are available for Bulgaria,
China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Ukraine, and Vietnam. It is possible that the limited time series in these countries,
as well as their sudden inclusion in 1995, at a time when IPRs were internationally on the
rise, may be skewing the panel results. The fourth and final group in the pooled analysis
includes all other countries not otherwise specified in one of the three previously mentioned
groups.
Table 2.1: Group Classification used in Pooled Regression Analysis
Group 1 Latin America & the Carribean
Group 2 Sub-Saharan Africa
Group 3 Transitional Economies, China, & Vietnam
Group 4 All Other Countries
Note: Transitional Economies, China, & Vietnam, are countries that
have a limited sample size for IPRs.
For each pooled group, an interaction term is created between per capita GDP and a
dummy variable, POOLi, that equals 1 for each Group j = i, and zero otherwise. This
allows each pooled group to have a different slope coefficient. Countries within groups
do not necessarily have similar intercepts, however. To account for country differences
within groups, each country is given its own intercept. In addition, year fixed effects are
included to capture difference between years. (Given that the estimation finds country
specific intercepts, intercepts for each pooled group are omitted.)
Equation (2.7) outlines the explicit form of the described estimation procedure.
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IPRkt =αk + αt +
4∑
i=1




2 ∗ POOLi) + εkt;
where,
POOLi
 = 1 if Group j = i;= 0 if Group j 6= i (2.7)
where αk is the country specific intercept term and αt is the year specific intercept term.
Results for the pooled regression are found in Table 2.2. As shown in column I, none of
the groups exhibit a significant U-shape. In fact, the coefficients on the rest of the world
(Group 4) instead tell a story more along the lines of a diminishing marginal choice in the
strength of IPRs as a country develops. This is particularly encouraging as Group 4 contains
382 of the 840 total observations in the pooled regression.
Overall, accounting for variation in slope coefficients for the four specified groups enables
the longitudinal effects in panel data to be better isolated. The results of the pooled regres-
sions do not provide support for a longitudinal U-shape relationship. In the next section,
the longitudinal relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP will be examined in more
detail by considering a fully specified choice equation for IPRs.
2.6 The Fully Specified Model
The objective of the fully specified model is to account better for the variety of factors
that influence a country’s choice in IPRs. A fully specified model leads itself to a more
accurate longitudinal interpretation of panel data. The first step of the process is to identify
a more complete list of variables that influence a country’s choice in IPRs.
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Table 2.2: Pooled Regression Using Panel Data
I II
Group 1 log(pc GDP) 0.32 0.27**
(0.24) (2.28)
Group 1 [log(pc GDP)]2 -0.01
(-0.07)
Group 2 log(pc GDP) 0.12 -0.02
(0.28) (-0.33)
Group 2 [log(pc GDP)]2 -0.01
(-0.34)
Group 3 log(pc GDP) -0.10 0.92***
(-0.02) (1.68)
Group 3 [log(pc GDP)]2 0.07
(0.25)
Group 4 log(pc GDP) 0.49* 0.42*
(11.50) (33.21)


















Note: Group 1 is Latin America & the Caribbean with a sample size of
180. Group 2 is sub-Saharan Africa with a sample size of 256. Group 3
are economies for which IPR data is limited to two data points (this includes
Eastern European Transitional Economies, China, and Vietnam) with a sam-
ple size of 22. Group 4 is the rest of the world not otherwise included in
Groups 1 through 3 and has a sample size of 382. t-statistics are in paren-
thesis ; ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance;
Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. Individual country
intercepts are included in the estimation procedure, but are not reported.
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2.6.1 Estimating IPRs
Numerous variables impact a country’s choice in IPRs. A country’s choice in IPRs
may depend not only on their level of development (or per capita GDP), but also on their
level of openness and institutional quality. Proxies for each of these factors are included as
regressors in the IPR equation and will be discussed further in a moment. In addition, a
country’s choice in IPRs may vary depending on their regional association. Latin American
and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern European Transitional Economies
(including China and Vietnam) are the three regions with unique links that have already
been discussed.21 Dummy variables for these regions are therefore included in the fully
specified model. Finally, time fixed effects are also included so to capture variation in the
IPR choice related to a certain year. To summarize, the full specification of the IPR equation
is as follows:
IPRit =β1 log(yit) + β2[log(yit)]2 + β3 log(opennessit) (2.8)
+β4 log(institutional qualityit) + β5Latini + β6Africai + β7Transitionali + εit.
Openness
The impact of openness to trade on a country’s level of IPRs is ambiguous. It is possible
that the more open a country is to trade, the stronger IPRs will be in order to entice high
technology goods. On the other hand, greater openness may occur in hopes of imitating
high technology goods, which would result in expectedly weak IPRs.
A country’s level of openness to trade depends on such things as tariffs, quotas, and
exchange controls. However, it is difficult to measure openness in a way that is not endoge-
nous with per capita GDP. The “Freedom to Trade Internationally” Index mitigates the
possibility of endogeneity. “Freedom to Trade Internationally” is a subindex included in the
21China and Vietnam are included in regional classification for Transitional Economies as all these countries
are limited to two data points in the GP IPR Index.
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Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index (to be discussed in more detail in
the below section on institutional quality). “Freedom to Trade Internationally” is estimated
using equally weighted data on the following five areas: (1) taxes on international trade, (2)
regulatory trade barriers such as non-tariff barriers, (3) the actual size of the trade sector
compared to expected trade sector, (4) the difference between the official exchange rate and
the black market rate, and (5) international capital market controls. Thus, this measure of
openness captures many desirable aspects that are often difficult to quantify without using
per capita GDP.
Institutional Quality
Institutional quality is a term used to describe a country’s ability to sustain sound
economic practices given their economic and political environment. Institutional quality is
sometimes approximated using a broad measure for economic freedom. This has been the
case in past literature analyzing IPRs.
There are two widely used indices of economic freedom: (1) The Economic Freedom of
the World Index created by the Fraser Institute, and (2) The Index of Economic Freedom
created by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. Chen and Puttitanun
(2005) used the former in their previous research into the U-shape. The Economic Freedom
of the World Index accounts for five different factors: (1) size of government as measured
by expenditures, taxes, and enterprizes, (2) legal structure and security of property rights,
(3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of credit,
labor, and business.22 The index ranges from zero to ten, with ten embodying complete
economic freedom. Beginning in 1995 a measure for intellectual property right protection
was included in the calculations of group 2. Therefore, using the Economic Freedom of the
World Index as a regressor in my estimation equation would be erroneous.
In addition to having a limited data range (with data available only beginning in 1996),
the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom also perpetuates simultaneity with
the IPR measure. The Index of Economic Freedom is comprised of ten freedoms: Busi-
22www.freetheworld.com.
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ness, Trade, Fiscal, Freedom from Government, Monetary, Investment, Financial, Property
Rights, Freedom from Corruption, and Labor Freedom. While the Heritage Foundation is
not specific about what goes into their calculations for property rights, the sources they
use to comprise data in this category are similar to those used in the Economic Freedom
of the World Index. This fact is a red flag that using either of these two indices of eco-
nomic freedom would bias my estimates. Using an index that, in part, measures a country’s
IPRs to approximate that country’s IPRs violate the non-collinearity assumption among
independent variables.
It is now apparent that, due to the breadth of categories included in economic freedom,
such a measure will likely be correlated with a country’s choice of IPRs. As a consequence,
it is better to narrow the focus of institutional quality from the wide-ranging concept of
economic freedom to those components of institutional quality that directly impact IPRs.
These include rule of law, physical property rights, and the existence of a sound business
environment.
Rule of law and physical property rights will have a clear consequence on a country’s
IPRs, but likely not the other way around. A country will only have incentive to implement
IPRs if they know such laws will be adequately enforced and not overpowered by corruption.
In addition, laws for physical property rights provide the precursor for laws for intellectual
property rights. Thus stronger physical property rights suggest the onset of stronger IPRs.
(Note, the direction of casualty is from physical property rights to IPRs.) Measures for rule
of law and physical property rights can be calculated by removing the IPR measure from
“legal structure and property rights” component of the Economic Freedom of the World
Index.
A sound business environment supports innovation and IPR related growth.23 Without
sound business environment, firms’ ability to innovate, as well as the benefits from innova-
tion, will be stunted. Component 5 of the Economic Freedom of the World Index, which
measures the “regulation of credit, labor, and business” effectively captures the sound busi-
23PCIPD recognizes the importance of a sound business environment and institutions in reaping potential
benefits for strong IPRs in developing countries; PCIPD, page 4.
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ness environment critical to institutional quality. Thus, the measure of institutional quality
used in the empirical estimations of this paper combine rule of law, physical property rights,
and business environment.
2.6.2 Endogeneity of IPRs and per capita GDP
Although the key relationship of interest is how IPRs are affected by levels of per capita
GDP, the causality also works in the other direction: per capita GDP is a function of
IPRs. Countries with stronger IPRs may generate more output and lead to more economic
growth. Ginarte and Park (1997) acknowledge problems pertaining to simultaneity, but they
did not account for it in their empirical analysis. Although Chen and Puttitanun (2005) do
incorporate a two-stage regression in their evaluation of the U relationship, they estimate
IPRs in the first stage and then estimate innovation as a function of IPRs in the second
stage.
Since CP model innovation to be dependent on income levels, their endogenous rela-
tionship is similar to the simultaneity of IPRs and income used in this paper. However,
the two-stage model CP used does not account for all the possible effects that IPRs could
have on income. Intellectual property protection in a country not only impacts domestic
innovation, but also affects things such as the country’s attractiveness to foreign companies.
A direct endogenous relationship between income and IPRs is therefore considered in this
paper.
In the case of simultaneous equations, the IPR equation will be estimated using a two-
stage least squares, instrumental variables approach. The next step, then, is to identify the
estimating equation for the included endogenous variable, per capita GDP.
2.6.3 Estimating per capita GDP
Per capita GDP in a given period depends upon physical capital, population, human
capital, and the level of intellectual property rights. Greater levels of physical and human
capital would expectedly lead to higher levels of output. Similarly, countries with stronger
IPRs may generate more output and lead to more economic growth. Population, on the
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other hand, expectedly has a negative relationship with per capita GDP. This relationship
between per capita GDP and the mentioned explanatory variables can be captured in a
traditional Cobb-Douglas production function as demonstrated below.





















log(yit) = logAit + α1 logKit + (α2 − 1) logPopit + α3 logHit + γIPRit + εit (2.9)
where Yit = output for country i at time t;
Popit = Population;
Kit = Physical capital stock;
yit = per capita GDP;
Hit = Human capital as approximated by tertiary school enrollment rates
IPRit = Index of IPR strength.
In the two-stage estimation, human capital is approximated by tertiary school enrollment
rates. Data on tertiary school enrollment rates is available on the UNESCO web site.24 IPR
strength is approximated by the GP IPR Index discussed previously. Data on per capita
GDP (in constant 2000 US dollars) and total population are obtained from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI).
24Recent data on tertiary school enrollment rates is available on UN-
ESCO’s main web site. Historical data on school enrollment is available at
http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/indicators/i pages/indic 5.htm.
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Data on physical capital stock between 1960 and 1990 is available from Nehru and
Dhareshwar (1995). This data is provided in the domestic country’s currency in constant
1987 prices. In order to make cross-country comparisons of capital stock, the Nehru and
Dhareshwar data was converted into constant 1987 US dollars by using the average period
market exchange rate obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
In addition, capital stock for the years since 1990 (for which Nehru and Dhareshwar data
is unavailable) was estimated using gross capital formation data as provided by the World
Bank’s WDI database.
Expanding the Capital Stock
Data on gross capital formation in constant local currency units is available from the
World Bank’s online WDI database. The first step in expanding the capital stock data is
to convert gross capital formation into constant 1987 US dollars by using the GDP defla-
tor.25 The GDP deflator was obtained from the WDI database. After compatible data on
gross capital formation was calculated, the capital stock was expanded using the following
equation for the evolution of capital stock:
Ki,t+1 = Ki,t(1− δi) + Gross Capital Formationi,t+1
where δi represents the average capital depreciation rate specific to each country. This
country specific capital depreciation rate corresponds to the ten-year average rate of capital
depreciation in a specific country for the years 1981 to 1990 (i.e. the last ten years for which
capital stock data from Nehru and Dhareshwar was available). This ten year average was
calculated using capital stock data from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1995) and gross capital
formation from the WDI database.
2.6.4 Specification of the System of Equations
The complete specification of the system of equations is as follows:
25The base year in local currency units varies across countries.
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IPR Choice : IPRit =β1 log(yit) + β2[log(yit)]2 + β3 log(opennessit)
+β4 log(institutional qualityit) + β5Latini + β6Africai
+β7Transitionali + εit.
Production : log yit = logAit + α1 log(Kit) + (α2 − 1) log(Popit) + α3 log(Hit) + γIPRit + µit.
A two stage least squares procedure is used to estimate the above equations. Since the
IPR Choice equation is of primary interest to address the first hypothesis of this paper,
predicted values of logged per capita output are used to estimate the IPR equation. The
two stage least squares procedure is necessary because, as previously discussed, per capita
GDP and IPRs are simultaneously determined. This presents a problem for estimation as
per capita GDP is an endogenous variable in the IPR equation. In other words E[per capita
GDP*εit] 6= 0 (or E[εit | per capita GDP] 6= 0).26
The condition for identification of an equation states that the number of exogenous vari-
ables excluded from the IPR equation must be at least as large as the number of endogenous
variables included in the IPR equation. In this case:
Included endogenous variables: log(yit), (log(yit))2
Excluded exogenous variables:Kit, Popit,Hit.
indicating that the system of simultaneous equations are over-identified. Over or exact-
identification is a necessary condition for two stage least squares estimation.
The excluded exogenous variables in the per capita GDP equation serve as instruments
in the two stage least squares estimation procedure. Empirical tests support the validity of
physical capital stock, population, and human capital as instruments in the IPR equation27
26E[x*εit] = 0 is an assumption of OLS estimation models, which must hold in order to ensure consistency
and unbiasedness of the estimators. Another way to state this identity is the E[ε | x] = 0.
27All equations in columns I through IV are over-identified. In addition, standard errors have been corrected
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2.6.5 Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics for all variables are found in Table 2.3, while Table 2.4 presents a
correlation matrix of the variables used.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
IPR 2.48 0.93 0 5 903
log(per capita GDP) 7.47 1.60 4.03 10.71 840
log(Institutional Quality) 1.66 0.30 0.14 2.22 590
log(Openness) 1.76 0.32 0.51 2.28 656
log(Population) 15.99 1.56 11.41 20.96 886
log(Capital Stock) 25.82 4.23 20.19 49.65 655
log(Tertiary) 1.85 1.49 -2.30 4.55 716
Table 2.4: Correlation Matrix
IPR log(pc GDP) log(Open) log(Ins.Q.) log(Pop) log(K) log(Ter.)
IPR 1
log(pc GDP) 0.4802 1
log(Inst.Qual.) 0.5112 0.5946 1
log(Openness) 0.4159 0.5333 0.6124 1
log(Population) 0.0168 -0.1878 -0.0656 -0.1138 1
log(K Stock) 0.1063 0.3286 0.1825 0.1422 0.348 1
log(Tertiary) 0.3035 0.7796 0.4523 0.4639 0.0686 0.3247 1
Table 2.5 provides the results of the two-stage estimation procedure for the fully specified
model. In addition to the variables shown in Table 2.5, each regression also accounts for time
fixed effects. As columns II and IV indicate, there no longer exists a U-shape relationship
between IPRs and per capita GDP in the fully specified model. Also notice that while
the openness and institutional quality variables are positive and statistically insignificant,
including them in columns III and IV shows little change in the slope coefficients for the
other variables when compared to columns I and II, respectively. This creates confidence
that the signs and significance levels of the per capita GDP variables are robust.
The results indicate that the U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP is
using White’s correction method. As a result, Hansen’s J-statistic can be used to test the validity of the
instruments. A low Hansen J-statistic indicates that you cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded
instruments are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term in the IPR equation). The J-statistics for the
two-stage least squares regression in columns I through IV of Table 2.5 indicate that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected and therefore lead to the conclusion that the excluded exogenous variables in the per
capita GDP equation–physical capital stock, population, and human capital–serve as valid instruments.
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Table 2.5: Choice of IPRs: The Fully Specified Model
(Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation)
I II III IV
log(pc GDP) 0.38* 1.86 0.29* 1.47
(8.98) (0.78) (5.27) (0.58)






sub-Saharan Africa 0.64* 0.74* 0.66* 0.74*
(5.74) (3.65) (5.22) (3.19)
Latin America -0.51* -0.74** -0.56* -0.71**
(-7.50) (-2.00) (-7.43) (-2.18)
Transitional Economies -0.69** -0.87** -0.86* -0.95*
(-2.40) (-2.26) (-2.97) (-2.84)
Constant -0.17 -5.57 -0.52*** -5.08
(-0.21) (-0.84) (-1.78) (-0.52)
N 513 513 425 425
Uncentered R-squared 0.9439 0.9385 0.9578 0.9510
Note: The above results reflect a two-stage least squares, instrumental vari-
ables approach to account for the simultaneity between IPRs and per capita
GDP. Year dummy variables are also included in the estimation procedure of
each of the above regressions. The comparison group for regional effects is
the “rest of the world.” z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance,
∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance. Standard errors have been
adjusted using White’s correction.
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statistically insignificant. Attention will now turn to exploring the whether a cross-sectional
U-shape link exists between IPRs and per capita GDP.
2.7 A Cross-Sectional Explanation for the U-shape
If the panel data set is broken down by year into eight different cross-sectional data sets
(one for 1965, 1970,..., 1995, 2000), the simple IPR-per capita GDP regression consistently
demonstrates the U-shape configuration. (See Table 2.6.) In each year there exists a sta-
tistically significant cross-sectional U.28 At the very least, this empirical result supports the
possibility that cross-sectional influences are driving the simple U-shape observed in past
literature between IPRs and per capita GDP in panel data.
Table 2.6: Cross Section of IPRs for Each Available Year
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
log(pc GDP) -1.14* -1.60* -1.70* -2.17* -1.67** -1.86* -1.42* -1.02**
(-2.63) (-3.76) (-4.56) (-4.35) (-2.36) (-2.95) (-3.05) (-2.53)
log(pc GDP)2 0.09* 0.12* 0.12* 0.16* 0.13* 0.14* 0.11* 0.08*
(3.04) (4.22) (4.97) (4.91) (2.84) (3.47) (3.79) (3.24)
constant 5.68* 7.37* 7.81* 9.39* 7.49* 8.28* 6.83* 5.88*
(3.66) (4.80) (5.86) (5.03) (2.77) (3.42) (3.81) (3.81)
N 91 96 100 104 106 106 119 118
R2 0.2125 0.2648 0.2720 0.3391 0.3021 0.3244 0.3814 0.3465
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors have been adjusted using White’s correction.
Examining the best fit quadratic line for each cross-sectional regression reveals that the
U-shape is similar in each case. This is particularly true for the years 1965, 1970, 1975,
1980, 1985, and 1990, for which the best fit U-shape line are close to overlapping, with a
slight shift to the right in up in each subsequent period. This trend satisfies the previous
notion that once countries have IPRs in place they either maintain them or increase them
as they develop, indicating that any existing cross-sectional U-shape should exhibit a shift
28Each cross-section was also tested including the regional dummy variables found to be important in the
longitudinal analysis. The squared per capita GDP term remains positive and statistically significant in 6 of
the 8 cross-sectional years. The results for the cross-sectional years including regional dummy variables can
be found in Appendix A.5.
38
right and up over time. The cross-sectional U for 1995 and 2000 are distinct as they exhibit
a minimum IPR point that is much higher than those in previous years.
Now that it has been shown that in year cross-sectional year a U-shape relationship
between IPRs and per capita GDP is statistically significant, the next step is to address
whether the U-shape relationship is logical for a cross section of countries. It is postulated
that the rationale for a cross-sectional U lies partially in the fact that countries respond
differently to international pressures to implement strong IPRs. This postulate will be
explored in greater detail in the next sections.
2.7.1 The Role of International Pressure in IPR Choice
Historically there has been tremendous pressure for developing countries, even the least
developed countries, to implement policies that protect intellectual property. The large num-
ber of international arrangements to strengthen IPRs exemplifies this pressure. One of the
first international standards for patent protection occurred at the Paris Convention in 1883.
Since that time, many developed countries have pushed hard for a new, robust international
code. This is exemplified by the numerous treaties administered by the World Intellectual
Property Right Organization (WIPO), an agency of the United Nations.29 However, noth-
ing illustrates the movement towards universally strong IPRs more than the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement that came into existence af-
ter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1986 to 1994 Uruguay Round.30
The TRIPS Agreement outlines detailed procedures for implementing and enforcing various
types of intellectual property rights.
Regardless of such agreements from international organizations it remains up to each
country to formulate and enforce their own domestic policies on IPRs. Developed countries
have been systematically quicker than developing countries at establishing the IPR regimes
outlined in international agreements such as the Paris Convention and TRIPS. In many
29WIPO has administered 24 treaties related to intellectual property rights.
30The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the successor to the GATT and is largely established by the
rules and regulations determined during the Uruguay Round. The TRIPS Agreement is now maintained
under the WTO.
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cases, the quality of institutions in developing countries has slowed the implementation of
recommended IPR regulations. In addition, the incentives for implementing strong IPRs
are less apparent for developing countries that traditionally rely on imitation rather than
innovation to stimulate growth.
Political Economy Support
The political economy literature on intellectual property rights supports the assertion
that developing countries experience pressures from developed countries to put in place
strong patent policies in line with those outlined in international agreements. Perez Pugatch
(2004) addresses the possible reasons why developing countries, which are assumed to have
weak innovative capabilities, would adopt strong IPR regimes. He considers the possibility
that developing countries may benefit from increased trade in intellectual property-related
goods and increased technology transfer, but concludes that the justification of these ar-
guments is weak and problematic.31 Instead, Perez Pugatch concludes that the political
reason that developing countries adopt strong IPR regimes is to avoid trade retaliation from
developed countries that desire strong international IPR codes.
Industrialized countries have clear incentives for wanting universally strong IPRs as they
expand their range of secure market access. Perfect international intellectual property pro-
tection would mean that the patentee possessed worldwide monopoly power over production
and trade of the patented good. According to Perez Pugatch, “(a) country with strong IP
capabilities will benefit from entering an international IP system as it essentially becomes
an exporter of IP products. This in turn will improve its terms of trade and will increase its
national income.”32 Since most innovation is conducted by industrialized economies, devel-
oped countries have consequently pressured developing countries to implement strong IPR
regimes.
Developing countries may find the social cost to abstaining from a strong international
IPR code to be high, as refusal to comply may result in trade retaliation from developed
31Perez Pugatch, page 72.
32Perez Pugatch, page 49.
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countries with strong IPR capabilities. Perez Pugatch (2004) makes the following claim.
...(A) political economy oriented explanation...suggests that trade retaliation
may be considered an important factor in the decisions of countries (mostly, but
not only, those countries with weak IP capabilities) to support a stronger IP
agenda. It is based on the assumption that the threat of trade retaliation may
significantly affect the way in which countries, particularly those that are linked
to the economies of countries with strong IP legislation, assess the costs and
benefits of joining an international IP system. Most important is the potential
loss of trade revenues that a country may face due to trade retaliation. (page
65)
Such trade retaliation was visibly effective in the case of Switzerland, which implemented
national patent legislation in 1888 largely as a result of pressures from Germany. Switzerland
later expanded its patent coverage in 1907 to include processes, after Germany announced
it would raise import duties on Swiss coal-tar dyestuffs if the Swiss patent law was not
amended (Perez Pugatch 2004; Penrose 1951).
The United States and European Community are often believed to have used trade
retaliation during the Uruguay Round to force developing countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, South Korea, and India to implement national patent policies agreed upon under
the GATT/WTO (which were later embodied by the TRIPS Agreement).33 Credible threats
included (1) denying developing countries access to the General System of Preferences and
(2) using section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
to allow the United States to take punitive action against imports from countries that the
United States believed violated IPRs (Perez Pugatch 2004; Treibilcock and Howse 1995).
Brazil and South Korea experienced pressures via US claims of section 301 violation of patent
protected pharmaceutical products. Implementation and amendment of patent legislation
in these countries was the ultimate result.
In conclusion, there is support in the political economy literature that developing coun-
tries have adopted strong national IPR regimes as a result of hegemonic pressures from the
large industrialized countries. Nonetheless, it is unfair to suggest that developing countries
receive no direct benefit from strengthening their IPR regimes. Instead, it is likely that
33Perez Pugatch (2004); as cited in Gadbaw and Richards (1988); Abbott (1989); and Emmert (1990).
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developing countries choose IPR strength based on some combination of international pres-
sures as well as in hopes that an IPR regime will stimulate growth. Briggs (2008a) explores
whether stronger IPRs in developing countries stimulate their export activity. The acqui-
sition of IPRs in developing countries was found to have a significantly positive impact on
developing country exports, suggesting a possible link between IPR policies and outward
oriented development policies.
Although the benefit of strong IPR regimes in developing countries via trade and technol-
ogy transfer appears ambiguous,34 there is an undeniable faction that advocates that strong
IPRs stimulate economic development. In fact, the Permanent Committee on Cooperation
for Development Related to Intellectual Property (PCIPD) is a branch of WIPO dedicated
solely to educating developing countries on how appropriate adoption and implementation
of IPRs can fuel growth. PCIPD proposes that implementing strong IPRs concurrently
with policies to modernize infrastructure and implement sound business, academic, and in-
stitutional environments can increase developing countries’ ability to “acquir(e) technology,
creat(e) intellectual property assets and generat(e) income and employment.”35 Countries
that were most hopeful (or desperate!) to achieve such benefits may have been more willing
to yield to pressures from the developed world to implement strong IPRs.
The International Vulnerability Hypothesis for the Cross-Sectional U
From the above discussion, the U-shaped link between IPRs and per capita GDP can be
explained as a consequence of cross sectional forces rather than longitudinal forces. These
cross sectional outcomes are generated as a result of developing countries’ varied responses
to international pressures to adopt strong IPR regimes in the presence of domestic vul-
nerability to trade retaliation.36 Given the dependence of the poorest countries on the
34Technology transfer is embodied in FDI, licensing, and joint ventures.
35 World Intellectual Property Organization; Permanent Committee on Cooperation for Development
Related to Intellectual Property. “Overview of Policy Directions, Priority Areas and Projects in WIPO’s
Support of the Development Objectives of Developing Countries.” Fourth Session, Geneva, April 14 and 15,
2005.
36The vulnerability to trade retaliation is captured later in empirical analysis by taking into account the
value of a country’s exports to developed countries.
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international community, these countries were the least resistant to pressures to implement
IPR regimes. In addition, the poorest countries were also the most hopeful that strong IPRs
would stimulate growth, thereby putting in place relatively stronger IPR regimes.
Countries with slightly higher per capita levels of income were better able to stand up
against international pressures and implemented relatively weak IPR regimes that they feel
better suited their desires and ability to imitate. These mid-range developing countries may
have had a less dismal outlook on their country’s ability to develop on its own and, as a
result, had incentives to maintain some autonomy in their decision making about IPRs. As
a result, one would expect IPRs in middle-income developing countries to be slightly weaker.
This variability in response to differing degrees of vulnerability as well as international
pressures to implement strong IPRs is a possible explanation for the downward portion
of the U-shape in a cross section of countries for a given period in time. Given greater
innovative activity in industrializing and developing countries, these countries choose to
adopt increasingly strong IPRs to correspond with domestic innovative activities. From
this point forward, the hypothesis that the cross-sectional U-shape between IPRs and per
capita GDP is a consequence of countries’ varied responses to pressure and vulnerability to
implement strong IPRs will be referred to as the “International Vulnerability Hypothesis.”
Testing the International Vulnerability Hypothesis
The next step is to test empirically the International Vulnerability Hypothesis as the
driving factor in the cross-sectional U-shape. In doing so, it is important to isolate the
IPR-per capita GDP pair corresponding to a country’s “first” choice in IPRs. Due to in-
consistencies in data on the year countries implemented their first IP law, it is assumed
that a country “first” chooses to implement IPRs in the year that it joined the first inter-
national IPR agreement – the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention took place in 1883,
with membership beginning in 1884. The Paris Convention set in place the first minimum
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standard for patent protection.37
Data on the year each country decided to participate in the Paris Convention is provided
on the WIPO’s web site.38 For example, the United Kingdom agreed to the Paris Convention
contract in 1884, the United States in 1887, Argentina in 1967, and Botswana in 1998. The
critical IPR-per capita GDP pairs for each country correspond to those years. Due to data
limitations on per capita GDP, which is available beginning in 1965, critical data pairs
corresponding to years prior to 1965 are approximated by using 1965 data point (i.e. the
first available year). In addition, data limitations on the GP Index, which is available every
five years beginning in 1960, means that data points must be rounded up to the closest 5th
year. For example, although Argentina agreed to the Paris Convention in 1967, the critical
data point for Argentina corresponds to the IPR-per capita GDP pair in 1970. Similarly,
although Botswana agreed to the Paris Convention in 1998, the critical data point for
Botswana corresponds to the IPR-per capita GDP pair in 2000. A list of all critical IPR-
per capita GDP pairs can be found in Appendix A.4.39 A summary of the number of
observations in each critical year can be found in Table 2.7.
The resulting data set is comprised of IPR-per capita GDP pairs that approximate the
onset of a country’s commitment to the international patent standards. The year in which
countries’ responded to the call to join the Paris Convention was two-fold. First, there
were those countries that initially advocated for the Paris Convention and joined at its
implementation. Advocating countries were largely European nations with strong political
relationships to countries in other regions as a result of colonial ties. Non-European and
37Once a country decides to participate in the Paris Convention and becomes an active member in an
international intellectual property agreement, it is expected to maintain the minimum standards outlined by
the Convention. Article 25 of the Paris Convention states that, in order to be a participating member, a
country party must take action at the domestic level to ensure the implementation and enforcement of the
rules and regulations outlined by the constitution agreed upon in the Paris Convention. Once IPR laws are
in place they often time intensive and costly to reverse. Therefore, once a country agrees to participate in
the Paris Convention it is counterintuitive to expect that it would actively weaken its IPRs (banning any
major institutional or revolutionary regime shift).
38http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/
39Nepal, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have critical pairs after 2000. As a result, the critical pair is rounded
down to 2000 so to keep the sample size as large as possible. (Data for IPRs is not available for 2005, so
rounding up would omit these country data point.)
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Table 2.7: Composition of the Critical Cross-Section of Years









non-colony countries may not have felt such a strong push to enter into an international IP
agreement, especially if there was little domestic innovation to make the benefits obvious.
Instead, these countries’ willingness to comply with continuing international pressures to
join the Paris Convention and implement IPRs was, in part, related to their vulnerability
to pressures to join. Although this vulnerability could take various forms, fear of trade
retaliation is the form best supported by the political economy literature.
Independent variables are included to test the vulnerability of countries to participate in
the Paris Convention, as outlined by the International Vulnerability Hypothesis. To mirror
the story of vulnerability, two regressors will be included in the estimating equation. First,
a dummy variable is created for European countries and countries with close colonial ties to
the United Kingdom. This variable captures those countries that likely the most vulnerable
to agree to a universal IP code from the movement’s onset. Use of this dummy variable is
validated by the fact that all 22 non-transitional European countries in the data set have
the critical IPR-per capita GDP pair in the first available year, 1965, as do 14 of 33 (or
42 percent of) countries with colonial ties to the United Kingdom. This variable is labeled
Euro & UKC in the below tables.
The second regressor looks at the vulnerability felt by non-European and non-UK colony
countries to implement strong IPRs as a consequence of their reliance on trade with indus-
trialized countries. The greater a country’s exports to developed countries as a percent of
GDP, the more dependent that country is on stable trade relations for growth and, therefore,
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the more vulnerable that country is to pressures from industrialized countries. In order to
capture this “vulnerability” to trade retaliation, a second regressor is included that measures
non-European and non-UK colony country exports (as a percent of total GDP) to indus-
trialized countries.40 Bilateral export data for this variable was obtained from the United
Nations Commodity Trade Database and converted into constant 2000 $US using Consumer
Price Index available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). GDP
in constant 2000 $US was also obtained from WDI. This dummy variable is labeled log(X
to Dev) in the below tables.
Multicollinearity exists between the two measures of vulnerability, Euro & UKC and
log(X to Dev). This is because the first variable is a dummy for European and UK colonies,
while the second variable considers exports in non-European and non-UK colonized coun-
tries. Two empirical tests support the existence of multicollinearity. First, there is an
88 percent pairwise correlation between the two variables. Second, the variance inflation
factor approaches eight when both variables are included in the estimating equation, also
signalling possible multicollinearity. As the second test suggests, the problem with multi-
collinearity between regressors is that it inflates the standard errors of the guilty regressors,
thereby causing the t-statistic to be artificially low. This can often lead to insignificance in
variables that would otherwise yield statistical significance. A common way of dealing with
multicollinearity in regressors is to omit one of the variables. Thus, empirical results testing
the International Vulnerability Hypothesis are preferred when only one of “vulnerability”
regressors is included in the estimation process.
Results for the critical cross section are found in Table 2.8. An OLS regression both
with and without time trends supports that this critical cross section possesses the U-shape
relationship between IPRs and logged per capita GDP that is in question. In addition, in the
absence of multicollinearity there is a statistically positive impact for both the Europe and
Colony Dummy and the measure of exports to industrialized countries by non-Europe and
non-colony countries. These results indicate that the vulnerability measures are statistically
40Industrialized countries were classified as such by using the World Bank’s high-income criteria of per
capita GNI of $10,726 in 2005.
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significant and positive in influencing a country’s choice in IPRs in the year that they first
decide to implement IPRs (as approximated by the year they join the Paris Convention).
Notice that the U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP remains statis-
tically significant throughout columns III through VI. This suggests that, while a country’s
vulnerability to implement strong IPRs significantly impacts their choice in IPRs, vulner-
ability is only a piece of the puzzle. Accounting for vulnerability is not enough to explain
the entire per capita GDP U-shape in the critical cross-section of years.41
In addition, the positive sign on the year dummy variables suggests that the choice in
IPRs is generally greater in a given year compared to the IPR choice in 1965 than can be
explained by a country’s level of per capita GDP or international vulnerability. While the
positive coefficient is not always significant, this sign suggests that IPR choice is generally
greater in the years to follow 1965. The year 1970 is one consistent exception, as the
coefficient for this year is negative, but not statistically significant.
Before continuing further, a few additional notes about the data used to estimate the
results in Table 2.8 should be made. Papua New Guinea and Mozambique both have an IPR
index of zero in the critical year. This result is clearly a discrepancy between the WIPO
data and the GP Index, which states that membership in the international Paris Convention
treaty is a contributory element of the index.42 Given the discrepancies in the data, it is
assumed that computational errors exist for these countries and therefore data points are
omitted from the analysis of the International Vulnerability Hypothesis. In addition, with
an IPR index of 0.33, Indonesia is a strong outlier in the data set, thereby biasing the results.
This fact is exemplified in the below box plot.43 As a result, Indonesia is omitted form the
41If the vulnerability measure did explain the entire U-shape, the coefficients on per capita GDP and per
capita GDP squared would expectedly be insignificant.
42Mozambique and Papua New Guinea have a GP Index value of zero for all years.
43A box plot is a visual tool used to identify outliers. The rectangular portion of the box plot represents
the inter-quartile range (from the lower quartile, Q1, to the upper quartile, Q3). The line in the middle of
the box represents the median point. Points that lie more than 1.5 times the inter quartile range below Q1
or 1.5 times the inter quartile range above Q3 are considered to be outliers. These points are identified as
dots that fall beyond the “whiskers” of the box plot.
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Table 2.8: Critical Cross Sectional IPR Decision
I II III IV V VI
log(pc GDP) -0.84** -0.79** -0.72** -0.69** -1.15** -1.06**
(-2.52) (-2.39) (-2.16) (-2.10) (-2.34) (-2.13)
[log(pc GDP)]2 0.06* 0.06* 0.05** 0.05** 0.08* 0.08**
(2.79) (2.73) (2.33) (2.35) (2.53) (2.41)
Euro & UKC 0.25** 0.23***
(2.00) (1.79)
log(X to Dev) 0.06** 0.05***
(2.49) (1.73)
1970 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13
(-0.32) (-0.03) (-0.62)
1975 0.02 -0.00 0.07
(0.06) (-0.01) (0.16)
1980 0.50* 0.46* 0.53*
(4.04) (2.92) (2.67)
1985 0.62** 0.63* 0.64***
(2.31) (2.97) (1.68)
1990 0.24** 0.12 0.24***
(2.42) (1.08) (1.88)
1995 0.22 0.23 0.25
(0.38) (1.65) (1.53)
2000 0.08 0.08 0.10
(0.38) (0.36) (0.40)
constant 5.16* 4.78* 4.74* 4.41* 6.44* 5.86*
(4.51) (0.38) (4.11) (3.94) (3.69) (3.22)
N 97 97 97 97 74 74
R2 0.13000 0.2048 0.1697 0.2375 0.2795 0.3542
Note: Euro & UKC= dummy variable = 1 if the country is in the Europe
Region or has colonial ties to the United Kingdom. log(X to Dev) is the
logged value of exports to developed countries for all non-European and non-
UK colony countries. The comparison year for the year dummies is 1965.
t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗∗∗ = 90% significance. These results exclude Indonesia, Papua New Guinea,
and Mozambique. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction.
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analysis as well.44
The fitted lines in the scatter plot of the critical cross section of countries, as shown
in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5, take the general form of the fitted lines in the scatter plot
for the entire panel data set, as shown in Figure 2.6. In addition, the minimum value in
the cross sectional critical values is approximately US$665 (in constant 2000 US$), which is
comparable to the minimum value of US$785 in the entire panel data set.
Figure 2.3: Box Plot of IPRs showing Indonesia as an Outlier
The data restrictions on per capita GDP and IPR pairs generate a possible problem
in evaluating the critical values that make-up the International Vulnerability Hypothesis’
cross-sectional U-shape. Recall that per capita GDP is unavailable prior to 1965. Therefore
any countries who joined the Paris Convention prior to 1965 have an approximated critical
IPR-per capita GDP pair at the first available year, which is 1965.45 Such rounding is
consistent with estimation for later years for countries that joined the Paris Convention on
or after 1961. However, considering that the Paris Convention was instituted in 1884,46
44The Indonesia outlier is not sensitive to the year Indonesia chosen, as Indonesia has an IPR index of 0.33
for the years 1965 through 1990. Since Indonesia’s critical year is 1965, the timing of the critical year would
not likely effect the fact that Indonesia’s critical point serves as an outlier. It should also be mentioned that,
in the complete panel data set (for which all data points are used) there do not exist any outlier IPR-per
capita GDP pairs. This includes Indonesia.
45This rounding assumption is actually consistent with approximation of the more current year for countries
that joined the Paris Convention on or after 1961.
46Recall that the Paris Convention was agreed to in 1883, but the implementation of the Paris Convention
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Figure 2.4: Scatter Plot of Critical Cross-Section when Indonesia is Included
Figure 2.5: Scatter Plot of Critical Cross-Section when Indonesia is Omitted
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Figure 2.6: Scatter Plot of IPRs and Per Capita GDP (Panel Data)
using the 1965 pair as an approximation for the actual critical pair may generate bias if the
majority of critical years occur in 1965. As we already know, the U-shape appears to exist
for a cross section of countries in a given year. Therefore, we need to ensure that the critical
cross section of Paris Convention years does not rely too heavily on 1965 data.
As indicated in Appendix A.3, 50 of the 97 countries considered use 1965 as their critical
year. Thus, it is worthwhile to test the robustness of our U-shape result by adjusting for
the possibility that the 1965 entries are driving this result. The immediate solution that
jumps to mind is excluding countries who joined the Paris Convention between 1884 and
1961, as their critical years were subject to a rounding procedure dissimilar to the rest of
the sample. Nonetheless, considering only countries that joined the Paris Convention since
1961 will exclude countries in the right portion of the U-shape that decided to participate in
IPR treaties out of domestic incentives to support domestic innovation. As a result, analysis
that considers just those countries that joined the Paris Convention since 1961 would result
in another type of bias.
The proposed solution is to divide countries into two separate groups: (1) those who
chose to join the Paris Convention immediately in 1884 and (2) those countries that joined
the Paris Convention after 1884. Given the separation of countries into these two groups
occurred in 1884.
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it would be sufficient to evaluate only the “critical” U using those countries who joined
the Paris Convention in 1884 and those countries who joined after 1960. Even with this
approach, however, the logical approximation of critical pairs for countries in 1884 is the
1965 pair as 1965 is the first year for which complete data is available.
This approach limits the possible 1965 bias. Table 2.9 shows the composition of years
that makes up the critical cross section of years. Of the 28 countries with critical years in
1965, only ten countries joined the Paris Convention in 1884.47 A total of 22 countries joined
the Paris Convention between 1885 and 1960 and have been omitted from the sample. It
also is intuitive that more countries experienced international pressures to join international
treaties such as the Paris Convention and implement stronger IPRs in the later years (1995
and 2000) since the World Trade Organization, passed guidelines for IPRs in their Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement in 1994.
Table 2.9: Composition of Critical Cross-Section: Omitting 1885-1960









Considering this more limited sample of countries, there still exists empirical evidence
for the support of the International Vulnerability Hypothesis, as the critical cross-section
of countries (again, indicated by the year that countries first joined the Paris Convention)
yields a statistically significant U-shape between IPRs and per capita GDP. These results
are found in Table 2.10. Also, note that the Indonesian outlier, which was present in the full
sample case, is no longer an issue when the sample size is limited to countries that joined
the Paris convention in 1884 or after 1960, as Indonesia joined the Paris Convention in 1950
47Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United King-
dom.
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and is, therefore, automatically omitted.
Finally, it should be noted that creation of the WTO has no underlying implications for
the rational behind the International Vulnerability Hypothesis. Rather, WTO guidelines,
such as the TRIPS Agreement, provide industrialized countries with more leverage for which
to exert international pressure to implement strong IPR laws. Countries that wanted to
join the WTO may have implemented domestic IPR policies simply to obtain positive trade
benefits.
The International Vulnerability Hypothesis does not negate this possibility. In fact,
developing countries’ desires to join the WTO gives developed countries a better position
by which they can exert their pressure and more acutely pick up factors of vulnerability. The
question is whether agreeing to the implementation of stronger IPRs just to gain ancillary
trade benefits will ultimately result in stronger and enforced IPRs in these countries. Since
agreement to participate in international trade agreements (specifically, the Paris Convention
and its revisions, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and Protection of New Plant Varieties
(UPOV)) is only a small portion of the GP Index48 in order to be considered to have strong
IPRs, according to empirical underpinnings of the GP Index, a country must have crucial
components of national patent laws in place. And, as argued earlier, the GP Index does a
good job at capturing the enforcement of these laws.
2.8 Conclusion
Past empirical observation of a U-shape link between IPRs and per capita GDP in panel
data has lead many researchers to conclude that the optimal choice of IPRs will first decrease
as a country develops before it increases. While longitudinal interpretations from panel data
are common, they are not always valid. This is certainly the case for the IPR-per capita
GDP relationship. A longitudinal U relationship is counter-intuitive, barring any change
to a country’s political economy. This paper demonstrates that when the longitudinal IPR
48The maximum index value obtained if a country has agreed to all three of the listed international treaties,
but has not changed domestic law to outline implementation of IPRs is one. This value is much lower than
the average IPR value for all countries, which is 2.46.
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Table 2.10: Critical Cross Sectional IPR Decision: Omitting 1885-1960
I II III IV V VI
log(pc GDP) -0.92** -0.89** -0.83** -0.80** -1.08** -0.94***
(-2.55) (-2.50) (-2.26) (-2.29) (-2.05) (-1.73)
[log(pc GDP)]2 0.07* 0.07* 0.06** 0.06** 0.08** 0.07***
(2.75) (2.77) (2.40) (2.49) (2.18) (1.96)
Euro & UKC 0.30** 0.27***
(2.15) (1.82)
log(X to Dev) 0.09* 0.06
(2.83) (1.64)
1970 -0.04 0.03 -0.12
(-0.15) (0.12) (-0.51)
1975 0.07 0.04 0.04
(0.18) (0.07) (0.09)
1980 0.54* 0.48* 0.52**
(3.83) (2.76) (2.22)
1985 0.67** 0.66* 0.61
(2.35) (3.10) (1.54)
1990 0.28** 0.14 0.19
(2.27) (0.96) (1.10)
1995 0.26 0.26*** 0.24
(1.63) (1.71) (1.31)
2000 0.11 0.10 0.08
(0.50) (0.42) (0.30)
Constant 5.42* 5.07* 5.05* 4.73* 6.34* 5.54*
(4.43) (4.25) (4.06) (4.01) (3.36) (2.74)
Observations 75 75 75 75 57 57
R2 0.1262 0.2245 0.1848 0.2700 0.2662 0.3461
Note: Euro & UKC= dummy variable = 1 if the country is in the Europe
Region or has colonial ties to the United Kingdom. log(X to Dev) is the
logged value of exports to developed countries for all non-European and non-
UK colony countries. The comparison year for the year dummies is 1965.
t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance. These results exclude Papua New Guinea, and
Mozambique. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction.
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choice is carefully examined, the U-shape relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP is
not statistically supported.
Instead, the true driving force behind the U-shape link between IPRs and per capita GDP
observed in the panel data is a result of cross sectional differences. Specifically, the poorest
countries implemented relatively strong IPR regimes largely as a result of vulnerability to
increasing pressures from the industrialized world. Middle income developing countries that
are further along in the development process when they agree to participate in international
treaties are less vulnerable to these pressures and therefore implement IPR regimes that are
less stringent and enable greater growth via imitation. Empirical tests of this “International
Vulnerability Hypothesis” provide evidence that a significant U-shape link between IPRs and
per capita GDP exists in the critical year that countries first choose to implement IPRs and
that a country’s vulnerability to pressures to implement strong IPRs positively contributes
to the IPR choice.
Since data on IPRs are relatively scarce, the majority of analysis presented in the IPR
literature is done using panel data or cross-sectional data. As a result, it is important to
understand the different longitudinal and cross-sectional relationships between IPRs and
per capita GDP, so that future analysis of IPRs can be interpreted accurately. This paper
provides further clarity on this point.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights
on High Technology Exports to
Developing Countries
3.1 Introduction
Developing countries have been persuaded by the industrialized world in recent years to
implement strong intellectual property rights (IPRs). Current international arrangements
attempting to establish a robust international standard for IPRs exemplify this fact.1 The
benefits of strengthening IPRs in developing countries is still being examined. Many ar-
gue that stronger IPRs in developing countries will increase developed country exports of
high technology goods to developing countries. The effects of IPRs on trade, however, are
multifaceted and may not necessarily yield such beneficial expansion of developed country
exports to developing countries.
In general, IPRs can impact trade via two avenues: the market power effect and the
market expansion effect. The market power effect refers to the reduction in trade that
1Nothing illustrates the movement towards universally strong IPRs more than the Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement that came into existence after the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) 1986 to 1994 Uruguay Round. The TRIPS
Agreement outlines detailed procedures for implementing and enforcing various types of intellectual property
rights. Although the least developed countries have been given extended time to implement IPR policies
outlined in TRIPS guidelines, the intended outcome is that all member countries abide by the TRIPS
agreement.
occurs because patents limit competition and thereby enable innovating firms to charge
relatively higher prices. The market expansion effect refers to the possibility that IPRs
increase the variety of goods in markets by attracting producers who would otherwise fear
loss of profitability in the absence of exclusive rights. Determination of the dominant effect
has, in the past, been left to empirical tests.
There have been past empirical observations suggesting that IPRs do not impact bilateral
aggregate trade of high technology goods.2 One explanation for this result has been that
there is a dominant market power effect of IPRs. This paper contributes to the literature in
that it (1) considers a disaggregation of high technology goods and (2) provides a theoretical
model that outlines the commodity specific characteristics that lead to a dominant market
power versus market expansion effect of increased IPRs.
The theoretical model in this paper suggests that the market expansion effect will domi-
nate if the markup in price for a certain variety of a good exceeds production costs inclusive
of the cost of adapting the technology for use in the developing country market. In this
case, stronger IPRs will lead the innovating firm to increase exports of the adapted variety
they choose to sell on the foreign market. If the markup in price is sufficiently greater than
production costs inclusive of adaptation costs, such that the ratio of costs to the markup is
statistically negligible (or rather, converges to zero) then strengthening IPRs will lead to an
insignificant change in the innovating firm’s exports of high technology goods. This result
suggests a dominant market expansion effect.
In order to analyze the theory empirically, this paper focuses on the impact of developing
country IPRs on disaggregated, high technology, developed country exports to developing
countries. In doing so, predictions can be made about the types of high-technology goods
that enable net market expansion and therefore enhance high-technology exports to devel-
oping countries.
In the next section, relevant literature is summarized. Section 3 presents the theoretical
model. Empirical observations and results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides a
summary and concludes.
2Such a result was observed in Primo Braga and Fink (1999).
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3.2 Review of Literature
There is an array of relevant literature contributing to the IPR-trade relationship being
considered in this paper. The review will begin by presenting an overview of literature
on IPRs and trade in the North-South context. Then, specific attention will be given to
literature on IPRs and bilateral trade flows. Finally, a brief review of literature on the
theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model is provided, as the empirical estimations of
bilateral trade flows in Section 4 are done using a gravity estimation equation.
3.2.1 Literature on IPRs and Trade in the North-South Context
Although IPRs lead to higher prices by providing innovating firms with monopoly rights,
IPRs are necessary to protect innovators, which take on large up-front research and devel-
opment costs, from losing profits at the hands of imitators. Most innovation occurs in the
North, while the South benefits from technology transfer via imitation of Northern innovated
goods. Stronger IPRs, however, limit imitation in the South. A great deal of literature exists
comparing the trade-offs between innovation and imitation in the context of a North-South
trade model.
Helpman (1993) used a dynamic general equilibrium model to evaluate the innovation-
imitation trade-off between the North and South. Helpman considered a variety of scenarios,
which often built off one another. For example, he considered the innovation-imitation trade-
off in the case of an exogenous and endogenous rate of innovation, as well as in the presence
and absence of foreign direct investment. In the absence of foreign direct investment (FDI),
Helpman noted that stronger IPRs in the South are welfare decreasing in the South as they
cause manufactured production to shift to Southern firms that can now receive higher prices,
even though efficiency in production remains with Northern production. The introduction
of FDI complicates the story as it introduces an increase in efficiency of Southern firms.
Helpman ultimately concludes that, while theoretical models are helpful to determine the
pathways in which IPRs impact the welfare of developing countries, empirical analysis is
necessary to determine whether an increase in IPRs in the South is welfare decreasing or
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improving.
Lai and Qiu (2001) considered the effect of IPRs on global welfare in the context of
North-South trade. Using a multi-sector model with IPR protection, they concluded that
global welfare would increase if the South increased IPRs. The improvement in global
welfare, however, may occur at the expense of the South. Grossman and Lai (2004) came to
a similar conclusion, finding that the harmonization of IPRs between the North and South
benefits the North at the expense of the South.
Connolly and Valderrama (2005) theoretically examined technological diffusion to the
South through imitation of traded goods during a period of trade liberalization.3 Unlike their
predecessors, Connolly and Valderrama found that stronger IPRs can be welfare increasing
in both the North and the South if IPRs are “properly designed.” For example, if Southern
imitation is permitted, but Southern imitating firms are forced to pay a one time licensing
fee to the Northern innovator, then stronger IPRs are welfare enhancing for both the North
and the South. Without licensing fees for Southern imitation, the North will likely face
comparatively less competition from the South, thereby decreasing the rate of Northern
innovation. In the latter case, Connolly and Valderrama conclude that stronger IPRs will
be welfare reducing for both regions.
The North-South trade models above focus on the implication of strengthening IPRs
on regional and/or global welfare. These models, however, do not focus specifically on the
impact of IPRs on bilateral trade flows.
3.2.2 Literature Review of Empirical Works on IPRs and Bilateral Trade
Flows
The impact of IPRs on bilateral trade flows has been empirically examined by Maskus
and Konan (1994), Maskus and Penubarti (1995), and Primo Braga and Fink (1999, as
adapted in Fink and Maskus (2005)). Maskus and Konan were interested in unveiling
the possible impact of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
3Connolly and Valderrama specifically examine the tradeoffs during a period of Southern trade liberal-
ization.
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Agreement on bilateral exports using 1984 data. To do so, they used correlation coefficients
to compare the magnitude and direction of residuals from a specified gravity equation for
equilibrium trade flows within 2-digit SITC manufacturing categories against an IPR Index
of patent strength. Such residual analysis allowed them to decipher whether IPRs impacted
the equilibrium flow of trade between five large technology-exporting countries. Maskus and
Konan concluded that actual trade was below predicted trade in countries with weak IPRs,
thereby signaling that the impact of IPRs on trade could be potentially large.
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) considered the IPR-trade relationship and found, using a
Helpman-Krugman (1985) type analysis, that developing countries with strong IPR regimes
experience an increased flow of imports. This is particularly true for large developing coun-
tries such as Mexico, South Korea, Argentina, and Brazil. Like Maskus and Konan, their
analysis was static utilizing 1984 data only. In their model, Maskus and Penubarti ac-
counted for possible endogeneity between a country’s trade flows and its level of economic
development by implementing a two-stage instrumental variables approach.
Primo Braga and Fink (1999) considered bilateral trade in both non-fuel and high-
technology goods using a gravity model and estimated it in a normally distributed, bivariate
probit regression to account for zero trade flows.4 Primo Braga and Fink (1999) found IPRs
had a significant and positive impact on bilateral trade of non-fuel goods, but did not have
a significant impact on high technology trade. They proposed the following five possible
explanations for their result: (1) Market power effects are particularly strong for high-
technology goods and may offset positive market expansion effects; (2) Stronger IPRs may
result in FDI by high-tech firms rather than increased trade; (3) The Ginarte-Park IPR
Index inappropriately captures IPR strength; (4) The availability of the high-technology
4The explanatory variables included in the Primo Braga and Fink gravity model include gross domestic
product and population of each trading partner, the distance between the two countries, a dummy variable for
whether the two countries share a common border, a dummy variable for whether the two countries share a
common language, dummy variables to account for preferential trading agreements, and, finally, the Ginarte-
Park IPR Index (which will be discussed in greater detail later in the paper) in the destination country. In a
footnote, Primo Braga and Fink (1999) indicate that they estimated a gravity model similar to that of Maskus
and Penubarti (1995) where they interacted the Rapp-Rozek IPR index with three dummy variables for high-
income countries, large developing countries, and small developing countries. They ultimately conclude that,
given that the interaction terms causes large changes in the coefficients on GDP and population, including
such an interaction picks up a “misspecification in the functional form of per capita income.” As a result,
they discredit this method.
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imports considered may be insensitive to the domestic country’s IPR regime; and/ or (5)
Specification error, such as the exclusion of variables for tariff and non-tariff trade barriers,
may bias the results. The theory outlined in this paper focuses on the validity of the first
reason, and provides a set of conditions under which increasing IPRs will lead to a dominant
market power (versus a market expansion) effect.
3.2.3 Review of Literature on Gravity Models
The gravity model is commonly used to estimate bilateral trade flows between countries
by incorporating GDP of each partner country as well as the distance between trade partners
in a log linear specification. Although the gravity equation can be used to explain a great deal
of bilateral trade that occurs between countries, theoretical underpinnings of the equation
are not as apparent. In general, the theoretical basis of the gravity model for trade hinges on
the supply and demand forces between two countries. These supply and demand forces are
related to the relative economic size of the two trading countries, adjusting for the distance
between them.
Key contributors to the theoretical models behind the gravity equation include Anderson
(1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1995), Feenstra et. al. (2001) and Eaton and
Kortum (2002). The theoretical model developed by Anderson (1979) assumed that each
country produced differentiated goods and consumers had identical Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences. He concluded that the gravity equation is most applicable for countries with similar
preferences in traded goods, tax structures, and transportation costs.
Bergstrand (1985) constructed his theoretical model for the gravity equation from a
general equilibrium model of world trade in which international products are perfectly sub-
stitutable. Bergstrand (1989) expanded his theory to consider a two-factor, two (differ-
entiated) industry, N-country general equilibrium framework in order to account for both
inter-industry and intra-industry trade.
Deardorff (1995) constructed two theoretical models for the gravity model stemming
from two variations of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. First, Deardorff considered a
model of “frictionless” trade where products are homogenous and consumer preferences are
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identical and homothetic. Second, Deardorff constructed a theoretical model in the case of
complete product specialization by countries and either Cobb-Douglas or constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) preferences by consumers.
Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001) argued that the gravity equation can be derived
using a various number of different trade models. They concluded that expectations about
the coefficient estimates should differ depending on which trade model the equation is theo-
retically rooted in. They paid particular attention to the impact of an increase in the home
country’s income on export activity.5
In a somewhat different approach, Eaton and Kortum (2002) used a Ricardian trade
model for a continuum of goods based on comparative advantage as the underpinning theory
for the gravity equation. A unique characteristic of this model is that more than one country
can produce the same good, with each producer supplying the good to different parts of the
world. Consumers in this model have CES preferences.
3.3 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model established in this section considers an innovating firm’s choice
to export a less-technologically advanced version of its newly innovated good to developing
countries. To illustrate the modeling, a general story will first be presented, followed by a
discussion of the formal theoretical model.
3.3.1 The Story
Developed country (Northern) innovations may not be immediately appropriate for use
in developing countries (the South). Therefore, Northern firms must adapt the good to
lower technology levels if they want to supply the good to the South. If they decide that
it is profitable to adapt the innovated good for use in the foreign market, they must decide
the avenue by which they will introduce the new good. The Northern innovating firm can
introduce an adapted version of the newly innovated good into Southern markets via exports
5This income effect is most commonly referred to as the “home market” effect.
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of the final good or foreign direct investment (FDI).6 While both avenues are important to
the story, this paper focuses on the introduction of newly innovated goods to the South by
means of the first avenue, exports. It would be useful in future explorations to consider the
impact of the choice to introduce high technology goods into these markets through FDI.7
The innovating firm’s choice to export an adapted version of its good is dependent on
demand for the good abroad. If the innovated good at the adapted technology level is
useful to domestic production processes in the South, demand for the innovated good will
be higher. In addition, stronger IPRs reduce the threat of piracy, making the market for
the innovated good less competitive. This will result in higher prices and a lower quantity
demanded of the good.
Ultimately, the Northern innovating firm’s decision to supply the adapted innovation to
the South via export is contingent on how the mark-up in price relates to production costs
inclusive of adaptation costs of the innovated good. The next section takes this general story
and establishes a more concrete theoretical model of a Northern innovating firm’s choice in
adapting and supplying their innovated good by means of exports to a developing country.
The theoretical model in this paper combines ideologies from Gaisford, Hobbs, and Kerr
(2007) and Diwan and Rodrik (1987) in order to establish a set of conditions necessary for
market expansion.
3.3.2 The Model
Let j denote the variety of a manufactured good. Every variety j can be adapted into a
version with technology level i ∈ [0, 12 ] where 0 represents the least technologically advanced
version of variety j and 12 represents the most technologically advanced version of variety j.
Each variety introduced to the market can potentially be adapted so that it is appropriate
to all levels of technology within this range.
6The FDI may include exports of high technology capital equipment needed to produce the good abroad
or it may be non-export related FDI in which investments are made in existing domestic firms.
7It is possible that the introduction of an FDI choice into the model may cancel the export related effects
discussed in the next sections. It is also possible that the FDI and export choices are both utilized, thereby
leading to the export effect discuss below, although to a lesser degree.
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It is assumed that, in period 1, a Northern firm innovates variety j with technology level
i = 12 . If the Northern innovating firm chooses to adapt the innovated variety to a level of
technology i ∈ [0, 12 ], so that it can be sold on the world market, it does so in period 2. The
model below focuses on the adaptation, production, and export decision of the Northern
innovating firm in period 2.
Consumers’ demand for the innovated variety j with technology level i is λji ∈ [0, 12 ].
Demand is a function of price, “pertinent usage”, and the level of IPR protection. More
specifically,
λji = λ(pji, Uji, ε) (3.1)
where pji is the price of the innovated variety j with technology level i, 0 < Uji ≤ 12
represents “pertinent usage” for the innovated variety j with technology level i, and 0 <
ε ≤ 1 represents the level of domestic IPRs, which are country specific.8
Pertinent usage refers to how useful the innovated technology is to production processes
common in the importing country’s market. The “pertinent usage” variable falls within
0 < Uji ≤ 12 such that higher values indicate that the innovation is more pertinent for
use in domestic production processes. Uji varies by both the variety of the innovation j
and the technology within a given variety i.9 At any technology level i, a variety will be
more pertinent the greater its impact on domestic production. For example, a developing
country that relies heavily on agricultural production may find innovations in genetically
modified seeds to be more pertinent than innovations in radioactive materials, therefore
causing Uji to be greater (at any technology level i) for agricultural related innovations
than for innovations in radioactive materials. Ranking the varieties available to a country
in ascending order from those that are the least useful in domestic production processes to
those that are most useful in domestic production processes yields a relationship between
8Although IPRs vary by country, they are uniform throughout all varieties and technologies.
9In order to keep things simple, the impact of j on pertinent usage is examined while assuming that
technology i is held constant. In addition, the impact of i on pertinent usage is examined while assuming
that variety j is held constant.
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Uji and j characterized by
∂Uji
∂j > 0.
In each country, pertinent usage for each innovated variety j also differs by the technology
level i. The pertinent usage of each variety on the domestic market will depend on the
appropriateness of technology i in the supply chain to domestic production. Specifically, Uji
is related to the resource endowment of the importing country, such that (for any variety
j) Uji will be greater the better a country can incorporate technology i into its supply
chain given its endowment of resources. It is assumed that pertinent usage for an innovated
variety differs in each country by the technology i such that ∂Uji∂i < 0. This indicates
that pertinent usage for each variety j will be greater the less technologically advanced
the innovated variety. This is a strong assumption that best characterizes the relationship
between pertinent usage and technology levels in the least developed countries.
The demand for variety j with technology level i depends on pertinent usage, Uji. This is
because each variety j with technology level i will have a different bundle of complementary
goods. These bundles of complementary goods will differ in price depending on their relative
abundance given a country’s resources. These bundles will differ across varieties as well
as across technology levels. For example, at any technology level i, the complementary
bundle of goods for genetically modified sees will differ from the complementary bundle for
synthetic yarn. In addition, within a given variety j, the bundle of complementary goods
corresponding to technology i may differ such that one technology requires electricity while
the other requires the use of batteries. The availability and cost of different power sources in
a country may vary, causing the price of the bundle of complementary goods to differ across
technologies. As a general result, the demand for variety j with technology level i will be
different at different levels of Uji. The concept that changes in the price and availability
of complementary goods will shift the demand curve is widely supported in microeconomic
65
theory.10
The demand for the innovated variety j with technology level i also depends on the
level of IPR protection. This occurs through a variety of avenues. First, IPRs influence
the number of competitors in the market and, subsequently, the number of close substitutes
competing for the export market. With fewer substitutes, demand for variety j with tech-
nology level i will be higher. Second, stronger IPRs attract complementary high technology
goods. The level of IPRs may alter the bundle of complementary goods and, therefore, the
price of complementary goods, which causes demand to shift at different levels of IPRs.
Assuming a functional form for the demand of variety j with technology level i will sim-
plify the estimation of firm-level profit-maximizing quantities. The functional form assumed
must satisfy the characteristics of demand described above. One such functional form is:
λji = 1− pji
Ujiε
. (3.2)
Notice that the above specification satisfies λji ∈ [0, 12 ] only when prices are constrained
such that 12 ≤
pji
Ujiε
≤ 1.11 Following the law of demand, a higher price will lead to a
lower quantity demanded. In addition, both greater pertinent usage and IPRs will lead to
a greater quantity demanded, as previously discussed.
10For a clarifying example on how demand will differ across technologies within the same variety, consider
laptop computers. Nicholas Negroponte had a mission to create a laptop that could be easily used by children
in developing countries. In his design of such a computer, he acknowledged that the goods/resources that
complemented the use of conventional laptops should ideally be altered. For example, access to electrical
power sources was a primary concern. As a result, Negroponte’s original design for the XO computer intended
to be sold in developing countries included a hand-crank for power. While this power source has not yet
been incorporated into XO laptops, and a new design for a “pull-cord hand-generator” is in the works, the
design of the laptop has focused on minimizing power usage by omitting motor driven components such as
fans and hard drives. The desire to reduce the need for electrical power addresses the fact that the price of
power-related goods complementary to conventional computers is high. Although developing countries have
a use for a computers, the price of complementary goods needed to use conventional computers causes the
demand for conventional technologies to be relatively lower than technologies that require less use of power
sources. In this example, the pertinent usage of hand-crank laptop in developing countries is greater than
the pertinent usage of conventional laptops, satisfying the assumption that
∂Uji
∂i
< 0 as well as the notion
that each technology corresponds to a different bundle of complementary goods.





≤ 1 it can be inferred that 0 < pji ≤ 12 .
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Prices
From the demand function in (3.2), the inverse demand curve can be derived. The
inverse demand curve provides a functional form for prices that can be used in the Northern
innovating firm’s profit function, which will be presented shortly. The inverse demand curve
is presented in equation (3.3) below.
pji = Ujiε(1− λji) (3.3)
From the inverse demand curve it can be shown that ∂pji∂Uji > 0 and
∂pji
∂ε > 0. These
comparative statics provide information about the relationship between pji and Uji and ε
along the demand curve.
Costs
The innovating firm for variety j with technology level i incurs marginal costs via two
avenues: (1) caji, the marginal cost of adapting the innovated variety j to a version with tech-
nological advancement i, and (2) cpj , the marginal cost of producing variety j.12 Therefore,
total marginal costs for producing variety j with technology level i is cji = caji + cpj ≥ 0.13
It is assumed that one firm, and only one firm, innovates each variety j. The original
innovation of variety j has a technology level i = 12 , indicating that it is the most tech-
nologically advanced version of the good available on the world market. This high level
of technology, however, may not be appropriate for use in less-developed (Southern) coun-
tries. Therefore, the Northern innovating firm must choose if it will adapt its variety to a
lower-technology version and export it abroad. The Northern innovating firm will choose
to produce and export the technology that maximizes all possible profits. The profit max-
imization equation for each technology, which will be explored in the next section, varies
12The marginal cost of producing variety j is assumed constant across technologies i within the same
variety.
13The model described assumes that the Northern innovating firm has already chosen R&D expenditures
in the previous period, which resulted in the original innovated variety. Therefore, in this one period, static
model, R&D costs for the “original” innovated variety do not enter into the cost function in the current
period.
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depending on the marginal cost of adaptation. Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider briefly
how, within each variety j, the marginal cost of adaptation will vary across the possible tech-
nologies i.
The marginal cost of adapting variety j, caji, varies systematically by i. It is more costly
to adapt the variety to lower technologies such that cajm > cajk for k > m. (Recall that the
innovated variety can be adapted to a level of technology i ∈ [0, 12 ] where 0 represents the
least technologically advanced version of the good and 12 represents the most technologically
advanced version of the good.) This implies that ∂caji∂i < 0.
Profits
Assume that there is one, and only one, Northern innovating firm for each variety j.
The firm producing variety j will adapt this variety to a level of technology i that yields the
highest profit across all possible technologies i. In order to determine this level of technology,
the firm producing variety j must identify profits corresponding to each technology i.
For each variety j, the innovating firm’s profit at technology level i (if it chooses to
produce a good at this technological level) is:
pi(λji) =(pji − cji)λji (3.4)
=Ujiε(1− λji)λji − (caji + cpj)λji
where λji represents the demand for the innovated variety j with technology level i. The
firm producing variety j chooses the quantity, λji, that maximizes the firm’s profit func-
tion at each possible technology i. The corresponding first order condition for the profit
maximization equation yields an optimal λji that satisfies:






− (caji + cpj)
2Ujiε
. (3.5)




Π = max(pi(λji) for i ∈ [0, 12]) (3.6)
Let β∗j be the optimal quantity of variety j that corresponds to the profit maximizing i.
14
Given that the quantity demanded for each technology i is somewhere within 0 ≤ β∗j ≤ 12 ,
the first order condition stated in (3.5) will be bounded by possible corner solutions. Taking
into account these corner solutions, the optimal quantity produced of variety j is as follows:
β∗j =






if 0 < (caji + cpj) < Ujiε;
1
2 if (caji + cpj) = 0.
(3.7)
From (3.7) it can be concluded that if the marginal cost of producing and adapting the
innovated variety j is sufficiently lower than the markup in the price (which is related to the
good’s pertinent usage and IPR protection), then the innovating firm will produce and export
the adapted good. If the marginal cost of adaptation and production exceeds the markup,
then the innovated variety will not be adapted for sale abroad. Lastly, if the marginal cost
of adaptation and production is zero (or negligible in terms of statistical significance) then
the innovating firm will export the maximum it can produce of the adapted variety.
14It should be reiterated that this is the optimal quantity that maximizes the profit for the one firm that is
producing and exporting variety j. This is not an equilibrium quantity for total exports across all varieties.
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Equilibrium
The theoretical model above describes a one-period, profit maximizing condition for a
single firm producing and exporting a single variety (and technology) of a good. The above
model, however, does not account for competitors and, therefore, does not lend itself to a
market equilibrium condition for export activity. A model in which the market equilibrium
is derived would better lend itself to address the entrance of imitators in the domestic market
via a contestable market framework.
In a contestable market, as described by Baumol (1982),15 the price set by the Northern
innovating firm in the above model would be influenced by the threat of possible entrants
into the domestic market. Contestable markets assume ease of entry and exit of competitors,
which leads the innovating (monopoly) firm to charge a price below monopoly rents so to
keep competing firms out of the market. In the model by Gaisford, Hobbs, and Kerr (2007),
for which this theoretical model is based, a contestable market is assumed such that the price
set by the Northern innovating firm is just below what potential imitators in the domestic
market can change and still cover the costs of production.16 Deriving a market equilibrium
for which this contestable market ideology can be applied would be a useful expansion of
the current theoretical model in this paper.
3.3.3 What Impacts the Optimal Quantity to Produce and Export?
From the above theory, a hypothesis can be constructed as to the types of high technology
goods developing countries should expect to see a dominant market expansion or dominant
market power effect if they increase IPRs. If the markup in price resulting from IPR
protection and pertinent usage of the good exceeds the marginal cost of producing and
adapting the good, then the optimal volume of exports abroad will fall somewhere between




2). Assuming this interior solution, it can be
demonstrated that the optimal β∗j increases when (1) IPRs, ε, increase, and (2) pertinent
15Other notable references include Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1983) and Tirole (2003).
16Specifically, Gaisford, Hobbs, and Kerr (2007) assume that the upward bound on price is equal to some















An increase in β∗j corresponds to increased exports of the adapted technology to countries
abroad, including developing countries. Therefore, an increase in β∗j corresponds to a dom-
inant market expansion effect.
As the ratio of costs to markups approaches zero, the innovating firm will saturate
production and exports will converge to the maximum possible volume, or β∗j =
1
2 , of the
adapted variety. The closer the innovating firm is to saturating its capacity to export that
particular variety of the good, the less likely it is that an increase in IPRs will have a
statistically significant impact on the quantity of exports. Therefore, as the ratio of costs
to markups approaches zero, a strengthening of IPRs will lead to a dominant market power
effect.
3.3.4 Predictions about the Empirical Results
Characteristics that cause the markup in price to exceed marginal production and adap-
tation costs will lead to an internal solution for β∗j and, therefore, a dominant market
expansion effect when IPRs are increased. The markup on price will be higher the more
pertinent the variety (and technology) is in domestic production (i.e. the greater Uji). In
addition, if the variety is not “too” costly to produce and/or adapt for use in foreign markets
it also has a greater likelihood of having an internal solution.
Convergence towards an upper corner solution of β∗j =
1
2 occurs for varieties with high
pertinent usage coupled with low marginal production and adaptation costs. So, varieties
that are highly pertinent to domestic production as well as relatively cheap to produce and
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adapt for use in the domestic market have the greatest likelihood of converging towards
the corner solution β∗j =
1
2 , ceteris paribus. In this case, production of the export good is
already saturated and increasing IPRs will have an insignificant effect on export activity,
thereby translating into a dominant market power effect.
These generalizations about the relationship between markups and costs can be made
more clear by considering specific examples of high technology goods. An intuitive gen-
eralization is that developing countries have a comparative advantage in and, therefore,
specialize in agricultural and textile production. As a result, developing countries have
a higher pertinent usage for varieties related to production in these types of goods.17 In
addition, the cost of adapting many of the manufactured varieties related to agricultural
and textile production (such as potassic fertilizers, synthetic yarn, respectively) is relatively
low. Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that developed country exports of varieties
related to production in agricultural and textile sectors are converging towards an upper
corner solution, indicating a dominant market power effect (i.e. higher IPRs do not increase
high technology agricultural and textile exports to developing countries).
Consider, on the other hand, varieties related to electrical machinery and apparatus for
which the potential usage in developing countries is pertinent, but marginal costs of adap-
tation are relatively higher as a result of limitations to infrastructure in the least developed
countries. In this case, there is a greater likelihood that electrical related high technology
products have an interior solution and would exhibit a dominant market expansion effect in
the presence of stronger IPRs.
Although hypotheses can be made, given the characteristics of the theoretical model, as
to which varieties of manufactured goods should exhibit a dominant market power effect
versus a dominant market expansion effect, empirical estimation is necessary to confirm
these predictions. The next section describes the empirical estimation used in this paper.
17This relates to the
∂Uji
∂j
assumption in the previous section.
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3.4 Empirical Estimation
This section outlines the estimation procedures and equations used to evaluate bilateral
industrialized high technology exports to developing countries for a variety of high tech-
nology goods. Of key interest are the results on how IPRs in developing countries impact
developed country exports to these countries, if at all. Predictions made in the previous
section about which variety of goods have a dominant market expansion or market power
effect in the wake of increased IPRs can be confirmed with empirical estimation.
A Tobit estimation procedure is used to estimate bilateral trade flows for each variety
of good considered.18 The Tobit model contains a discrete component, which accounts for
differences between zero and positive trade values, as well as a continuous component, which





yit = y∗it if y
∗
it > 0
yit = 0 if y∗it = 0.
where yit is the dependent variable and xit is the vector of independent variables. IPRs enter
as an independent variable. (A complete specification will be discussed later.) A significant
and positive coefficient on IPRs means that an increase in developing country IPRs will lead
developed countries to increase exports to these countries, or that β∗j from the theoretical
model is increasing. Therefore a positive coefficient on IPRs indicates a dominant market
expansion effect. An insignificant coefficient on IPRs means that an increase in developing
country IPRs has a statistically insignificant impact on developed country exports. If there
is a reason to believe, from the theoretical model, that this statistical insignificance is a
result of an upper corner solution, then an increase in IPRs would be hypothesized to have
18Estimation using a Probit model was also conducted. The results were similar to those obtained using
Tobit estimation.
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a dominant market power effect.
3.4.1 The Gravity Model
The gravity model is commonly used to estimate bilateral trade flows as it leads itself
to good empirical estimation results. The theoretical basis of the gravity model for trade
hinges on the supply and demand forces between two countries. (A review of literature
on the gravity model was provided in Section 2.) These supply and demand forces are
related to the relative economic size of the two trading countries, adjusting for the distance
between them. Often the gravity model for trade accounts for physical, social, and/or
cultural distance between trade partners.
Equation (3.10) represents a gravity model for bilateral trade, while a logged transfor-
mation in (3.11) presents a basic estimating equation derived from the gravity model.






log(Tij) = logG+ θ1 log(Mi) + θ2 log(Mj)− θ3 log(Dij) (3.11)
where Tij is trade flow from country i to country j, Mi is the economic size of country i,
Mj is the economic size of country j, Dij is the distance between countries i and j, and G
is some constant of gravitation.
Given the success of gravity models in estimating bilateral trade flows, this paper utilizes
such a model for empirical estimation. The bilateral trade flows specifically under consid-
eration in this paper are developed country exports of high technology goods to developing
countries. Therefore, the dependent variable in the gravity equation is developed country
export values to developing countries.19 Data on bilateral export values was obtained from
19Export values, rather than export quantities, are used so to keep the data measurements consistent
across countries and commodities. Although the home country originally reports these export values in their
current national currency, the UN applies the current dollar exchange rate so that all available export value
data is reported in current US dollars. The export values are made consistent by using the consumer price
index to adjust export values to constant 2000 US dollars.
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the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Database (Comtrade) for the years 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Export values from the UN’s Comtrade database are reported
in terms of “free on board” (fob). This means that the value reported for export data in-
cludes the transaction value of the good, the cost to transport the good to the border of the
exporting country, and the cost to load the good on the carrier.
The core independent variables used in the gravity equation of this paper include gross
domestic product (GDP) in the reporting and parter country, population in the reporting
and partner country, the distance between trade partners, and sharing a common border,
language, or colonizer. GDP is a measure of economic size that is key to the supply and
demand forces for which the gravity model is rooted. More specifically, GDP of the importing
country captures the country’s capacity to absorb trade, while GDP of the exporting country
captures its capacity to produce trade. Therefore, the coefficients on GDP are expected
to be positive. Data on GDP were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
Including a regressor for population for both trade partners allows for the possibility of
scale effects independent of economic size. Traditionally, the coefficients on population have
been said to be indeterminant.20 However, it is possible that for the case of high technology
manufactured exports to developing countries, as considered in this paper, the coefficient
on population may be expectedly negative. This is because the coefficient on population
may be capturing the relationship between per capita GDP and exports. Countries with
higher populations, likely corresponding to lower levels of per capita GDP, may receive fewer
industrialized high technology exports. This would correspond with a negative coefficient for
population. Data on population was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
The other independent variables included in the gravity equation embody physical, so-
cial, and cultural distance-related barriers to trade. Data on these variables was obtained
20The general argument for this is two-fold. A more populous country may be better able to diversify and
become self sufficient, thereby decreasing trade. On the other hand, countries with greater populations may
be better able to engage in economies of scale production, likely increasing export activity.
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from CEPII distance database.21 The first measure of “distance” is physical distance. This
is approximated by the geographical distance between the “most important” cities in each
trading partner according to population and agglomeration economies. Physical distance is
used as a proxy for transportation costs such that the greater physical distance, the greater
the costs associated with transporting goods. The sign of the physical distance coefficient
is therefore expected to be negative.
Similar social and cultural interactions among countries may also positively impact trade
by reducing the “cultural distance” between trade partners. For example, the interactions
that lead to trade may be easier if countries share a common language. To account for this
possibility, the gravity equation includes the variable language, which is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if countries have similar official national languages and a value of
zero otherwise. Social and economic similarities may also exist if the countries have colonial
ties. Countries with colonial ties are likely to have compatible trade policies as well as a pre-
established economic relationship (regardless of distance). Therefore, including a dummy
variable, colony, that takes the value of one if trading partners have ever had a colonial link
and zero otherwise is also included in the gravity equation.22
Trade flows are also believed to be impacted by whether or not trading partners share
a common border. Contiguous countries have greater ease in the transport of goods (which
can been seen as decreasing a barrier to trade). Although this variable is important, it is
omitted since no developed-developing country pair in the data set share a common border.
This is because the classification of developed countries contains only high income countries
and the classification of developing countries contains only the least developed, low income
countries. (The classification of countries as developed or developing is discussed in greater
detail later in this section.)
To summarize, the specific benchmark gravity equation used in estimation takes the
following form:
21http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
22Although there are common links between countries with shared colonial ties and shared languages, both
variables are often included in the gravity equation. Empirical test do not show multicollinearity between
these two variables and therefore they are both included in the estimating equations with confidence.
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log(Xnit) =β0 + β1 log(GDP)nt + β2 log(GDP)it + β3 log(pop)nt + β4 log(pop)it (3.12)
+ β5 log(distance)ni + β6(colony)ni + β7(language)ni + εnit
where the subscript n represents the Northern exporting country and subscript i represents
their Southern trade partner. Xnit represents country n’s exports into country i at time
t. All the coefficients are expected to be positive, except for the population and distance
variables, as previously explained.
An index of the strength of IPRs in the importing country is included as an additional
regressor to test how patent rights in the developing countries impact their receipt of high
technology exports from developed countries. The Ginarte-Park IPR Index is used to ap-
proximate the strength of patent protection in the importing country.23 The Ginarte-Park
(GP) Index ranges from 0 to 5, with 5 indicating maximum patent protection. The index
takes into account; (1) coverage, (2) membership in international treaties, (3) loss of pro-
tection, (4) enforcement, and (5) duration of protection. Since its arrival, the GP Index
has been accepted as the superior index to be used in empirical IPR analysis. In addition,
the GP Index has been expanded to include a larger set of countries and years. For these
reasons, the GP Index is used to approximate patent strength in this paper.
As shown in the theory, IPRs have a positive or insignificant effect depending on whether
the country is dominated by market expansion or market power effects, respectively. There-
fore, interpreting the coefficient on IPRs will be similar. If the coefficient on IPRs is statis-
tically significant and positive, meaning that an increase in developing country IPRs leads
to an increase in developed country exports to developing countries, than a dominant mar-
ket expansion effect can be assumed for the corresponding high technology good. On the
other hand, if the coefficient on IPRs is statistically insignificant, meaning that coefficient is
not significantly different than zero and therefore that changes in developing country IPRs
provide no significant response to export activity in developed countries, than the economy
23I would like to thank Walter Park for providing me with the index.
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is in a “corner solution” state described in the equation (3.7). Although the two corner
solutions cannot be differentiated empirically, one possibility is that there is a dominant
market power effect (the upper corner solution). The other possibility is that production
costs are so high that the good is not exported to any developing countries (the lower corner
solution).
Sector specific value added as a percent of GDP in the previous year is included as a
final regressor in the estimating equation. In general, value added for a sector measures
total output for a sector net of intermediate inputs. The value added regressor attempts to
capture how “pertinent usage,” captured by the Uji variable in the theoretical model impacts
whether an increase in IPRs leads to a dominant market expansion or market power effect.
Recall that Uji refers to the pertinent usage of high technology variety j with a given level
of technological advancement i in production processes. Value added as a percent of GDP
in the previous year is included as a proxy for pertinent usage in an attempt to capture
a country’s increased demand for high-technology varieties that have a greater impact on
domestic production.
It is assumed that each high technology variety that the developed country exports
will be used for production in the receiving developing country in one of the following five
categories: (1) Agriculture, (2) Chemicals, (3) Textiles and Clothing, (4) Machinery and
Transport Equipment, and (5) Other Manufacturing goods.24 The “value added” category
corresponding to each high technology good is outlined in Table 3.2. (For an explanation
as to how each high technology good was assigned a “value added” category, see Appendix
B.2.) The greater value added as a percent of GDP in a category in the previous year, the
more useful innovations will be that are used in these sectors. Data on value added was
24Agricultural value added refers inputs related to forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of
crops and livestock production. Other manufacturing refers to inputs used in production of wood and related
products, paper and paper-related products, petroleum and related products, basic metals and mineral prod-
ucts, fabricated metal products and professional goods, and other similar industries. Other manufacturing
also includes all unallocated data. In general, value added is the sum of gross output minus the value of
intermediate inputs used in each specified sector of production.
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obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.25
Including the IPR and value added regressors yields the following fully specified gravity
equation:
log(Xnitj) =β0 + β1 log(GDP)nt + β2 log(GDP)it + β3 log(pop)nt + β4 log(pop)it (3.13)
+ β5 log(distance)ni + β6(colony)ni + β7(language)ni + β8 log(IPR)it
+ β9(value added)ij,t−1 + εnitj
where j corresponds to the value added category best associated with the high technology
group being estimated and Xnit represents country n’s exports into country i at time t.
Estimation of (3.13) is conducted for each high technology group in Table 3.1. In ad-
dition, trade values for each high technology group are considered over the time span 1970
to 2000. Due to limitations of the Ginarte-Park IPR index, full data is available every five
years, or 1970, 1975, 1980,..., 2000. Comtrade reports trade values in current US dollars
and is therefore converted into constant US dollars using the consumer price index. Year
dummy variables are included in the estimation equation to account for year fixed effects.
3.4.2 Country and High Technology Good Specifications
Of primary concern in this paper is how developed country high technology exports to
developing countries respond to increases in IPRs in developing countries. Only exports to
the least developed countries are considered as they best fit the characteristics assumed by
the theoretical model. Countries are considered “developing” if they are low income (per
capita GNI below $875) according to the World Bank classifications. Countries are consid-
ered “developed” if they are high income (per capita GNI greater than $10,725) according
25Data on Agriculture and Manufacturing value added was available in terms of a percent of GDP. Chem-
ical, textile and clothing, machinery and transport equipment, and other manufacturing value added was
available as a percent of total manufacturing. In order to calculate value added as a percent of GDP, each
category with a value added as a percent of manufacturing was multiplied by the percent of manufacturing
value added as a percent of GDP.
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to World Bank classifications.26
Classifying a variety as high technology is slightly more difficult. Krugman (1987) defines
high technology goods as the goods in which investment in the creation of knowledge makes
up a substantial portion of total production costs. Primo Braga and Yeats (1992) identify
high technology commodity groups using a more precise classification of high technology
goods proposed by Davis (1982). Primo Braga and Yeats (1992) equated “technological
intensity” with the amount of research and development expenditures required to produce a
certain good in the United States. Based on this definition, they identified a group of goods
that could be labeled as “high technology.” (For a full explanation of how the following
commodity groups were specified as “high technology” groups, refer to Primo Braga and
Yeats (1992).) Primo Braga and Fink (1999) later used this classification of high technology
goods in their research. It is also the high technology classification used in this paper.27
The composition of the high technology aggregate is outlined in Table 3.1. Table 3.2
lists the value added category that corresponds to each high technology variety. For ex-
ample, developed country exports of inorganic elements (SITC Revision 1 code 513) will
likely correspond to value added in chemical related production in the developing country.
Therefore, the country specific value added in chemical production (as a percent of GDP)
in the previous year for the importing country is used to approximate the relevant usage of
imports of inorganic elements in country specific production in the current period. (For a
complete explanation as to how the value added categories were assigned, refer to Appendix
B.2.)
3.4.3 Results
Equation (3.13) is estimated for each of the high technology variety specified in Table 3.1.
The results for each commodity are found in Table 3.3. This table contains a great deal of
information. To summarize the key results, when empirically accounting for pertinent usage
26These classifications are based on 2005 GNI.
27While Primo Braga and Fink considered the impact of IPRs on trade of a high technology aggregate of
goods, this paper considers high technology exports at a disaggregated level, so to evaluate the empirical
results using the predicted market expansion versus market power effects deduced from the theoretical model.
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Table 3.1: Composition of Aggregate High Technology Goods
SITC (Rev. 1) Description
513 Inorganic elements
514 Other inorganic elements
515 Radioactive Materials
533.1 Coloring Materials
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
541.9 Pharmaceutical goods excluding medicaments
561.3 Potassic fertilizers
571.2 Fuses and detonators
571.4 Hunting and sporting ammunition
581.1 Plastics and products of condensation
581.2 Products of polymerization
651.6 Synthetic fibers
651.7 Yarn and artificial fibers
711.3 Steam engines
711.4 Aircraft engines
711.5 Internal combustion engines
711.6 Gas turbines
711.8 Engines not elsewhere specified
714 Office machinery
724 Telecommunications apparatus
729.3 Transistors, photocell, and so forth
729.7 Electron accelerators









Table 3.2: Value Added Categories
SITC (Rev. 1) Description Value Added Category
513 Inorganic elements Chemical
514 Other inorganic elements Chemical
515 Radioactive Materials Chemical
533.1 Coloring Materials Textile
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products Chemical
541.9 Pharmaceutical goods excluding medicaments Other
561.3 Potassic fertilizers Agricultural
571.2 Fuses and detonators Other
571.4 Hunting and sporting ammunition Agricultural
581.1 Plastics and products of condensation Other
581.2 Products of polymerization Other
651.6 Synthetic fibers Textile
651.7 Yarn and artificial fibers Textile
711.3 Steam engines Machinery and Transport Equip.
711.4 Aircraft engines Machinery and Transport Equip.
711.5 Internal combustion engines Machinery and Transport Equip.
711.6 Gas turbines Machinery and Transport Equip.
711.8 Engines not elsewhere specified Machinery and Transport Equip.
714 Office machinery Machinery and Transport Equip.
724 Telecommunications apparatus Machinery and Transport Equip.
729.3 Transistors, photocell, and so forth Other
729.7 Electron accelerators Other
729.9 Electrical machinery and apparatus Machinery and Transport Equip.
734 Aircraft Machinery and Transport Equip.
861 Scientific instruments Other
862 Photographic supplies Other
891.1 Tape recorders Other
891.2 Recorders of sound Other
894.3 Nonmilitary arms Other
899.6 Orthopedic appliances Other
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of each high technology variety in production (as approximated by the commodity specific
value added variable), IPRs have either a positive effect (13 varieties) or no effect (17 vari-
eties) on industrialized high technology exports to developing countries. As noted earlier,
those commodity groups that show IPRs having a positive impact on export values suggests
a dominant market expansion effect for the corresponding commodity. Those commodity
group estimations in which IPRs have no statistically significant impact on developed coun-
try exports to developing countries suggest that either: (1) there is a dominant market
power effect (β∗j =
1
2 in the theory) or (2) the marginal cost of production and adaptation
is so high that no markets will be supplied (β∗j = 0 in the theory), therefore resulting in no
significant change in export activity.
For 20 out of 30 varieties, the significance of the IPR variable remains the same for
the case when the “value added” variable is included as well as when it is omitted.28 To
complement the theory, the preferred specification includes the value added component.
The results suggest that an increase in IPRs has caused developing countries to expe-
rience a dominant market expansion effect for the following high technology goods: inor-
ganic elements not elsewhere specified (514), medicinal goods including medicaments (541),
plastics and products of condensation (581.1), products of polymerization (581.2), internal
combustion engines (711.5), engines not elsewhere specified (711.8), office machinery (714),
telecommunication apparatuses (724), electrical machinery and apparatuses (729.9), scien-
tific instruments (861), photographic supplies (862), tape recorders (891.1), and nonmilitary
arms (894.3),
On the other hand, an increase in IPRs has had no significant impact on developed
country exports to developing countries for the following high technology goods: oxides,
gases, and chemical elements (513), radioactive materials (515), coloring materials (533.1),
pharmaceutical goods excluding medicaments (541.9), potassic fertilizers (561.3), fuses and
detonators (571.2), hunting and sporting ammunition (571.4), synthetic fibers (651.6), yarn
and artificial fibers (651.7), steam engines (711.3), aircraft engines (711.4), gas turbines
28Differences occur in the following varieties: 513, 541.9, 571.2, 651.6, 711.4, 711.6, 729.3, 734, 891.2, and
894.3.
83
(711.6), transistors, photocells and the like (729.3), electron accelerators (729.7), aircrafts
(734), recorders of sound (891.2), and orthopedic appliances (899.6). Of these varieties,
coloring materials (533.1), potassic fertilizers (561.3), synthetic fibers (651.6), and yarn and
artificial fibers (651.7) have relatively low adaptation costs and high pertinent usage in
developing countries, and are therefore subject to a dominant market power effect. Notice
that these four varieties can best be associated with the textile and agricultural industries
and are traditionally critical to production in developing countries. (Also, note that the sign
on the IPR coefficient for these four varieties is the same both when empirically accounting
for pertinent usage and when omitting it.)
Table 3.3 reveals additional insight into the exports of high technology goods. The value
added variable for most varieties has a coefficient of zero or very close to zero. The sign on the
agricultural value added coefficient for potassic fertilizers, however, is statistically significant
and takes a value of -0.25.29 This oddly suggests that higher value added to production in
the agricultural sector in the previous year will lead to a lower exports of potassic fertilizers
in the current period. Although it is unclear from the confines of the regression analysis,
perhaps the negative impact of “value added in the previous year” is a result of stockpiling
resources or demand shifts resulting from evolving agricultural techniques. For the varieties
in which the coefficient on value added is zero or close to zero, (while the coefficient is
not always significant) the coefficient suggests the value added in the previous period in
the corresponding sector has no to negligible impact on current exports of high technology
goods in these sector. This does not necessarily negate the importance of “pertinent usage”
in the demand for these goods. It may, however, suggest that pertinent usage is time specific
and can not be interpreted across different periods.
The coefficients on the gravity variable in Table 3.3 are largely consistent with expecta-
tions. For example, the distance variable is negative in all cases except for tape recorders
(891.1).30 In addition, the colony and language variables take, for the most part, a positive
sign. The coefficients on GDP are positive as well, while the coefficients on population are
29Potassic fertilizers is one of eight varieties for which the value added coefficient takes a negative sign.
30This refers to the regression where the value added variable is omitted.
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overwhelmingly negative as postulated. From this we can conclude that the gravity model
fits the estimation of disaggregated high-technology bilateral export flows fairly well.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper is unique as it is the first to distinguish between the market power and market
expansion effect of IPRs in developing countries by using highly disaggregated data on high
technology exports. The impact of developing country IPRs on high technology exports
from developed countries is contingent on a combination of variables such as production
and adaptation costs and whether the variety of the innovation can readily be used in the
domestic production processes. Innovations of high technology varieties such as potassic
fertilizers and synthetic, yarn, and artificial fibers are traditionally very pertinent to pro-
duction in developing countries. As a result, this allows innovating firms to markup prices
relatively higher than they could if the purchasing country had limited use for the good.
In addition, marginal production and adaptation costs of innovated goods in these cate-
gories are expectedly low. Increasing IPRs in developing countries, therefore, does not lead
to market expansion of these goods, but rather the market power effect dominates. High
technology goods that have relatively higher production and adaptation costs may exhibit
dominant market expansion effects in developing countries.
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Table 3.3: Developed Country High Tech Exports to Low Income Countries
(By Commodity Code)
513 513 514 514 515 515 533.1 533.1
log(IPR) 1.82*** -0.54 3.27* 3.38*** -1.95 -1.27 0.96 0.37
(1.78) (-0.25) (3.42) (1.67) (-0.95) (-0.29) (0.75) (0.14)
log(GDPrep) 2.35* 1.93** 3.37* 3.50* 3.61* 2.43 4.72* 4.06*
(5.55) (2.47) (8.31) (4.66) (3.82) (1.50) (8.20) (4.52)
log(GDPpart) 0.71 1.17 2.03* 1.96* 4.22* 6.72* 0.31 1.41
(1.41) (1.57) (4.24) (2.65) (2.69) (3.24) (0.40) (1.33)
log(Poprep) -1.30* -0.93 -2.16* -2.37* -1.86*** -0.83 -3.53* -3.16*
(-2.89) (-1.15) (-5.05) (-3.02) (-1.91) (-0.52) (-5.89) (-3.38)
log(Poppart) 0.77 0.33 -0.65 -0.43 -3.49** -5.82* 0.74 0.00
(1.43) (0.41) (-1.27) (-0.54) (-2.14) (-2.70) (0.91) (0.00)
colony 6.85* 4.49* 6.48* 4.42* 6.09* 4.53** 7.30* 6.21*
(8.69) (3.63) (8.63) (3.67) (5.15) (2.52) (8.13) (4.53)
log(distance) -3.93* -5.67* -3.61* -6.08* -2.75** -5.85* -4.08* -6.55*
(-7.30) (-5.88) (-7.24) (-6.49) (-2.30) (-2.76) (-5.78) (-5.33)
language 1.21** 2.17* 0.51 1.17 0.87 1.92 0.75 0.96
(2.36) (2.92) (1.08) (1.64) (0.97) (1.49) (1.12) (0.99)
1975 2.10* 0.82 2.48* 1.01 3.83** 1.30 0.64 -1.96
(2.62) (0.68) (3.24) (0.85) (2.26) (0.57) (0.61) (-1.34)
1980 4.02* 2.37** 3.35* 1.32 3.04*** 1.50 1.27 -1.78
(4.99) (1.99) (4.35) (1.12) (1.75) (0.65) (1.21) (-1.20)
1985 3.40* 3.38* 2.84* 2.11*** 0.89 -0.18 2.38** 0.33
(4.22) (2.84) (3.67) (1.81) (0.51) (-0.08) (2.26) (0.22)
1990 3.79* 3.45* 2.23* 1.32 4.17** 2.41 2.58** 0.75
(4.62) (2.82) (2.82) (1.09) (2.33) (0.99) (2.37) (0.49)
1995 2.14** 2.08 0.37 -0.25 4.52** 1.45 1.52 -0.97
(2.51) (1.59) (0.45) (-0.20) (2.45) (0.54) (1.34) (-0.58)
2000 0.83 1.63 -0.33 -2.65*** 2.40 -1.18 0.85 -1.61
(0.90) (1.03) (-0.37) (-1.72) (1.17) (-0.34) (0.70) (-0.76)




Constant -32.47* -13.58 -55.22* -31.87* -87.26* -78.24* -36.15* -20.06
(-4.67) (-1.10) (-8.21) (-2.64) (-4.95) (-2.97) (-3.73) (-1.29)
Observations 3007 1392 3013 1361 1023 541 1943 965
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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541 541 541.9 541.9 561.3 561.3 571.2 571.2
log(IPR) 6.66* 6.13* 2.77* 1.26 1.59 2.26 5.58*** 9.16
(9.37) (4.13) (2.80) (0.66) (0.49) (0.66) (1.88) (1.47)
log(GDPrep) 2.00* 2.11* 2.55* 2.63* 6.07* 3.01 0.28 -0.24
(7.26) (4.18) (6.21) (3.95) (3.82) (1.38) (0.22) (-0.11)
log(GDPpart) 3.80* 3.80* 2.44* 3.19* 2.19 1.54 1.09 -0.16
(12.20) (7.81) (4.68) (4.34) (0.91) (0.59) (0.51) (-0.05)
log(Poprep) -1.13* -1.44* -1.52* -1.86* -4.54* -1.50 1.59 2.61
(-3.79) (-2.65) (-3.43) (-2.69) (-2.88) (-0.69) (1.18) (1.15)
log(Poppart) -3.22* -3.10* -1.58* -2.13* -2.33 -1.76 0.25 1.52
(-9.19) (-5.70) (-2.85) (-2.73) (-0.88) (-0.62) (0.10) (0.46)
colony 5.16* 3.07* 7.88* 6.57* 2.06 2.11 13.74* 16.09*
(8.06) (3.05) (10.84) (6.28) (0.87) (0.85) (7.22) (4.50)
log(distance) -3.26* -4.04* -3.41* -5.41* -2.02 -2.76 -3.13*** -1.11
(-9.69) (-6.31) (-6.73) (-6.34) (-0.98) (-1.20) (-1.77) (-0.34)
language 1.86* 1.87* 1.44* 1.67* 0.65 0.84 1.63 2.78
(5.69) (3.79) (3.12) (2.60) (0.32) (0.40) (1.25) (1.41)
1975 0.86 -0.53 2.17* 1.04 -0.07 -1.42 3.96*** 3.75
(1.61) (-0.63) (2.60) (0.92) (-0.02) (-0.52) (1.81) (1.17)
1980 1.72* -0.18 2.94* 2.01*** -2.71 -5.83*** 3.66 2.03
(3.21) (-0.22) (3.52) (1.74) (-0.97) (-1.95) (1.62) (0.60)
1985 1.82* 1.21 3.69* 3.60* -1.42 -3.00 2.54 5.77***
(3.41) (1.45) (4.46) (3.16) (-0.50) (-1.02) (1.12) (1.74)
1990 1.87* 1.13 5.54* 3.99* -0.24 -1.50 5.57** 6.83***
(3.43) (1.32) (6.64) (3.44) (-0.08) (-0.49) (2.37) (1.94)
1995 1.15** 1.07 3.97* 3.48* -0.72 -2.80 1.08 0.44
(2.05) (1.18) (4.61) (2.84) (-0.24) (-0.86) (0.42) (0.11)
2000 -0.51 -1.12 5.07* 5.12* -5.53 -7.32** -2.51 -4.12







Constant -46.55* -36.55* -47.11* -34.07* -70.37** -29.36 -52.74** -69.87***
(-10.52) (-4.39) (-6.54) (-2.96) (-2.56) (-0.92) (-2.45) (-1.91)
Observations 4491 1876 2819 1359 700 658 584 335
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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571.4 571.4 581.1 581.1 581.2 581.2 651.6 651.6
log(IPR) 2.61 3.95 2.49* 5.04* 5.67* 7.44* 2.18*** 0.25
(1.37) (1.11) (2.65) (2.76) (6.75) (4.62) (1.83) (0.10)
log(GDPrep) 3.59* 4.55* 2.59* 2.78* 3.17* 2.56* 3.47* 2.51*
(4.35) (3.48) (6.81) (4.52) (9.43) (4.77) (6.72) (3.11)
log(GDPpart) 1.45 3.18*** 2.57* 2.94* 1.29* 1.44* 0.43 0.57
(1.03) (1.86) (6.01) (4.81) (3.57) (2.72) (0.83) (0.76)
log(Poprep) -2.66* -3.52* -1.60* -1.74* -2.25* -1.71* -2.25* -1.81**
(-3.11) (-2.71) (-3.93) (-2.72) (-6.22) (-3.05) (-4.11) (-2.16)
log(Poppart) -0.25 -1.62 -1.46* -1.86* 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.21
(-0.16) (-0.92) (-3.17) (-2.82) (0.16) (0.10) (0.29) (0.25)
colony 9.22* 10.18* 6.59* 5.10* 5.51* 3.15* 7.15* 5.99*
(7.63) (5.61) (8.80) (4.65) (7.63) (2.96) (7.79) (4.24)
log(distance) -3.17** -4.05** -4.14* -5.23* -3.08* -4.26* -0.39 -2.05**
(-2.51) (-2.06) (-8.61) (-6.59) (-7.64) (-6.39) (-0.68) (-2.05)
language 2.12** 1.12 -0.39 0.29 0.48 1.47** 0.06 -0.46
(2.01) (0.73) (-0.84) (0.45) (1.18) (2.57) (0.10) (-0.52)
1975 1.83 0.61 1.35*** 0.68 1.09*** -1.02 2.66* 0.64
(1.27) (0.32) (1.83) (0.65) (1.66) (-1.10) (2.75) (0.47)
1980 0.46 0.93 2.88* 2.19** 2.99* 1.13 3.42* 2.16
(0.30) (0.48) (3.92) (2.06) (4.57) (1.23) (3.53) (1.57)
1985 -1.61 -1.16 2.38* 2.87* 2.51* 2.08** 1.67*** 1.49
(-1.04) (-0.59) (3.21) (2.70) (3.82) (2.26) (1.69) (1.08)
1990 -2.36 -3.68*** 1.79** 1.92*** 4.13* 2.84* 1.42 1.49
(-1.44) (-1.71) (2.37) (1.79) (6.23) (3.01) (1.42) (1.05)
1995 -2.24 -2.88 3.14* 2.91* 3.18* 2.08** 0.38 0.24
(-1.32) (-1.26) (4.08) (2.60) (4.64) (2.09) (0.36) (0.16)
2000 -3.69** -5.08*** 1.93** 1.79 1.04 -0.94 0.06 0.08
(-1.98) (-1.83) (2.32) (1.32) (1.41) -0.79 (0.05) (0.04)
textile 0.00
(0.69)
other 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.45) (0.50) (0.86)
Constant -50.64* -73.78* -41.70* -39.14* -46.46* -35.29* -55.67* -27.83**
(-3.41) (-3.14) (-6.48) (-3.67) (-8.46) (-3.80) (-6.75) (-2.03)
Observations 1100 615 3169 1566 3838 1903 2478 1209
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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651.7 651.7 711.3 711.3 711.4 711.4 711.5 711.5
log(IPR) 2.82 3.11 1.33 3.01 2.58*** 1.68 3.68* 4.18**
(1.55) (0.83) (0.75) (0.76) (1.71) (0.49) (4.79) (2.47)
log(GDPrep) 4.16* 3.24** 3.37* 4.23* 2.05* 2.63** 1.94* 1.50*
(4.69) (2.43) (4.19) (2.92) (3.22) (2.29) (6.34) (2.71)
log(GDPpart) 0.96 0.87 2.16 4.11** 1.61*** 1.50 4.55* 4.76*
(1.14) (0.79) (1.52) (2.10) (1.85) (1.13) (12.76) (8.44)
log(Poprep) -2.47* -1.83 -1.78** -2.11 -0.80 -1.46 -1.28* -0.69
(-2.73) (-1.35) (-2.16) (-1.58) (-1.20) (-1.35) (-3.89) (-1.27)
log(Poppart) 0.05 0.02 -0.53 -2.14 -0.20 0.04 -3.31* -3.59*
(0.05) (0.02) (-0.36) (-1.08) (-0.20) (0.03) (-8.59) (-5.85)
colony 5.03* 3.83** 8.52* 10.10* 8.48* 7.23* 6.58* 5.21*
(4.10) (2.06) (7.26) (5.20) (8.16) (4.27) (10.02) (4.68)
log(distance) -5.00* -6.05* -2.53** -5.26** -3.18* -5.52* -2.91* -3.76*
(-5.32) (-3.74) (-2.27) (-2.42) (-3.82) (-3.56) (-7.63) (-4.84)
language 1.90*** 2.43*** -0.18 -0.68 1.60** 3.33* -1.05* -0.66
(1.94) (1.73) (-0.18) (-0.45) (2.19) (2.94) (-2.80) (-1.11)
1975 -0.69 0.42 3.70** 2.37 3.37* 3.94** 1.61* 1.29
(-0.50) (0.22) (2.52) (1.13) (2.79) (2.11) (2.75) (1.34)
1980 -1.76 0.01 4.86* 1.59 1.68 0.04 2.08* 1.86***
(-1.24) (0.00) (3.28) (0.73) (1.35) (0.02) (3.52) (1.93)
1985 -2.69*** -0.46 2.03 0.44 2.16*** 3.35*** 1.20** 1.44
(-1.88) (-0.24) (1.34) (0.21) (1.75) (1.77) (2.03) (1.52)
1990 -4.52* -2.56 2.46 -0.09 3.72* 5.07* 1.52** 0.81
(-3.02) (-1.25) (1.56) (-0.04) (2.97) (2.64) (2.54) (0.84)
1995 -5.85* -5.00** 1.56 -0.57 2.57*** 4.14** 0.86 0.99
(-3.81) (-2.14) (0.96) (-0.24) (1.96) (1.99) (1.38) (0.96)
2000 -5.78* -2.89 1.59 -0.02 0.48 2.41 -0.39 0.02
(-3.52) (-1.01) (0.90) (-0.01) (0.33) (0.91) (-0.59) (0.01)
textile 0.00
(0.70)
mach. & trans -0.01 0.00 -0.01**
(-0.81) (0.64) (-2.09)
Constant -39.93* -18.71 -81.37* -95.40* -52.22* -35.06 -62.30* -54.82*
(-3.04) (-0.86) (-5.33) (-3.46) (-5.00) (-1.61) (-12.17) (-4.92)
Observations 1341 704 1352 680 1894 896 3870 1550
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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711.6 711.6 711.8 711.8 714 714 724 724
log(IPR) 6.66* 3.01 3.91* 4.58*** 4.02* 4.65* 5.28* 5.28*
(3.91) (0.84) (3.22) (1.82) (6.02) (3.08) (7.43) (3.40)
log(GDPrep) 2.09* 1.56 2.01* 0.33 1.39* 1.15** 1.42* 1.57*
(2.68) (1.13) (3.95) (0.38) (5.34) (2.39) (5.27) (3.23)
log(GDPpart) 2.47*** 0.35 3.16* 3.38* 4.95* 5.25* 3.48* 3.65*
(1.91) (0.19) (4.24) (3.39) (15.78) (10.19) (11.32) (7.48)
log(Poprep) 0.30 0.69 -0.42 0.98 -0.84* -0.61 -0.79* -0.91***
(0.38) (0.54) (-0.78) (1.21) (-2.96) (-1.30) (-2.68) (-1.90)
log(Poppart) -1.16 1.49 -2.19* -2.25** -4.32* -4.63* -2.76* -3.23*
(-0.85) (0.77) (-2.80) (-2.15) (-12.65) (-8.19) (-8.08) (-5.93)
colony 6.93* 7.05* 7.60* 7.31* 4.80* 3.89* 4.90* 3.95*
(5.98) (3.94) (9.09) (5.45) (8.12) (3.78) (7.65) (3.66)
log(distance) -2.33** -2.25 -3.21* -2.23** -2.47* -3.07* -0.24 -0.02
(-2.30) (-1.26) (-5.02) (-1.97) (-7.93) (-4.73) (-0.75) (-0.03)
language 1.26 1.87 1.24** 0.45 1.38* 1.45* 1.35* 1.05**
(1.47) (1.42) (2.15) (0.53) (4.51) (2.86) (4.22) (2.06)
1975 6.32* 6.73* 1.94*** 1.86 0.48 -0.37 2.17* 0.29
(3.66) (2.77) (1.92) (1.31) (0.94) (-0.42) (4.07) (0.34)
1980 11.23* 11.37* 1.13 1.79 0.87*** 0.39 2.60* 1.43***
(6.70) (4.73) (1.10) (1.24) (1.69) (0.45) (4.84) (1.65)
1985 11.87* 12.65* 1.95*** 1.63 1.32** 1.53*** 2.32* 2.04**
(7.07) (5.38) (1.91) (1.15) (2.56) (1.78) (4.32) (2.36)
1990 12.55* 13.61* 4.41* 4.03* 2.65* 2.10** 3.15* 1.96**
(7.29) (5.60) (4.27) (2.81) (5.09) (2.44) (5.77) (2.27)
1995 6.07* 8.29* 4.86* 5.44* 2.28* 2.69* 3.12* 3.00*
(3.40) (3.21) (4.55) (3.57) (4.24) (2.93) (5.54) (3.24)
2000 6.79* 8.85* 3.31* 4.87* 1.86* 2.12*** 3.08* 2.06***
(3.60) (2.88) (2.84) (2.59) (3.20) (1.83) (5.06) (1.75)
mach. & trans -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01**
(-1.52) (0.39) (1.22) (-2.30)
Constant -97.10* -77.18* -66.13* -65.53* -55.23* -50.53* -65.15* -62.78*
(-6.69) (-2.92) (-6.75) (-3.78) (-12.32) (-5.22) (-14.19) (-6.56)
Observations 1519 710 2322 1115 4306 1696 4573 1798
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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729.3 729.3 729.7 729.7 729.9 729.9 734 734
log(IPR) 1.97*** 2.95 -4.78 -21.67 4.35* 4.96* 2.50*** 1.99
(1.94) (1.50) (-0.36) (-0.54) (5.58) (2.91) (1.77) (0.66)
log(GDPrep) 2.42* 2.19* -1.81 -4.58 2.28* 1.90* 2.51* 2.51**
(5.93) (3.38) (-0.37) (-0.41) (7.29) (3.49) (4.31) (2.55)
log(GDPpart) 3.42* 2.75* 3.12 5.34 3.05* 3.35* 2.14** 2.24***
(6.32) (3.71) (0.38) (0.57) (7.88) (5.89) (2.56) (1.94)
log(Poprep) -1.02** -0.86 2.66 3.52 -1.24* -0.99*** -1.52** -1.53
(-2.33) (-1.28) (0.50) (0.39) (-3.68) (-1.86) (-2.45) (-1.62)
log(Poppart) -2.06* -1.13 -2.26 -4.93 -2.11* -2.75* -0.88 -1.07
(-3.53) (-1.41) (-0.24) (-0.46) (-5.04) (-4.42) (-0.98) (-0.86)
colony 6.68* 4.87* 1.01 -2.77 5.97* 4.79* 3.93* 0.65
(9.03) (4.42) (0.18) (-0.36) (9.13) (4.39) (3.82) (0.39)
log(distance) -2.90* -3.68* -0.09 -9.46 -1.80* -2.77* -2.37* -2.47***
(-5.81) (-4.48) (-0.01) (-0.77) (-4.71) (-3.79) (-3.30) (-1.91)
language 1.97* 2.26* 2.97 10.81 0.51 0.57 2.89* 3.76*
(4.26) (3.50) (0.61) (1.31) (1.40) (1.03) (4.65) (4.00)
1975 2.55* 1.64 1.45 -3.87 2.39* 1.79*** 2.74** 1.17
(3.01) (1.41) (0.25) (-0.46) (3.95) (1.93) (2.53) (0.73)
1980 3.24* 1.77 2.10 1.98 3.11* 1.75*** 3.56* 2.68***
(3.82) (1.49) (0.36) (0.22) (5.10) (1.85) (3.26) (1.66)
1985 2.97* 2.66** -9.12 -9.63 2.19* 1.32 2.20** 1.71
(3.50) (2.26) (-1.19) (-0.83) (3.54) (1.40) (1.99) (1.06)
1990 4.64* 4.70* -4.82 -7.33 2.67* 1.79*** 1.19 0.71
(5.44) (3.95) (-0.68) (-0.65) (4.25) (1.89) (1.04) (0.44)
1995 4.42* 3.73* -3.15 -2.4 2.26* 2.08** 1.95*** 1.99
(5.01) (2.96) (0.42) (0.19) (3.49) (2.06) (1.67) (1.14)
2000 4.88* 4.72* 10.67 15.05 1.50** 1.25 1.11 1.37
(5.15) (3.15) (1.12) (0.58) (2.13) (0.97) (0.86) (0.62)




Constant -74.41* -63.55* -60.24 54.55 -63.32* -46.56* -59.08* -55.03*
(-10.36) (-5.49) (-0.61) (0.24) (-11.55) (-4.22) (-5.59) (-2.86)
Observations 2923 1477 158 125 3697 1543 2554 1174
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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861 861 862 862 891.1 891.1
log(IPR) 5.24* 6.14* 2.77* 3.62*** 3.34* 4.02**
(8.46) (5.07) (2.89) (1.96) (3.91) (2.49)
log(GDPrep) 1.79* 1.55* 2.27* 1.96* 1.73* 2.03*
(7.42) (3.97) (5.84) (3.14) (5.06) (3.71)
log(GDPpart) 4.96* 5.28* 1.89* 2.56* 2.84* 3.16*
(18.04) (13.10) (4.19) (3.95) (7.01) (5.52)
log(Poprep) -1.10* -1.08* -1.47* -1.27*** -0.97* -1.40**
(-4.21) (-2.61) (-3.51) (-1.94) (-2.61) (-2.44)
log(Poppart) -4.30* -4.61* -0.80 -1.23*** -2.28* -2.55*
(-14.17) (-10.26) (-1.64) (-1.74) (-5.18) (-4.09)
colony 4.52* 3.00* 6.66* 5.28* 6.81* 5.05*
(7.93) (3.53) (9.10) (4.91) (9.91) (5.06)
log(distance) -1.77* -2.32* -3.12* -3.88* 0.07 -1.69**
(-6.17) (-4.73) (-6.58) (-4.79) (0.16) (-2.43)
language 0.87* 1.22* 0.95** 1.53** 1.27* 1.61*
(3.04) (2.97) (2.03) (2.38) (3.25) (2.90)
1975 1.64* 0.63 2.00* 1.09 2.86* 1.99**
(3.51) (0.93) (2.62) (1.02) (4.21) (2.08)
1980 1.97* 0.74 3.75* 2.65** 3.78* 3.14*
(4.20) (1.07) (4.93) (2.45) (5.55) (3.26)
1985 1.43* 1.21*** 2.34* 2.34** 3.28* 3.36*
(3.02) (1.73) (3.07) (2.17) (4.81) (3.48)
1990 1.93* 1.20*** 3.57* 2.46** 2.73* 2.54**
(4.05) (1.69) (4.61) (2.21) (3.91) (2.53)
1995 1.51* 1.17 2.57* 2.15*** 2.11* 2.46**
(3.06) (1.57) (3.21) (1.83) (2.93) (2.35)
2000 0.41 -0.79 1.09 -0.42 0.89 0.27
(0.77) (-0.89) (1.26) (-0.30) (1.14) (0.22)
other 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.75) (0.48) (1.39)
Constant -66.25* -59.61* -39.90* -40.74* -64.88* -53.32*
(-15.94) (-8.55) (-5.93) (-3.71) (-10.91) (-5.46)
Observations 4615 2191 2967 1468 3262 1591
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗∗∗ = 90% significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The
comparison year for the year dummies is 1970.
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891.2 891.2 894.3 894.3 899.6 899.6
log(IPR) 1.83** 2.76 4.52* 4.72*** 0.08 -1.14
(1.99) (1.58) (3.21) (1.72) (0.06) (-0.46)
log(GDPrep) 2.38* 1.97* 1.97* 1.10 4.24* 3.52*
(6.51) (3.41) (3.14) (1.05) (7.50) (4.14)
log(GDPpart) 1.34* 1.81* -0.46 -1.34 3.55* 4.50*
(3.09) (2.91) (-0.56) (-1.24) (4.54) (4.44)
log(Poprep) -1.48* -1.02*** -1.30** -0.64 -2.78* -2.36*
(-3.73) (-1.67) (-1.97) (-0.60) (-4.66) (-2.71)
log(Poppart) -0.25 -0.39 1.77** 2.92** -3.28* -4.37*
(-0.51) (-0.57) (1.98) (2.47) (-4.04) (-4.20)
colony 6.77* 5.39* 6.60* 5.42* 6.71* 6.33*
(9.59) (5.23) (6.59) (3.72) (7.90) (5.39)
log(distance) -0.28 -1.61** -3.24* -4.40* -4.15* -4.53*
(-0.67) (-2.26) (-3.91) (-3.23) (-5.62) (-3.89)
language 1.76* 1.67* 1.00 1.46 1.96* 1.79**
(4.32) (2.92) (1.21) (1.27) (3.18) (2.21)
1975 2.92* 2.25** -0.33 -0.54 2.13*** 1.69
(3.83) (2.10) (-0.30) (-0.35) (1.94) (1.18)
1980 3.78* 3.37* 0.71 0.31 4.50* 4.18*
(4.95) (3.11) (0.64) (0.19) (4.15) (2.93)
1985 3.83* 3.94* -0.92 0.21 4.13* 4.09*
(5.03) (3.61) (-0.81) (0.13) (3.80) (2.88)
1990 6.90* 6.09* -2.48** -1.24 4.55* 5.37*
(9.02) (5.52) (-2.06) (-0.74) (4.11) (3.72)
1995 7.29* 7.79* -1.66 -0.35 4.79* 4.63*
(9.24) (6.75) (-1.35) (-0.20) (4.21) (2.99)
2000 7.48* 7.64* -4.11* -2.35 4.13* 5.25*
(8.82) (5.66) (-3.02) (-1.12) (3.35) (2.83)
other 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
(0.68) (1.69) (0.25)
Constant -64.54* -62.12* -18.49*** 1.63 -58.68* -51.67*
(-10.51) (-6.13) (-1.76) (0.10) (-5.75) (-3.44)
Observations 3377 1660 1448 786 1872 992
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗∗∗ = 90% significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The
comparison year for the year dummies is 1970.
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Chapter 4
Do Intellectual Property Rights Increase
Export Activity in Developing Countries?
4.1 Introduction
Development policies centered on export promotion have become increasingly popular
strategies for stimulating economic growth in developing countries. At the same time, many
developing countries have begun to implement intellectual property rights (IPRs), often
upon the suggestion of the industrialized world. This paper examines the link between
these two policies by examining the role that patent policies have on export activity in
developing countries. While past research in the area of IPRs and trade focused on the role
that domestic IPRs play in attracting imports, the focus of this paper lies in the role of
domestic IPRs in creating exports.
There is some sector specific evidence that domestic IPRs do play a role in increasing
export activity in developing countries. For example, domestic generic pharmaceutical firms
in Jordan (a lower-middle income country according to the World Bank’s classification) at-
tribute the thirty percent increase in export activity between 1999 and 2002 to a national
strengthening of IPRs during this period (Holden 2006). This paper provides more macroe-
conomic and empirical support for the notion that stronger domestic IPRs increase exports
in developing countries.
The theoretical model presented in this paper suggests that the increase in total exports
resulting from stronger domestic IPRs is a consequence of increased exports of newly inno-
vated goods as well as greater exports of existing goods that have become more efficient to
produce as a result of increased technological spillovers from greater level of inward FDI.
Empirical analysis supports the theoretical model that IPR policies serve as an effective
path to achieve export led development.
Section 2 will provide a brief discussion of related literature. The theoretical model will
be introduced in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data, methodology, and key empirical
results. Sections 5 concludes.
4.2 Relevant Literature
Literature on the relationship between bilateral trade and IPRs has focused on whether
domestic IPRs attract imports. Primo Braga and Fink (1999, 2005) found that stronger
domestic IPRs increase imports of non-fuel goods. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) found
similar results and concluded that domestic IPRs increase manufacturing imports into both
small and large developing countries. Smith (2002) narrowed the analysis and looked at
how foreign IPRs affected exports of pharmaceutical goods from the United States. Smith
concluded that foreign IPRs increase US exports of pharmaceutical goods only if the trade
partner has strong imitative abilities. Yang and Woo (2006) found that domestic IPRs have
no impact on agricultural imports. Briggs (2008b) considers developing-country imports of
a variety of high technology goods from developed countries and finds that IPRs have a
significant impact on attracting high technology imports if and only if the marginal cost of
adapting and producing the good is adequately below the mark-up in price.
While these articles look at the role domestic IPRs play in attracting imports, the rela-
tionship between domestic IPRs and export platforms has received little attention. Instead,
most research has focused on the relationship between innovation and export activity. The
impact of innovation on export behavior is central to the product life cycle models seen in
papers such as Vernon (1966), Krugman (1979), and Dollar (1986). Such product life cycle
models postulate that innovation is the driving force behind export activity of developed
95
countries. These models, however, consider innovation to be an exogenous influence on
exports.
More recent explorations of the link between innovation and export activity consider the
possibility that innovation and export activity are endogenous. While innovation may lead
to more exports, it is also possible that those countries and firms that engage in exporta-
tion embody qualities that lead them to innovate. Such endogeneity was incorporated by
Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1991), Young (1991), Smith et. al. (2002), and Lachenmaier
and Wossmann (2006). The general conclusion is that innovation stimulates export activity
in industrialized countries. More pertinent to the focus of this paper, however, is research
that considers innovation and export activity in developing countries.
Young (1991) finds that when engaged in less restricted trade, less developed countries
(LDCs) experience rates of technological progress at or below levels they would expect to
achieve in autarky. He attributes this to the belief that, in the presence of free trade, LDCs
specialize in the production of lower technology goods in which “learning by doing” has
already been exhausted. In the absence of free trade more laborers work in “advanced”
domestic industries (“advanced by LDC standards”) therefore leading to greater levels of
technological advancement via learning by doing. Young acknowledges that static gains
from trade that occur when countries utilize their comparative advantages may still result
in trade being welfare-improving.
Other literature related to the IPR-innovation-export triad includes research examining
the relationship between IPRs and innovation. Empirical investigation by Schneider (2005)
led her to conclude that IPRs do in fact increase innovation, although the effect is larger in
developed countries. A partial equilibrium model developed by Chen and Puttitanun (2005)
confirms Schneider’s empirical findings that there is a positive relationship between IPRs
and innovation, which may increase as a country develops.1
1Literature on optimal patent policy often explores the relationship between innovation and IPRs. Lit-
erature on optimal patent breadth and length examines the optimal level of patent protection given the
subsequent benefits from innovation versus the costs to producers and consumers. IPRs provide firms with
incentives to innovate by protecting against the pirating of innovated technologies likely developed as a con-
sequence of significant research and development costs. Stronger IPRs, however, do not necessarily translate
into higher welfare for countries as a whole. Welfare maximization and cost minimization models are often
used to analyze optimal patent policies. William Nordhaus (1969, 1972), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klem-
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To summarize, although research exists linking IPRs and innovation, and innovation
and exports, there is little literature examining the link between IPRs and exports. This
paper will attempt to answer whether IPRs play a role in generating export platforms in
developing countries, either directly or indirectly. Many developing countries embrace the
idea of export led growth, so it is worthwhile to examine whether stronger IPRs help create
an environment that enables them to achieve increased export activity. In the next section,
a theoretical model is established to explore these issues.
4.3 Theoretical Model
It is assumed that the domestic market in developing countries is composed of two types
of firms, (1) innovating firms that produce and sell new goods and (2) firms that produce
and sell an existing good. As a consequence, total developing country exports are comprised
of these two types of goods.
Xtotal = Xnew +Xexisting (4.1)
The impact of intellectual property rights on the exports of newly innovated goods and
existing goods will first be discussed separately, and then brought together to assess the
impact of IPRs on total exports as represented by (4.1).
4.3.1 Exports of Newly Innovated Goods
The volume of domestic exports of newly innovated goods is a linear function of the
number of new domestic products sold on the foreign market.
Xnew =MI(β) (4.2)
perer (1990), Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001), and Gallini (1992) examined the theory behind optimal patent
choice. Nordhaus (1972), Hopenhayn and Mitchell, and Gallini paid particular attention to how spillover
effects impact innovation, and ultimately the optimal choice of IPRs. Although this paper does not examine
the optimal choice in IPRs (and instead takes IPRs as exogenously given), the models of optimal patent
policy are important as they underscore the idea that various levels of IPRs do in fact impact a country’s
innovation in a variety of ways.
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where I is the number of newly innovated products sold on the foreign market, β is the
level of domestic IPRs, and M is the quantity of each product that is imported by a foreign
market.2 Stronger IPRs lead to increased innovation and, therefore, a greater number of
innovated goods sold on the foreign market, or I ′(β) > 0.3 (Chen and Puttitanun (2005)
have provided theoretical evidence to support this assertion.) M is related to the size of the
importing country. The larger the economy of the trade partner, the more of each innovated
good that will be exported.
The impact of a change in IPRs on exports of new goods is positive. This fact is
demonstrated in (4.3)
Xnewβ =MI
′(β) > 0 (4.3)
where
Xnew is exports of newly innovated goods,
M is the quantity of each product that is imported by a foreign market (M is related
to the size of the importing market),
I is the number of newly innovated goods appropriate for sale on the foreign market,
β is the level of domestic IPRs.
It may seem difficult to find a good estimate for the number of new products a coun-
try sells on the foreign market to use in empirical analysis. However, a common estimate
of total innovation, patent counts, is well suited to approximate such “foreign market ap-
propriate” newly innovated goods. Patent counts are increasingly used to approximate a
country’s innovative achievements (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). However, using domestic
patent count data is problematic as (1) less-developed countries often lack sufficient data
on domestic patents and (2) collecting data on patent counts from individual country data
2The number of newly innovated products refers to the number of different types of newly innovated
goods. This is distinctly different from the total volume of newly innovated products sold on the foreign
market.
3The influences of other factors that impact innovation such as institutional quality and human capital
are assumed away as they bring no additional information in assessing the relationship between IPRs and
exports in the theoretical model.
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sources may not be comparable as individual legal standards such as patent breadth may
vary across countries. To ensure standardized data, patent count data reported by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), European Patent Office (EPO), or
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) are often used. The USPTO, EPO, JPO are the three patent
offices receiving the greatest number of filings both domestically an internationally (OECD,
2004). Therefore, countries have the greatest likelihood of applying for a patent in one of
these three countries.
Patent counts reported by organizations such as the USPTO may be an insufficient
measure of innovation in a country as innovators in foreign countries are not likely to apply
to patent all domestic innovations for protection on the US market. This is because some
domestic innovations likely have more domestic appeal than foreign appeal. This might
occur because inventions have little use in industrialized, foreign markets or because in-
dividuals/firms are not familiar with processes to receive international patents. (Further
discussion on the use of patent counts to estimate innovation is explored in Appendix C.1.)
Although USPTO patent counts are a flawed measure of innovative achievements in a
country, they are better used to approximate innovation of goods that have potential use
abroad. And, if an innovation has a use abroad, it is also a good candidate for export from
the domestic innovating country. Therefore, this paper assumes that a country’s exports
of newly innovated goods is a linear function of the number of patents granted to them by
the USPTO. As a consequence, data on USPTO patent grants are used to approximate the
number of newly innovated products that are sold in foreign markets, I, in later empirical
analysis.
4.3.2 Exports of Existing Goods
The influence of developing country IPRs on exports of existing goods can be modeled
using a profit maximization equation for a representative (perfectly competitive) firm that
chooses the quantity of goods to produce for the domestic (developing country) market
as well as the quantity to produce for the foreign market. The general structure of this
component of the theoretical model resembles that used by Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison
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(1997). (Aitken, et.al. did not include IPRs or innovation in their model, but they did
create a general model for a representative firm’s choice in export quantity.)
It is assumed that N firms are identical to one another, so that the impact of an increase
in IPRs on the decision making of one representative firm is the same as the impact on the
entire country. The quantities the representative firm produces for each market, domestic
and foreign, are determined from a profit maximizing equation. Although multiple export
markets are likely, for simplicity exporting to the foreign market is considered a single
decision.
The profit maximizing equation includes both total costs and total revenues. Total costs
for each firm are comprised of firm level production and distribution costs. The equation
representing total costs is as follows:
h(qd + qf , F,A) +md(qd) +mf (qf ) (4.4)
where d represents the domestic market, f represents the foreign market, h() is the common
function for production costs regardless of the intended market, md() is the cost function for
distributing the good to the domestic market, mf () is the cost function for distributing the
good to the foreign market, F is a function of fixed production costs that enter additively
into the cost function, and A is fixed economy-wide FDI acquisition costs. Since each of
the N identical firms acquires an equal proportion of inward FDI, the fixed cost to this
acquisition is 1N th of total FDI acquisition costs, A(θ), where θ is total domestic inward
FDI. Economy wide inward FDI is assumed to be exogenous, such that each individual firm
cannot choose its level of inward FDI.
Total domestic inward FDI is assumed to result in technology transfer to domestic firms,
which will make domestic capital more efficient. With more efficient capital, the unit cost of
production is lower. Let kθ represent the reduction in cost due to the technological transfer
to the domestic firm that results from inward FDI.
A change in domestic IPRs will cause a chain reaction throughout the domestic economy.
An increase in domestic IPRs will reduce imitation in the sector specific to the innovated
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good. Imitation allows for a more competitive market. Therefore, a reduction in imitation in
a given industry corresponds to a social cost associated with moving away from a perfectly
competitive market. The reduction in imitation, however, will have a welfare improving
effect as foreign firms find it more attractive to invest in the domestic market. Sector
specific increases in FDI will generate an increase in economy wide technology transfer
to domestic firms, as elements of sector specific FDI can be applied in other sectors where
imitation is not a concern to the foreign firm. For example, FDI in one sector may introduce
management and production techniques that can be used in a variety of sectors.
It is assumed that the economy wide externalities from an increase in IPRs exceed the
social sector-specific costs of moving towards a less competitive market. Theoretically, the
overriding positive economy wide effect is captured by the assumption that θ′(β) > 0,
indicating that strengthening domestic IPRs lead to an increase in inward FDI and a net
benefit via technology transfer.
Simple functional forms of the cost functions provide an optimizing equation for exports
that leads itself to empirical estimation. The functional form of production costs is detailed
in (4.5) and the functional form for distribution costs to the domestic and foreign markets
are found in equations (4.6) and (4.7), respectively. These functional forms resemble those
used by Aitken, et.al. (1997) and lead to a manageable profit maximization equation.
h(qd + qf , F ) =
a
2






q2d + cdqd (4.6)
mf (qf ) =
bf
2
q2f + cfqf (4.7)
where k, a, bd, bf cd, and cf are scalar parameters;
h(qd + qf , F ) is production costs;
md(qd) is distribution costs to the domestic market;
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mf (qf ) is distribution costs to the foreign market;
F is a function of fixed production costs
A is total FDI acquisition costs for the domestic country
N is the number of (identical) firms in the domestic economy that enter additively;
θ is FDI.
.
The representative firm maximizes profit by choosing the quantity to produce for the
domestic market (qd) and the foreign market (qf ). The profit function in (4.8) embodies
total revenue minus total cost for the representative firm.
max︸︷︷︸
qd,qf









where Pd and Pf are the price of the (existing) good on the domestic and foreign market,
respectively.
Maximization of (4.8) yields the following first order conditions:
∂pi
∂qd
: Pd − a(qd + qf ) + kθ − bdqd − cd = 0 (4.9)
∂pi
∂qf
: Pf − a(qd + qf ) + kθ − bfqf − cf = 0 (4.10)
From the first order conditions shown in (4.9) and (4.10), the implicit function theorem can
be used to determine the impact that a change in IPRs will have on the quantity produced
for the foreign market.










The Hessian in (4.11) is positive definite. This is demonstrated below in (4.12).
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H =(−a− bd)(−a− bf )− (a)2 (4.12)
=a2 + abd + abf − a2
=abd + abf
Since each component of the above equation is positive, it can be concluded that |H| > 0.





It has already been shown that |H| > 0. Therefore, the entire sign of (4.13) will take the
sign of the numerator. The numerator is equal to bdkθβ > 0 indicating that
∂qf
∂β > 0. This
implies that stronger IPRs will increase exports of existing goods by each representative
firm. Since the representative firm is assumed to be identical to all other firms producing
existing goods, exports of existing goods from the domestic economy, Xexisting = Nqf ,
where N is the number of firms in the domestic market producing existing goods. It should,
therefore, also be noted that Xexistingβ = N
∂qf
∂β > 0.
4.3.3 Total Export Activity
As revealed in equation (4.1), total domestic exports are a linear combination of exports
of newly innovated goods and exports of existing goods. Given the linear structure of total
exports, the impact of IPRs on total exports is also a linear combination of the impact of
IPRs on exports of newly innovated goods and the impact of IPRs on exports of existing
goods. As a consequence, the impact of IPRs on total exports is theoretically positive.
Xtotal = Xnew +Xexisting ⇒ Xtotalβ = Xnewβ +Xexistingβ > 0 (4.14)
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Given the above theory, there is reason to believe that higher IPRs in developing coun-
tries will generate greater export activity. The next step is to explore whether there is
empirical evidence of this hypothesis.
4.4 Empirical Estimation
This section first discusses the estimating equation for bilateral exports as derived from
the theoretical model. Endogeneity problems and estimation techniques are then explored,
and empirical results reported.
4.4.1 Estimating Equation for Exports
The estimating equation for bilateral exports used in this paper models the components






















a, bd, bf , and k are scalar parameters in the production and distribution costs functions,
θ is FDI,
N is the number of firms in the domestic market producing existing goods
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M is a linear function (related to the size of the importing market) that
determines how many of each newly innovated good will be exported,
I is the number of newly innovated goods appropriate for sale on the foreign market,
β is the level of domestic IPRs.
While it is not practical to estimate (4.15) directly, the estimating equation for bilateral
exports used in this paper approximates (4.15). This estimating equation is as follows:
logXdft =α0 + α1 log(GDP)dt + α2 log(GDP)ft + α3 log( ˆInnovation)dt (4.16)
+ α4 log( ˆFDI)dt + α5 log(IPR)dt − α6 log(distance)df + εdft + µd + ηt.
where d denotes the domestic country, f denotes the foreign country, and Xdft is the value of
exports from country d arriving in country f at time t.4 The estimating equation in (4.16)
resembles the logged transformation of the gravity model for bilateral trade flows, which
has proven to be successful in estimating bilateral trade flows.5 (The theoretical basis of
the gravity model for trade hinges on the supply and demand forces between two countries.
These supply and demand forces are related to the relative economic size of the two trading
countries, adjusting for the distance between them.)
Each variable included as a regressor in (4.16) can be linked to a component of equation
(4.15) in the theoretical model. Domestic and foreign GDP capture the relative size of the
exporting and importing markets and are used to approximate the information embodied
in N and M , respectively. A measure of innovation is included to capture the effects of I in
(4.15). A measure of inward FDI is included as a regressor to approximate the impact of θ
on bilateral exports. The variable for physical distance between trade partners is included
to capture the effect bd and bf , which are scalars in the cost function for distributing goods.
4The estimating equations for ˆInnovation and ˆFDI will be discussed in more detail later.
5See Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1995), Feenstra et. al. (2001) and Eaton and
Kortum (2002).
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Notice that the sign on the distance equation is negative, signaling that distribution costs will
be higher the greater the distance between trading partners, which will have an expectedly
negative impact on bilateral exports. Lastly, a measure for IPRs, β, is also included in the
regressor to capture the effect that IPRs on export activity.
A Tobit model is used to estimate bilateral trade flows as it accounts for the possibility of
zero trade. The Tobit model contains a discrete component, which accounts for differences
between zero and positive trade values, as well as a continuous component, which accounts





yit = y∗it if y
∗
it > 0
yit = 0 if y∗it = 0.
where yit is the dependent variable and xit is the vector of independent variables.
4.4.2 Problems with Endogeneity
From the theoretical model, it has been established that both innovation and foreign
direct investment are functions of IPRs in a given period. As a result some of the regressors
in equation (4.16) are correlated with the error term. Estimating (4.16) using OLS would,
therefore, lead to inconsistent and biased results. An instrumental variables approach is
instead used to mitigate endogeneity among regressors.
The estimating equation in (4.16) contains two endogenous variables. Therefore, in order
to utilize instrumental variable estimation, at least two variables must be identified that are
correlated with FDI and/or innovation, but uncorrelated with the error term in the export
equation. These excluded exogenous variables will serve as instruments in the empirical
estimation of bilateral exports.
In order to identify instruments, it is first important to identify which variables are
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correlated with the two endogenous variables. In doing so, the estimating equation for
innovation is first explored, followed by the estimating equation for FDI.
Estimating Innovation
Chen and Puttitanun (2005) model innovative output as a function of IPRs, per capita
GDP, tertiary school enrollment rates, economic freedom, and population. Schneider (2005)
estimated innovation as a function of IPRs, human capital stock, high technology imports,
research and development, GDP, FDI, and infrastructure. The production function for
innovation used in this paper is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form with inputs that
closely resemble those used by Chen and Puttitanun.
Innovation is assumed to be a function of domestic IPRs, domestic GDP, tertiary school
enrollment rates, business environment, population, and R&D expenditures. Each α coef-
ficient in the estimating equation can be interpreted as the elasticity of that variable with
respect to innovation. In most research where innovation is the dependent variable,6 each
explanatory variable is assumed to have a constant elasticity such that a change in the
explanatory variable will have the same change in innovation, regardless of the initial value
of the variable. The constant elasticity of the explanatory variables is captured by the fact
that each explanatory variable enters into log form in equation (4.17), below.
log(Innovation)it =α0 + α1 log(IPR)it + α2 log(R&D)it + α3 log(GDP)it (4.17)
+ α4 log(tertiary school enrollment)it + α5 log(business environment)it
+ α6 log(population)it + εit + µi + ηt.
Innovation is expected to have a positive relationship with all of the above variables. A
more sound business environment creates an economic environment capable of effectively
utilizing innovation. Population is included as a regressor so to control for possible scale
effects that may arise from the assumption that countries with larger populations will likely
6See Smith (2005), Chen and Puttitanun (2005), Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984, 1986).
107
have a larger number of innovations (or patent counts) simply because they are more pop-
ulous. Chen and Puttitanun (2005) provided theoretical support for the expected positive
relationship between IPRs and innovation; in other words, they found theoretical support
for the previously assumed notion that I ′(β) > 0. This assumption arises from the belief
that stronger IPRs support an environment conducive to innovation. Chen and Puttita-
nun also provided theoretical support for the positive relationship between innovation and
output concluding that innovation will be greater in more developed countries.
A discussion of the specific data used to estimate (4.17) will take place later in the paper.
Before doing so, however, an estimation equation for the second endogenous variable, inward
FDI, is discussed.
Estimating Inward FDI
There are many components that impact inward FDI in a country. It is assumed that:
Inward FDI = f(IPRs, business environment, GDP, population, K in the previous period) (4.18)
Each of the variables in (4.18) is expected to have a positive impact on FDI. Stronger IPRs
in country i should attract more inward FDI into this country. In addition, a more sound
business environment will also attract more FDI. The larger a country, as approximated by
GDP, the greater the capacity for inward FDI. Similarly, the more populous a country, the
greater the opportunity for domestic labor to support inward FDI. Lastly, capital stock in
the previous period is related to how attractive foreign investors may find the market in the
current period. In the context of developing countries, higher levels of capital stock in the
previous period suggest that the domestic economy may be able to support further capital
investments, therefore making the domestic market more attractive to inward FDI. This
contrasts with the possible effect that higher levels of capital in the previous period signal
a saturated market, which is better suited for developed countries.
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As with the production function for innovation, the production function for FDI is as-
sumed to be Cobb-Douglas in form. Such a Cobb-Douglas form lends itself to an estimation
equation for FDI that is linear in logs. The specific estimating equation for inward FDI is
as follows:
log(Inward FDI)it =θ0 + θ1 log(IPRs)it + θ2 log(business environment)it (4.19)
+θ3 log(GDP)it + θ4 log(population)it + θ5 log(K)i,t−5 + εit + µi + ηt
where t − 5 represents the previous period for which there is complete data. (Data on the
IPR Index is available every fifth year.)
Empirical estimation of the innovation and FDI equations support that the specified
independent variables are in fact statistically significant in explaining innovation and inward
FDI, respectively.
Identification
Given the explanatory variables for innovation and inward FDI listed in (4.17) and (4.19),
respectively, the bilateral export equation is over-identified. The number of excluded exoge-
nous variables in the innovation equation (R&D expenditures, tertiary school enrollment,
business environment, population of the domestic economy, and capital in the previous pe-
riod) exceeds the number of included endogenous variables in the bilateral export equation
(innovation and inward FDI). Over or exact-identification is a necessary condition for two
stage, instrumental variables estimation.
Empirical tests indicate that the above excluded exogenous variables are valid instru-
ments in that they are not correlated with the error term in the export equation. To test this,
tertiary school enrollment, business environment, and physical capital in the previous period
are included in the estimation equation for bilateral exports, leaving R&D expenditures and
population in the domestic economy to serve as instruments in the two-stage estimation.
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A joint F-test supports that tertiary school enrollment, business environment, and capi-
tal in the previous period are jointly insignificant in determining bilateral exports. Then,
R&D expenditures and population in the domestic economy are included in the estimation
equation for bilateral exports leaving tertiary school enrollment, business environment, and
capital in the previous period to serve as instruments in the two-stage estimation. Again, a
joint F-test supports that R&D expenditures and population in the domestic economy are
jointly insignificant in determining bilateral exports.
4.4.3 Data Description
In order to estimate exports from developing countries, criteria for “developing” must
first be established. A country is considered “developing” if it is a low or lower-middle
income country. Country classifications were obtained from the World Bank. A country is
considered low income if 2005 per capita GNI is below $875, while a country is considered
lower-middle income if 2005 per capita GNI is between $876 and $3,465.
The dependent variable in the export equation is bilateral exports from developing coun-
tries. Data on bilateral trade flows were obtained from the United Nation’s Commodity
Trade Database (Comtrade). Trade values for imports from the UN’s Comtrade database
are stated in “free on board” (fob) terms. This means the value reported for export data
includes the transaction value of the good and the cost to transport the good to the border
of the exporting country, as well as loading costs. Trade values, rather than trade quantities,
are used so to keep the data measurements consistent across countries and commodities.7
Independent variables in the bilateral export equation include GDP for the reporting and
partner country, and inward FDI, innovation, and IPRs in the reporting country. Data on
GDP were obtained from the World Development Indicators database. Data on inward FDI
flows as reported on the country’s balance of payments were also obtained from the World
Development Indicators database. FDI flows are reported in current US dollars. However,
7Although the home country originally reports these trade values in their current national currency, the
UN applies the current dollar exchange rate so that all available trade value data is reported in current US
dollars. The trade values are made consistent by using the consumer price index to adjust trade values to
constant 2000 US dollars.
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the US consumer price index was used to convert inward FDI flows into constant 2000 US
dollars, so that multi-period analysis can accurately be interpreted.
As previously discussed, US patent grants are used to approximate innovation in each
country. This data is available from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). Countries will likely apply for a patent in the United States if the innovation is
significant and, particularly, if the innovation is “valuable” internationally. In addition, col-
lecting patent grants from a standardized source, such as the USPTO, is critical as different
countries have different patent regimes in place.8 Historical data on USPTO patent counts
were obtained from the World Bank database created by Lederman and Saenz (2005).9
The distance variable accounts for the geographical distance between the “most impor-
tant” cities in each trading partner according to population and agglomeration economies.
Physical distance is used as a proxy for transportation costs such that the greater physical
distance, the greater the costs associated with transporting goods. The sign of the phys-
ical distance coefficient is therefore expected to be negative. Data on these variables was
obtained from CEPII distance database.10
Data were collected for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. The sample was
limited to every fifth year as the index of IPRs used is only available every five years. The
Ginarte-Park Index for IPRs is currently the most widely accepted index to approximate
patent protection in a country. The index ranges from zero to five, with five being the
highest possible level of patent protection. The index is comprised of a series of scores
stemming from five different areas of patent protection. These areas include: (1) coverage
of certain innovative areas, (2) country membership in international treaties, (3) safeguards
against loss of protection, (4) enforcement of patent laws, and (5) duration of protection.
In general, the index captures the strength of patent rights in a given country.
8For example, the patent system in Japan is set up so that many patents are needed to achieve the same
level of breadth of coverage that can be achieved with a single US patent. The breadth of the Japanese
patent system widened in 1988 at the onset of a new patent system, so to more resemble that of the United
States. Nonetheless, patent breadth remains narrower in Japan compared to the US.
9Lederman and Saenz compiled a data set of various patent and R&D variables, which is discussed in
their 2005 work. The data set is available at http://go.worldbank.org/NNIBBIHTA0.
10http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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Recall, the excluded exogenous variables are R&D expenditures, tertiary school enroll-
ment, business environment, population of the domestic economy, and capital in the previous
period. Data on R&D expenditures as a percent of GDP was obtained from the Lederman
and Saenz (2005) data, and were converted to stock R&D expenditures by multiplying R&D
expenditures as a percent of GDP with GDP in constant 2000 US dollars.11 It is important
to use R&D expenditures rather than R&D expenditures as a percent of GDP as GDP is
included as a regressor, and including a measure of R&D that is weighted by GDP would
create endogeneity among the data.
Data on tertiary school enrollment rates were obtained directly from the UNESCO web
site.12 Data on total population were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. The a subindex of the Economic Freedom of the World Index that captures
the “regulation of credit, labor, and business” is used to measure a country’s business
environment.
Finally, data on physical capital stock between 1960 and 1990 was obtained from Nehru
and Dhareshwar (1995). This data is provided in the domestic country’s currency in constant
1987 prices. In order to make cross-country comparisons of capital stock, the Nehru and
Dhareshwar data was converted into constant 1987 US dollars by using the average period
market exchange rate obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
In addition, capital stock for the years since 1990 (for which Nehru and Dhareshwar data
is unavailable) was estimated using gross capital formation data as provided by the World
Bank’s WDI database.13
11Lederman and Saenz compiled data on R&D expenditures using UNESCO yearbooks.
12While data for tertiary school enrollment rates was already available in a downloadable,
panel form, data for R&D was not, which is why R&D data was obtained from Leder-
man and Saenz. The web site for which historical school enrollment data is listed is
http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/indicators/i pages/indic 5.htm.
13The first step in expanding the capital stock data is to convert gross capital formation into constant
1987 US dollars by using the GDP deflator. Data on gross capital formation in constant local currency units
as well as the GDP deflator was obtained from the WDI database. After compatible data on gross capital
formation was calculated, the capital stock was expanded using the following equation for the evolution of
capital stock: Ki,t+1 = Ki,t(1 − δi) + Gross Capital Formationi,t+1 where δi represents the average capital
depreciation rate specific to each country. This country specific capital depreciation rate corresponds to the
ten-year average rate of capital depreciation in a specific country for the years 1981 to 1990 (i.e. the last ten
years for which capital stock data from Nehru and Dhareshwar was available). This ten year average was
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Descriptive statistics for (non-dummy) data used in the estimation equations, as de-
scribed above, can be found in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics: Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries
(Panel Data, 1975, 1980, 1985,..., 2000)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
log(IPR Index) 23335 0.747 0.421 -1.109 1.311
log(Value of Bilateral Exports) 24055 9.711 6.829 0 24.678
log(USPTO Patent Grants) 24055 0.503 1.041 0 4.875
log(FDI inflows) 21950 22.301 2.552 13.693 28.976
log(Distance) 23254 8.713 0.784 4.656 9.892
log(GDP partner country) 49573 23.890 2.157 18.612 29.910
log(GDP reporting country) 23883 23.282 1.635 19.940 27.812
log(Population) 23983 16.695 1.533 13.264 20.956
log(R&D expenditures) 5516 23.667 2.136 18.918 27.812
log(Tertiary School Enrollment) 22842 1.691 1.120 -2.303 3.902
log(Business Environment) 19803 1.619 0.203 0.993 1.932
log(Lagged K Stock) 19498 25.460 4.118 20.756 42.739
Note: In order to account for zero trade values, a Tobit regression procedure is used to estimate
bilateral exports. Thus, a trade value of zero also assumes a logged value equal to zero. Similarly,
zero USPTO patent grants assumes a logged value equal to zero.
4.4.4 Empirical Results
Bilateral exports originating in low and lower-middle income countries (to all countries)
are estimated in Table 4.2, using the two-stage, instrumental variable approach previously
described. The two-stage Tobit model can be calculated using one of the two estimating
procedures: (1) Newey’s efficient two-step estimator or (2) maximum likelihood estimation.
Although maximum likelihood estimation is commonly used in instrumental variables, this
paper utilizes Newey’s two-step estimator. The benefit of the Newey two-step estimator
is that it does not require convergence to determine the initial values, which proved to be
difficult in practice. Difficulty with convergence, however, may signal that the first stage
is misspecified. To verify that this is not the case, joint significance of the exogenous vari-
ables in the innovation and inward FDI equations is tested in the first stage. In doing so,
calculated using capital stock data from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1995) and gross capital formation from the
WDI database.
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it is confirmed that the exogenous variables are jointly statistically significant in determin-
ing innovation and inward FDI. Therefore, the Newey two-step estimator is the preferred
estimation method for all instrumental variable, Tobit regressions.
When accounting for endogeneity of innovation and FDI in the benchmark instrumental
variable equation, innovation and inward FDI each have a positive impact on bilateral
exports in developing countries, as previously suggested by the theory. Neither innovation
or FDI, however, is statistically significant.
Of particular interest for this paper is the positive sign and significance of the IPR
variable. While IPRs may have a direct effect on export activity, the full impact of IPRs
is not captured by the IPR variable in column I of Table 4.2.14 This is because there are
indirect effects of IPRs on exports via increased innovation and FDI. Because of the non-
linear nature of the two-stage instrumental variable estimation, in order to evaluate the
total effect of IPRs on export behavior, exports should be estimated using a reduced form
equation that includes all exogenous variables.15
The reduced form results reported in column II of Table 4.2 enables the complete impact
of IPRs on export activity to be better interpreted. This complete impact includes the
impact that IPRs directly has on export activity as well as the indirect impact IPRs have
on export activity via innovation and FDI. The reduced form estimation reveals that the
total effect of IPRs is both positive and statistically significant in impacting developing
country exports. This result suggests that IPR policies increase export activity in developing
countries.
An Alternate Specification
An alternate specification to the benchmark equation is explored in Table 4.3. The
estimation specification used to derive the results in Table 4.3 account for the possibility
14The first stage results for innovation and inward FDI are reported in Appendix C.2.
15An alternate approach to estimating the direct effect of IPRs on developing country export activity
is to estimate a structural model. One downside to this approach is that misspecification would lead to
biased results. A reduced form equation for which all variables are exogenous eliminates problems with
misspecification bias. Nonetheless, estimation of a structural model is a worthwhile avenue to explore in
future research.
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Table 4.2: Bilateral Exports with Inward FDI in Current Period







































Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis in column I. t-statistics are in parenthesis in
column II. Instrumental variable Tobit estimation was conducted using Newey’s ef-
ficient two-step estimation procedure. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance. The comparison year is 1975. Country fixed effects are
also found in empirical estimation, but not reported. The difference in observation
between columns I and II is a result of the limited number of observations with inward
FDI data in 1975. This discrepancy in the number of observations does not appear
when dealing with lagged data, as in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Bilateral Exports with Lagged Inward FDI





































Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis in column I. t-statistics are in parenthesis in
column II. Instrumental variable Tobit estimation was conducted using Newey’s ef-
ficient two-step estimation procedure. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance. The comparison year is 1975. Country fixed effects are also
found in empirical estimation, but not reported.
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that FDI will not impact export activity immediately, but rather after some fixed amount of
time has passed. Therefore, the possibility that FDI has a lagged effect on exports is tested
by substituting a lagged value for inward FDI in the benchmark equation. Since complete
data is available every five years, it is assumed that the lagged impact of FDI on export
activity occurs after five years.
Assuming that lagged FDI impacts export activity, rather than FDI in the current period,
mitigates concerns that inward FDI is endogenous with export activity. Therefore, lagged
FDI is assumed exogenous in Table 4.3. This also means that the instruments used in the
first stage no longer include a measure for lagged capital stock, as this appeared only in the
estimating equation for inward FDI.
When lagged FDI is considered, the overall results of the instrumental variables estima-
tion appear less convincing. This is largely because the coefficients on innovation and lagged
inward FDI are significantly negative, which goes against intuitive expectations about the
sign of these variables. This non-intuitive result may stem from the fact that FDI is lagged
by five years, which could be too long of time lag to have an impact on export activity. Data
restrictions prohibit estimation using a shorter period.
Regardless of these potential problems in the estimation, the sign of the IPR variable
remains positive. It is not, however, statistically significant. In the reduced form estimation
in column II, which accounts for total impact of IPRs (including the indirect effect of IPRs
via innovation), IPRs are statistically significant. This is a critical result, as it mirrors those
results found in the original specification presented in Table 4.2.
The overriding result in both Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 is that IPRs have a significant and
positive impact on bilateral exports. This suggests that IPR policies may, in fact, go hand
in hand with export promotion policies in developing countries.
Comparison to Developed Country Exports
So far, the impact of IPRs on export activity of developing (low and lower-middle income)
countries has been explored. It is of interest, however, to see how these results compare with
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the export activity of developed countries.16 Given the outlined theoretical model, there
is no reason to believe that the effect of developed country exports should be any different
than that of developing countries.
Developed countries are classified using the World Bank’s classification of high-income
countries. Countries are considered high-income if they have 2005 per capita GNI greater
than $10,725. Descriptive statistics for these high income countries can be found in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics: High Income Countries Only
(Panel Data, 1975, 1980, 1985,..., 2000)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
log(IPR Index) 18858 1.185 0.252 0.637 1.609
log(Value of Bilateral Exports) 18858 13.902 6.399 -0.064 26.204
log(USPTO Patent Grants) 17617 5.354 2.559 0 11.351
log(FDI inflows) 15987 25.417 2.393 19.475 31.101
log(Distance) 17846 8.686 0.814 4.088 9.891
log(GDP partner country) 17457 23.671 2.140 18.612 29.910
log(GDP reporting country) 18858 25.702 1.756 20.662 29.910
log(Population) 18858 16.086 1.560 12.292 19.458
log(R&D expenditures) 11208 26.723 1.925 19.519 30.902
log(Tertiary School Enrollment) 18275 3.372 0.625 1.163 4.551
log(Business Environment) 18274 1.786 0.170 1.194 2.175
log(Lagged K Stock) 14671 27.752 2.902 21.660 36.125
Note: Zero USPTO patent grants assume a logged value equal to zero.
Table 4.5 presents results for bilateral exports from high income countries. Estimation
procedures for Table 4.5 are identical to those used to estimate Table 4.2. Unlike the results
found in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, which focused on developing countries, IPR policies do not
have a statistically significant impact on the export activity in developed countries. This
suggests that bilateral exports in developed countries are not significantly impacted by the
level of domestic IPRs in these countries.
One explanation for the contrasting insignificant impact of domestic IPRs on developed
country exports could be that innovation and inward FDI in developed countries is less
dependent on the level of IPRs than it may be in developing countries. This would be con-
16The question of how IPRs impact the export activity of developed countries was asked in Briggs (2008b).
Briggs (2008b), however, considered the impact of foreign IPRs on developed country high technology exports
specifically to developing countries, which is a more narrow question than what is preliminarily explored here.
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Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis in column I. t-statistics are in parenthesis in column
II. Instrumental variable Tobit estimation was conducted using Newey’s efficient two-step
estimation procedure. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance.
The comparison year is 1975. Country fixed effects are also found in empirical estimation,
but not reported. The difference in observation between columns I and II is a result of
the limited number of observations with inward FDI data in 1975. This discrepancy in the
number of observations does not appear when dealing with lagged data, as in Table 4.3.
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sistent with the belief that innovation in developed countries occurs so rapidly and becomes
outdated so quickly that stronger patent protection brings relatively less in the way of extra
incentives to innovate compared to that in developing countries. The prevalence of new
goods available to export in developed countries is consistently present. In addition, inward
FDI in developed countries may be less dependent on the strength of IPRs in developed
countries and more on cyclical market confidence and macroeconomic stability.
While this paper does not provide a thorough analysis of total export activity in de-
veloped countries, it provides a preliminary comparison to the impact of domestic IPRs on
total exports in developing countries, which is more thoroughly explored in this paper.
4.5 Conclusion
In theory, the implementation of domestic IPRs should increase export activity in coun-
tries. Empirical evidence also shows that domestic IPRs have a positive, statistically signif-
icant impact on developing country exports. IPRs impact export activity directly as well as
indirectly through innovation and FDI. Similar preliminary evaluation of the impact of IPRs
on export activity in developed countries fails to exhibit this same statistically significant
effect. The results linking stronger IPRs to increased export activity in developing coun-
tries suggest that IPR policies and outward oriented development policies in this countries
countries may be positively linked. This is something that proponents of IPRs in develop-
ing countries have been proclaiming for a while, and this paper provides some evidence in
support of this claim.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Essay One
A.1 Summary of Empirical Results from Past Literature
Table A.1: IPR Regression Results from Past Literature
GP Maskus (1) Maskus (2) CP (1) CP with
time dummies
Variable OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
per capita GDP 0.23* -3.38* -2.58* -0.27* -0.22**
(0.03) (2.09) (0.64) (0.11) (0.12)
per capita GDP squared 0.22* 0.17* 0.02* -0.02*
(0.03) (0.40) (0.01) (0.01)
School Enrollment Ratio -0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
Openness 0.06 -0.04 -0.05
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03)




(scientists + engineers)/LF 0.08*
(0.03)
Former UK colony 0.23*
(0.07)




constant -1.06* 13.61* 10.76* not reported not reported
(0.20) (2.09) (2.47)
No. of Observations 192 144 144 211 211
Adjusted R squared 0.31 0.33 0.37 not reported not reported
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗ indicates more than 95% significance. ∗∗ indicates 94%
significance. All variables are logged except for colony, time and WTO dummies. Years covered
by Ginarte-Park (GP) are 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1990; by Maskus are 1985 and 1990; by Chen-
Puttitanun (CP) are 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. CP results are for developing countries only, while
GP and Maskus use data for both developed and developing countries. LF=Labor Force.
The above table reports the regression results for IPRs from Ginarte and Park (GP)
(1997), Maskus (2000), and Chen and Puttitanun (CP) (2005), as discussed in the above lit-
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erature review. The two-stage model specification for CP is as follows: IPRs = f (per capita GDP, per capita GDP squared, tertiary school enrollment, trade as a % of GDP, economic freedom, WTO membership)
for IPRs and INNOVATION = f (IPRs, per capita GDP, tertiary school enrollment, economic freedom, population)
for innovation, where the estimated innovation results are used in the IPR equation.
The results in Table A.1 indicate that standard OLS analysis of panel data on IPRs and
per capita income yeild a U-shape link between the two variables. Similar results are found
using the updated GP Index and per capita GDP (in constant US dollars). These results
are presented in Table A.2.
Table A.2: Preliminary Results for IPR Choice
Linear Quadratic
logged per capita GDP 0.25* -1.65*
(13.72) (-8.59)






Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ =
95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance. Standard errors have
been adjusted using White’s correction.
According to the results in Table A.2 the U-curve reaches a minimum at approximately
log(GDP ) = 6.67, which translates into a per capita income of US$785 (in 2000 US dollars).1
This simplistic estimation procedure does not provide evidence as to whether the U-shape
relationship is driven by longitudinal or cross-sectional forces, but it does confirm that
preliminary results using the updated GP Index are similar to those found in past literature.
1Calculations were made using data expanded to five decimal places.
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A.2 Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights
Table A.3: Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights: Categories and Calculations
(1) Coverage
Available Not Available
Patentability of pharmaceuticals 1/7 0
Patentability of chemicals 1/7 0
Patentability of food 1/7 0
Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1/7 0
Patentability of surgical products 1/7 0
Patentability of microorganisms 1/7 0
Patentability of utility models 1/7 0
(2) Membership in International Treaties
Available Not Available
Paris Convention and Revisions 1/3 0
Patent Cooperation Treaty 1/3 0
Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV) 1/3 0
(3) Protection Against Losses Arising from:
Available Not Available
“Working” Requirements 1/3 0
Compulsory Licensing 1/3 0
Revocation of Patents 1/3 0
(4) Enforcement
Available Not Available
Preliminary Injunctions 1/3 0
Contributory Infringement 1/3 0
Burden-of-Proof Reversal 1/3 0
(5) Duration of Protection
Full* Partial* or No Protection
1 f /(full protection)
Note* : Full duration of protection is 20 years from the date of application or 17 years from the
date of grant (depending on whether the country has an application or grant based system). The
duration of protection as a fraction of full protection is equal to f /(full protection) such that f /(full
protection) is between zero and one. Note 1: Each category is scored between 0 and 1. The index
is comprised by adding the score for each category. Note 2: The composition of the GP Index as
described in the above table resembles that found in Appendix A of Ginarte and Park (1997) as
well as Economic Freedom of the World 2001 Annual Report.
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A.3 Identifying the “Critical” Cross-Sectional Year
Table A.4: Specification for the ‘Critical” Cross-Sectional Year
Logged
Year Joined IPR in per capita GDP
Country Paris Convention Rounded Year Rounded Year in Rounded Year
Algeria 1966 1970 3.38 7.243078
Argentina 1967 1970 1.93 8.797403
Australia 1925 1965 2.90 9.207758
Austria 1909 1965 3.38 9.105095
Bangladesh 1991 1995 2.32 5.714601
Belgium 1884 1965 3.38 9.112437
Benin 1967 1970 2.52 5.684398
Bolivia 1993 1995 2.31 6.854131
Botswana 1998 2000 2.24 8.004244
Brazil 1884 1965 1.64 7.26867
Burkina Faso 1963 1965 2.10 5.100389
Burundi 1977 1980 2.86 4.839107
Cameroon 1964 1965 2.10 6.154122
Canada 1925 1965 2.76 9.311739
Central African Rep. 1963 1965 2.10 5.787224
Chad 1963 1965 2.38 5.458616
Chile 1991 1995 3.07 8.365095
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1975 1975 2.86 5.759536
Congo, Rep. 1963 1965 2.10 6.458126
Costa Rica 1995 1995 1.80 8.19082
Cote d’Ivoire 1963 1965 2.38 6.516385
Czech Republic 1993 1995 3.19 8.520643
Denmark 1894 1965 2.66 9.654785
Dominican Republic 1890 1965 2.26 6.619038
Ecuador 1999 2000 3.57 7.16664
Egypt 1951 1965 1.99 6.306225
El Salvador 1994 1995 2.86 7.59751
Finland 1921 1965 1.99 9.097638
France 1884 1965 3.10 9.164486
Gabon 1964 1965 2.10 7.774975
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Logged
Year Joined IPR in per capita GDP
Country Paris Convention Rounded Year Rounded Year in Rounded Year
Ghana 1976 1980 2.57 5.4534
Greece 1924 1965 2.46 8.384
Grenada 1998 2000 2.51 8.305833
Guatemala 1998 2000 1.56 7.454464
Guyana 1994 1995 1.42 6.745617
Haiti 1958 1965 3.19 6.532083
Honduras 1994 1995 2.10 6.81621
Hong Kong 1997 2000 3.05 10.119
Iceland 1962 1965 2.12 9.416005
India 1998 2000 2.18 6.109697
Ireland 1925 1965 2.56 8.664925
Israel 1950 1965 3.37 8.892984
Italy 1884 1965 3.32 8.895614
Jamaica 1999 2000 3.22 8.039177
Japan 1899 1965 3.18 9.27008
Jordan 1972 1975 1.86 7.019552
Kenya 1965 1965 2.04 5.565759
Korea, Rep. 1980 1980 3.28 8.077585
Liberia 1994 1995 2.86 4.034598
Lithuania 1994 1995 2.90 7.844923
Luxembourg 1922 1965 2.29 9.543539
Madagascar 1963 1965 1.05 5.905131
Malawi 1964 1965 2.70 4.691645
Malaysia 1989 1990 2.70 7.842833
Mali 1983 1985 2.57 5.149384
Malta 1967 1970 1.89 7.502462
Mauritania 1965 1965 2.10 5.827742
Mauritius 1976 1980 2.89 7.355027
Mexico 1903 1965 1.70 8.03862
Morocco 1917 1965 2.38 6.426567
Nepal 2001 2000 3.19 5.415621
Netherlands 1884 1965 3.29 9.259804
New Zealand 1931 1965 3.18 9.159622
Nicaragua 1996 2000 1.59 6.676875
Niger 1964 1965 2.10 5.84994
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Logged
Year Joined IPR in per capita GDP
Country Paris Convention Rounded Year Rounded Year in Rounded Year
Nigeria 1963 1965 3.05 5.775947
Norway 1885 1965 2.66 9.434578
Pakistan 2004 2000 1.99 6.274768
Panama 1996 2000 3.53 8.278739
Paraguay 1994 1995 2.80 7.341485
Peru 1995 1995 2.71 7.586815
Philippines 1965 1965 2.52 6.517182
Portugal 1884 1965 1.98 8.001512
Rwanda 1984 1985 2.86 5.611012
Saudi Arabia 2004 2000 2.05 9.079221
Senegal 1963 1965 2.10 6.146386
Sierra Leone 1997 2000 3.00 4.94564
Singapore 1995 1995 3.90 9.860181
Slovak Republic 1993 1995 3.19 8.053965
South Africa 1947 1965 3.37 7.897295
Spain 1884 1965 3.29 8.590518
Sri Lanka 1952 1965 2.60 5.642336
Sudan 1984 1985 3.52 5.489991
Swaziland 1991 1995 2.86 7.178594
Sweden 1885 1965 2.66 9.531565
Switzerland 1884 1965 2.71 9.993171
Syria 1924 1965 2.46 6.306041
Togo 1967 1970 2.24 5.694402
Trinidad & Tobago 1964 1965 3.01 8.344262
Tunisia 1884 1965 1.90 6.5935
Ukraine 1991 1995 3.05 6.508002
United Kingdom 1884 1965 3.04 9.363698
United States 1887 1965 3.86 9.706059
Uruguay 1967 1970 2.26 8.311857
Venezuela, 1995 1995 2.76 8.540833
Zambia 1965 1965 3.52 6.404285
Zimbabwe 1980 1980 2.90 6.394734
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A.4 Stage One Results for the Fully Specified Model
Table A.5: Stage One Results: log(Per Capita GDP)
Stage One for columns Stage One for columns
I and II of Table 2.5 III and IV of Table 2.5




log(Tertiary School Enrollment) 0.90* 0.75*
(18.82) (13.76)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.40* -0.43*
(-3.21) (-3.49)
Latin America -0.78* -0.36*
(-9.61) (-4.31)






Uncentered R2 0.9914 0.9938
N 513 425
Note: The above results reflect the first stage results for the two-stage least squares, instrumental
variables approach estimated in Table 2.5. Year dummy variables are also included in the estimation
procedure of each of the above regressions. t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance,
∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90% significance.
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A.5 Cross-Sectional Results Accounting for Regional Effects
Table A.6: Cross-Sectional Results by Year, Including Regional Dummy Variables
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
log(pcGDP ) -0.28 -0.66 -0.87** -1.25** -0.68 -0.90 -1.05*** -0.80
(-0.52) (-1.33) (-2.06) (-2.12) (-0.85) (-1.20) (-1.89) (-1.63)
log(pcGDP )2 0.04 0.06*** 0.07* 0.10* 0.07 0.08*** 0.09* 0.07**
(0.98) (1.91) (2.67) (2.73) (1.34) (1.72) (2.70) (2.41)
sub Saharan Africa 0.32 0.43** 0.41** 0.41*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.55** 0.51**
(1.54) (2.10) (2.08) (1.83) (1.98) (1.88) (2.56) (2.20)
Latin America -0.35*** -0.32 -0.29 -0.38*** -0.44** -0.39*** -0.02 0.09
(-1.89) (-1.62) (-1.55) (-1.94) (-2.03) (-1.77) (-0.13) (0.47)
Transitional 0.40*** 0.49*
(1.85) (2.68)
Constant 2.38 3.63*** 4.46* 5.68** 3.50 4.36 4.88** 4.52**
(1.20) (1.95) (2.84) (2.55) (1.14) (1.51) (2.28) (2.37)
Observations 91 96 100 104 106 106 119 118
R2 0.3014 0.3617 0.3548 0.4091 0.3821 0.3904 0.4246 0.3923
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors have been adjusted using White’s correction.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Essay Two
B.1 Explanations Proposed by Primo Braga & Fink
Primo Braga and Fink (1999) have proposed some possible reasons for finding IPRs to
have an insignificant impact on developing country high technology imports, while having a
significant impact on total and non-fuel imports. The reasons provided are, again, as follows:
(1) Market power effects are particularly strong for high-technology goods and may offset
positive market expansion effects, (2) Stronger IPRs may result in FDI by high-tech firms
rather than increased trade, (3) The Ginarte-Park IPR Index inappropriately captures IPR
strength, (4) The availability of the high-technology imports considered may be insensitive
to the domestic country’s IPR regime, and (5) Specification error, such as the exclusion of
variables for tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, may bias the results.
Justification for the first reason has been provided in this paper. Let us now briefly
discuss the other possible reasons mentioned.
The possibility that strong IPRs in developing countries result in increased FDI rather
than increased trade in high-technology goods, Reason 2, is a possibility worth exploring
in future research. The impact of IPRs on FDI was not considered in this paper. A
preliminary empirical investigation of whether stronger IPRs increase bilateral inflows of
FDI was conducted using a gravity model type approach, similar to that used for bilateral
trade flows. The preliminary results are indeterminate. Too many impervious empirical
obstacles exist to have an adequate empirical investigation. For example, bilateral FDI data
is scarce1 and the empirical breakout of bilateral FDI flows by sector is next to impossible.
1Data on bilateral FDI inflows are obtained from two sources: (1) Source OECD bilateral FDI data and
(2) UNCTAD’s World Investment Directory (WID) on-line. Source OECD provides the most complete set of
bilateral FDI data, while UNCTAD’s WID filled in some gaps for the 2000 data. Also, note that UNCTAD
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As a result, it is empirically difficult to decipher whether the FDI is truly allocated to
high-technology production, thereby replacing trade of high-technology goods.
The appropriateness of the Ginarte-Park IPR Index in capturing IPR strength Reason
3 is not easily testable. Of course, some subjectivity will always enter into the process of
creating an index. Nonetheless, the Ginarte-Park Index remains the common measure of
choice in similar analysis.
The fourth reason, that the availability of the high-technology exports to developing
countries may be insensitive to the domestic country’s IPR regime is the obvious and straight
forward interpretation of an insignificant IPR coefficient on an aggregate technology regres-
sion such as that in Primo Braga and Fink (1999). However, this is a very general assumption
that does not consider the wide variety of goods that comprise a high technology aggregate.
This paper, on the other hand, examines exports of high technology goods at a disaggregated
level.
Reason 5, which argues the possible existence of specification errors could be analyzed by
altering the variables used in the estimation equations. However, the robustness of gravity
equations has been tested in previous papers (Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2006) and so we will
maintain that the equation specification used in this paper is sufficient.
B.2 Determining “Value Added” Categories
Value added data was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). Value added is the net output of a sector, after intermediate inputs are subtracted
from outputs. Value added as a percent of GDP is available from WDI for agriculture and
manufacturing. Value added as a percent of total manufacturing is available for chemicals,
machinery and transport, textiles, and other manufacturing. Chemicals are comprised of
ISIC groups 351 and 352. Machinery and transport equipment comprise ISIC groups 382-84.
Textiles and clothing comprise ISIC division 32. Other manufacturing includes wood and
related products (division 33), paper and paper-related products (division 34), petroleum
WID data is unavailable for 1985 and can be used to supplement data for the year 2000 only.
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and related products (groups 353-356), basic metals and mineral products (divisions 36
and 37), fabricated metal products and professional goods (groups 381 and 385), and other
industries (group 390). Multiplying value added as a percent of total manufacturing to
manufacturing value added as a percent of GDP provides estimates for sector specific value
added within manufacturing as a percent of GDP.
In order to identify the “value added” category corresponding with each high technology
good listed in Table 3.1, the ISIC group characterizing each value added group as described
above was matched with the SITC Revision 1 group for which the high technology goods
are identified. There are some instances in which the high technology good is expected to
impact value added in a “non-corresponding” ISIC group. For instance, potassic fertilizers
(561.3, SITC Revision 1) will likely be used in agriculture and therefore impact value added
in agriculture rather than chemicals, as its corresponding ISIC group for may suggest. The
two other high technology exports which will expectedly effect value added in a different
sector are: Coloring Materials (533.1, which is a characterized in the “chemicals” group for
SITC Revision 1, but applied to value added in the “textiles” group) and Pharmaceutical
goods excluding medicaments (541.9, which is characterized in the “chemicals” group for
SITC Rev. 1, but applied to value added in the “other manufacturing” group as 541.9 does
not include medicaments but rather other pharmaceutical related products).
B.3 Analysis of Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries
The empirical analysis conducted up until this point has considered developed (high
income, 2005 per capita GNI greater than $10,725) country exports to least developed (low
income, 2005 per capita GNI below $875) countries. This appendix expands the definition
of developing countries to include low income and lower-middle income countries (2005 per
capita GNI between $876 and $3,465).2 There are some possible problems with interpreting
estimates of exports to this broader definition of developing countries. First, the more dis-
similar countries are, the more difficult it will be to make predictions about dominant market
2Recall, income classifications are based on World Bank classifications.
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power versus market expansion effects using the theoretical model. Lower-middle income
countries, for example, may have “pertinent usage” for a wider variety of high technology
goods relative to low-income countries, thereby increasing the likelihood of a dominant mar-
ket power effect of increasing IPRs, according to the theoretical model. A second problem
is that it becomes increasingly possible that IPRs will attract high technology goods via
foreign direct investment rather than trade, making it less desirable to only consider the
case that the Northern innovating firm will supply high technology goods to the South via
exports.
Despite the possible problems with using a broader definition of developing countries, the
empirical estimates for developed country, high technology exports to these countries exhibit
links to estimates of exports to low-income countries only. Using the expanded definition
of developing countries, IPRs have a statistically significant impact on developed country
exports in fewer high technology groups. Each group that exhibits statistical significance
in IPRs, however, is a subset of those reporting statistical significance in Table 3.3. More
specifically, the results (including the “value added” regressor) suggest that an increase in
IPRs has caused developing (low and lower-middle income) countries to experience a domi-
nant market expansion effect for the following high technology goods: internal combustion
engines (711.5), office machinery (714), telecommunications apparatus (724), transistors,
photocells and the like (729.3), electrical machinery and apparatuses (729.9), tape recorders
(891.1), and recorders of sound (891.2). Estimates for high technology exports to low and
lower-middle income countries can be found in Table B.1.
When considering exports to low and lower-middle income countries, there are a greater
number of high technology groups for which IPRs are insignificant, signaling a dominant
market power effect. Such deviation in results may occur because the broader definition of
“developing” countries causes countries in consideration to be more dissimilar, as previously
discussed. Of those commodity groups that indicate a dominant market power effect for low
and lower-middle income countries, the commodity groups for coloring materials (533.1),
potassic fertilizers (561.3), synthetic fibers (651.6), and yarn and artificial fibers (651.7),
are of particular interest as they best satisfy empirical predictions based on the theoretical
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model.
Of additional interest is the result that the coefficient on IPRs is both negative and sta-
tistically significant for the commodity groups for pharmaceutical goods excluding medica-
ments (541.9) and fuses and detonators (571.2). (Developed country exports of these high
technology goods to low-income countries only were statistically insignificant in the value-
added regressions. Refer to Table 3.3.) One explanation would be that the reduction in
developed country exports is met with an increase in foreign direct investment in this par-
ticular commodity group. This negative coefficient is particularly interesting is worthy of
additional attention in future research.
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Table B.1: Developed Country Exports to Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries
(By Commodity Code)
513 513 514 514 515 515 533.1 533.1
log(IPR) 0.08 -0.35 -0.28 0.18 -2.09* -1.11 0.12 0.08
(0.19) (-0.54) (-0.67) (0.31) (-2.65) (-1.03) (0.22) (0.10)
log(GDPrep) 2.33* 2.23* 2.72* 2.94* 2.72* 3.14* 2.83* 2.99*
(15.25) (8.80) (18.80) (12.15) (9.45) (6.48) (14.07) (9.24)
log(GDPpart) 1.63* 1.53* 2.23* 2.09* 3.46* 4.07* 1.49* 1.32**
(5.44) (3.79) (7.94) (5.52) (4.04) (3.83) (3.34) (2.32)
log(Poprep) -0.97* -0.93* -1.45* -1.80* -0.91* -1.28* -1.35* -1.54*
(-6.06) (-4.05) (-9.61) (-8.22) (-3.22) (-3.08) (-6.45) (-5.24)
log(Poppart) -0.05 0.04 -0.79* -0.72*** -2.22** -2.90** -0.30 -0.08
(-0.15) (0.09) (-2.59) (-1.75) (-2.45) (-2.57) (-0.62) (-0.13)
colony 6.11* 4.56* 5.17* 4.17* 4.95* 3.97* 5.99* 5.53*
(11.52) (6.05) (10.23) (5.79) (6.27) (3.64) (9.84) (6.62)
log(dist) -2.82* -3.09* -2.57* -2.58* -2.42* -2.49* -3.57* -3.59*
(-13.56) (-10.90) (-12.99) (-9.64) (-6.57) (-5.24) (-13.45) (-10.59)
language 0.25 0.98** 0.74** 0.88*** 1.33** 1.61** 0.81*** 0.69
(0.71) (2.09) (2.22) (1.96) (2.29) (2.13) (1.81) (1.17)
border -4.42** -5.62** -5.79* -7.16* 5.05 4.52 -10.16* -11.57*
(-2.16) (-2.46) (-2.86) (-3.14) (0.78) (-0.69) (-4.21) (-4.20)
1975 0.82*** 0.16 1.28* 0.70 4.24* 3.57* -0.05 -1.05
(1.66) (0.23) (2.76) (1.05) (4.33) (2.69) (-0.08) (-1.18)
1980 2.12* 1.61** 2.07* 1.44** 3.88* 3.85* 0.85 0.22
(4.26) (2.28) (4.44) (2.17) (3.90) (2.89) (1.31) (0.25)
1985 0.94*** 1.23*** 1.15** 1.31*** 2.16** 2.87** -0.21 -0.47
(1.88) (1.73) (2.45) (1.95) (2.16) (2.14) (-0.32) (-0.53)
1990 1.50* 1.44** 0.48 0.39 3.63* 3.66* 0.37 0.33
(2.96) (1.99) (1.01) (0.57) (3.54) (2.65) (0.56) (0.36)
1995 0.45 0.71 -0.54 -0.60 4.32* 3.77* -0.66 -1.38
(0.88) (0.98) (-1.12) (-0.88) (4.19) (2.71) (-0.98) (-1.49)
2000 -0.71 -0.29 -0.49 -1.02 3.59* 2.22 -0.52 -0.47
(-1.29) (-0.35) (-0.94) (-1.33) (3.20) (1.42) (-0.71) (-0.44)




Constant -54.02* -48.07* -59.74* -56.17* -87.36* -96.33* -46.39* -45.61*
(-13.80) (-8.15) (-15.80) (-10.00) (-9.46) (-7.94) (-8.44) (-5.95)
N 6251 3409 6333 3416 2627 1576 4315 2537
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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541 541 541.9 541.9 561.3 561.3 571.2 571.2
log(IPR) -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -1.11*** 0.06 0.83 -2.15*** -3.82**
(-0.03) (-0.10) -0.08 (-1.82) (0.05) (0.60) (-1.90) (-2.55)
log(GDPrep) 2.05* 2.11* 2.13* 1.98* 2.95* 2.49* 1.30* 1.01
(19.39) (12.25) (13.93) (8.23) (5.94) (2.78) (2.94) (1.40)
log(GDPpart) 3.96* 3.53* 3.74* 3.89* -1.51 -2.28*** 2.89* 2.04
(19.97) (13.03) (11.75) (9.57) (-1.25) (1.81) (2.74) (1.62)
log(Poprep) -1.18* -1.60* -1.06* -1.06* -1.42* -0.93 -0.34 0.06
(-10.43) (-9.89) (-6.44) (-4.66) (-2.94) (-1.06) (-0.73) (-0.09)
log(Poppart) -3.46* -3.00* -2.75* -2.91* 2.82** 3.53** -1.53 -0.36
(-15.41) (-9.75) (-8.05) (-6.64) (2.09) (2.52) (-1.26) (-0.25)
colony 5.40* 4.11* 5.79* 4.59* -1.06 -0.51 8.70* 7.58*
(12.35) (6.72) (11.32) (6.70) (-0.76) (-0.34) (7.72) (4.68)
log(dist) -2.34* -2.14* -2.71* -2.84* -3.48* -3.33* -3.09* -4.01*
(-15.65) (-10.57) (-12.98) (-10.56) (-5.94) (-5.46) (-6.10) (-6.25)
language 0.95* 1.09* 0.98* 0.88** 4.09* 4.07* 1.79** 2.87**
(3.99) (3.33) (2.91) (1.99) (3.57) (3.32) (2.07) (2.48)
border -10.53* -11.67* -6.97* -7.04* -7.98*** -7.97*** 6.57 9.01
(-5.64) (-5.73) (-2.91) (-2.66) (-1.87) (-1.85) (1.23) (1.44)
1975 0.39 0.11 1.68* 1.32*** 0.64 0.49 0.48 1.40
(1.12) (0.21) (3.19) (1.84) (0.42) (0.31) (0.38) (0.78)
1980 1.30* 0.83 2.60* 2.24* 0.32 -0.73 1.62 2.96***
(3.72) (1.64) (4.95) (3.10) (0.21) (-0.45) (1.25) (1.65)
1985 1.12* 1.40* 2.55* 2.62* 1.16 1.43 -1.80 1.97
(3.22) (2.75) (4.89) (3.65) (0.75) (0.87) (-1.37) (1.10)
1990 0.98* 1.03** 3.25* 2.35* 0.47 0.22 0.10 2.77
(2.76) (1.98) (6.15) (3.23) (0.29) (0.13) (0.08) (1.49)
1995 1.28* 1.60* 2.80* 2.65* 1.19 0.90 -2.44*** -0.43
(3.59) (3.09) (5.26) (3.66) (0.73) (0.53) (-1.75) (0.22)
2000 1.12* 1.64* 4.06* 4.16* 1.14 0.57 -4.55* -1.70







Constant -48.34* -41.17* -62.34* -57.94* -30.33** -19.3 -50.75* -42.43*
(-18.30) (-10.33) (-14.99) (-10.22) (-2.34) (-1.29) (-5.09) (-3.22)
N 8784 4409 5772 3282 1962 1811 1529 1004
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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571.4 571.4 581.1 581.1 581.2 581.2 651.6 651.6
log(IPR) -0.89 -1.85 0.37 0.02 0.97** 0.51 1.30** 0.64
-1.02 (-1.59) (0.87) (0.04) (2.53) (0.97) (2.52) (0.92)
log(GDPrep) 2.02* 1.77* 2.27* 2.35* 2.27* 2.21* 3.28* 2.75*
(6.40) (3.46) (15.94) (10.41) (17.99) (11.26) (17.77) (9.60)
log(GDPpart) 1.57*** 1.72*** 3.04* 2.87* 1.91* 1.80* 0.68** 0.53
(1.91) (1.78) (11.54) (8.38) (8.23) (5.90) (2.19) (1.30)
log(Poprep) -1.29* -1.26* -1.10* -1.24* -1.26* -1.41* -2.05* -1.85*
(-3.92) (-2.72) (-7.23) (-5.96) (-9.32) (-7.68) (-10.62) (-7.00)
log(Poppart) -0.12 -0.07 -1.82* -1.74* -0.43*** -0.44 0.70*** 0.99**
(-0.13) (-0.06) (-6.33) (-4.64) (-1.67) (-1.29) (1.95) (2.13)
colony 7.05* 7.08* 5.21* 4.12* 4.59* 3.13* 4.36* 3.53*
(8.22) (6.11) (10.11) (5.96) (9.35) (4.75) (7.18) (4.22)
log(dist) -1.98* -1.84* -2.88* -2.70* -2.73* -2.52* -2.19* -2.66*
(-4.97) (-3.70) (-14.89) (-10.85) (-15.79) (-11.32) (-9.90) (-9.26)
language 1.50** 1.49 -0.63*** 0.02 0.39 0.80** 1.13* 0.98***
(2.12) (1.64) (-1.89) (0.04) (1.34) (2.14) (2.72) (1.78)
border -63.99 -61.89 -7.24* -8.51* -6.20* -6.96* -6.54* -8.85*
(.) (.) (-3.48) (-3.68) (-3.13) (-3.24) (-2.75) (-3.34)
1975 2.48* 1.98 0.96** 1.28*** 0.58 -0.10 1.58* 1.13
(2.58) (1.53) (2.03) (1.96) (1.36) (-0.17) (2.70) (1.40)
1980 -0.67 -0.86 2.12* 2.32* 2.44* 1.82* 1.93* 1.79**
(0.67) -0.64 (4.49) (3.55) (5.78) (3.16) (3.29) (2.22)
1985 -2.88* -2.73** 1.66* 2.33* 2.05* 2.27* 0.18 0.75
(-2.81) (-2.01) (3.52) (3.55) (4.84) (3.92) (0.30) (0.92)
1990 -2.77* -3.19** 1.06** 1.55** 2.99* 2.67* 0.02 0.79
(-2.59) (-2.22) (2.22) (2.33) (7.00) (4.52) (0.03) (0.96)
1995 -1.27 -2.00 2.52* 3.02* 2.90* 2.94* 0.49 1.44***
(-1.19) (1.40) (5.30) (4.63) (6.75) (5.06) (0.82) (1.75)
2000 -1.35 -1.37 2.26* 3.31* 2.23* 2.42* -0.31 0.60
(-1.17) -0.86 (4.44) (4.50) (4.87) (3.69) (-0.48) (0.64)
textile 0.00
(0.37)
other 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.65) (0.20) (1.25)
Constant -50.64* -50.82* -57.59* -55.15* -48.69* -42.95* -52.44* -40.19*
(-5.86) (-4.41) (-15.81) (-10.75) (-15.31) (-9.56) (-12.33) (-6.63)
N 2604 1633 6577 3750 7594 4294 5399 3107
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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651.7 651.7 711.3 711.3 711.4 711.4 711.5 711.5
log(IPR) 0.42 -0.11 0.66 -0.03 0.23 0.64 0.46 0.95***
(0.58) (-0.12) (0.92) (-0.03) (0.31) (0.61) (1.34) (1.85)
log(GDPrep) 2.38* 2.37* 3.00* 2.71* 2.05* 2.28* 1.84* 1.66*
(8.60) (5.49) (11.12) (5.68) (8.32) (4.99) (16.06) (7.86)
log(GDPpart) 1.46* 1.10*** 3.72* 3.69* 1.52* 0.64 4.73* 4.58*
(3.08) (1.87) (5.10) (4.08) (2.79) (0.88) (21.13) (14.72)
log(Poprep) -0.87* -0.91** -1.29* -1.35* -0.72* -1.57* -0.99* -1.10*
(-3.16) (-2.38) (-4.79) (-3.41) (-2.74) (-4.02) (-7.99) (-5.83)
log(Poppart) 0.34 0.65 -2.00** -1.79*** 0.19 1.04 -3.44* -3.38*
(0.62) (0.94) (-2.57) (-1.85) (0.31) (1.27) (-14.04) (-9.86)
colony 3.63* 3.11* 7.10* 6.51* 5.84* 4.59* 5.82* 4.74*
(4.56) (2.87) (8.96) (5.79) (7.93) (4.38) (12.85) (7.11)
log(dist) -4.44* -4.45* -2.41* -3.01* -3.29* -3.48* -2.30* -2.19*
(-14.00) (-11.09) (-6.64) (-6.32) (-9.74) (-7.67) (-14.21) (-9.69)
language 1.64* 1.74** -0.14 -0.37 2.05* 2.72* -1.10* -0.97**
(2.61) (2.13) (-0.22) (-0.44) (3.94) (3.85) (-4.01) (-2.52)
border -5.64*** -5.20 8.34 5.35 4.72 1.99 -8.48* -8.78*
(-1.93) (-1.60) (1.18) (0.74) (0.88) (0.31) (-4.36) (-4.08)
1975 -1.25 -0.21 2.55* 1.86 1.97** 2.26*** 0.99* 0.93
(-1.57) (-0.20) (2.94) (1.56) (2.41) (1.95) (2.58) (1.61)
1980 -2.11* -0.90 2.41* 1.62 0.81 0.67 1.39* 1.31**
(-2.58) (-0.83) (2.75) (1.36) (0.97) (0.56) (3.62) (2.28)
1985 -3.95* -2.10*** -0.72 -0.86 1.13 2.25*** 0.14 0.05
(-4.78) (-1.91) (-0.81) (-0.71) (1.37) (1.92) (0.35) (0.08)
1990 -4.91* -3.37* 0.19 -0.24 2.29* 3.51* 0.33 0.00
(-5.75) (-2.97) (0.21) (-0.19) (2.72) (2.94) (0.85) 0.00
1995 -5.27* -3.98* 0.17 0.30 2.78* 3.63* 0.43 0.58
(-6.17) (-3.51) (0.19) (0.24) (3.26) (2.99) (1.10) (0.99)
2000 -4.79* -2.86** -0.50 -0.35 2.28** 3.66* -0.19 -0.27
(-5.27) (-2.21) (-0.51) (-0.25) (2.47) (2.65) (-0.47) (-0.40)
textile 0.00
(0.89)
mach&trans 0.00** 0.01* 0.00***
(2.13) (3.27) (1.71)
Constant -46.82* -42.90* -96.47* -85.91* -54.64* -36.98* -69.12* -61.47*
(-7.40) (-4.91) (-11.88) (-7.22) (-8.61) (-3.59) (-22.97) (-12.20)
N 3365 2061 3182 1858 3994 2234 7690 3817
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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711.6 711.6 711.8 711.8 714 714 724 724
log(IPR) 0.98 0.79 0.13 0.34 0.74** 1.35* 1.28* 0.92***
(1.25) (0.71) (0.26) (0.48) (2.35) (2.86) (3.89) (1.92)
log(GDPrep) 2.32* 2.33* 2.28* 1.76* 1.73* 1.68* 1.87* 1.82*
(8.41) (4.59) (12.72) (5.72) (16.76) (8.73) (17.24) (9.19)
log(GDPpart) 4.41* 3.60* 3.93* 3.62* 4.79* 4.68* 3.63* 3.55*
(5.64) (3.68) (9.24) (6.83) (23.33) (16.12) (17.71) (12.45)
log(Poprep) -0.37 -0.91** -0.60* -0.64** -0.78* -1.06* -0.85* -1.45*
(-1.31) (-2.17) (-3.21) (-2.40) (-7.01) (-6.19) (-7.27) (-8.19)
log(Poppart) -2.64* -1.61 -2.79* -2.52* -3.93* -3.83* -2.76* -2.84*
(-3.16) (-1.52) (-6.15) (-4.46) (-17.41) (-11.92) (-12.06) (-8.88)
colony 5.90* 5.34* 6.29* 5.78* 4.32* 3.57* 4.04* 2.93*
(7.09) (4.59) (11.10) (7.28) (10.29) (5.72) (8.92) (4.44)
log(dist) -3.10* -3.29* -2.72* -2.79* -1.82* -1.74* -1.07* -1.24*
(-8.16) (-6.55) (-11.54) (-9.00) (-12.52) (-8.44) (-7.07) (-5.92)
language 1.31** 1.52*** 0.92** 0.48 1.06* 1.19* 1.08* 1.17*
(2.19) (1.89) (2.32) (0.91) (4.50) (3.48) (4.43) (3.37)
border 3.33 5.42 -6.07** -8.18* -7.22* -8.45* -4.60** -6.35*
(0.60) (0.87) (-2.26) (-2.85) (-4.03) (-4.16) (-2.51) (-3.19)
1975 5.25* 4.56* 1.62* 2.55* 0.44 0.50 1.78* 0.78
(4.88) (3.16) (2.65) (3.03) (1.25) (0.95) (4.93) (1.46)
1980 9.52* 8.46* 0.92 2.30* 0.46 0.68 2.14* 1.84*
(9.08) (6.00) (1.48) (2.73) (1.31) (1.28) (5.90) (3.45)
1985 9.15* 9.49* 0.83 2.00** 0.63*** 0.86 1.51* 1.16**
(8.74) (6.75) (1.35) (2.36) (1.80) (1.62) (4.14) (2.16)
1990 10.46* 10.46* 2.59* 3.73* 1.70* 1.66* 2.23* 1.62*
(9.78) (7.28) (4.15) (4.36) (4.82) (3.10) (6.04) (2.99)
1995 6.69* 6.38* 3.81* 5.26* 1.95* 2.53* 2.72* 2.75*
(6.15) (4.36) (6.09) (6.19) (5.48) (4.74) (7.33) (5.08)
2000 6.25* 6.14* 3.93* 5.29* 2.13* 2.51* 3.07* 2.73*
(5.43) (3.80) (5.86) (5.54) (5.62) (4.13) (7.74) (4.41)
mach&trans 0.00*** 0.01* 0.00** 0.00*
(1.68) (3.15) (2.40) (2.65)
Constant -104.46* -89.97* -79.25* -63.72* -67.92* -62.66* -65.94* -49.27*
(-12.47) (-7.32) (-15.05) (-8.23) (-24.80) (-13.66) (-23.49) (-10.67)
N 3496 1942 5108 2830 8479 4181 8910 4344
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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729.3 729.3 729.7 729.7 729.9 729.9 734 734
log(IPR) 0.52 1.15*** 0.09 -1.28 0.76** 1.29* 0.07 0.39
(1.13) (1.82) (0.03) (-0.37) (2.19) (2.58) (0.11) (0.42)
log(GDPrep) 2.60* 2.75* 3.64* 4.53** 2.29* 2.00* 2.10* 1.96*
(16.95) (11.21) (3.32) (2.22) (19.54) (9.47) (9.55) (4.96)
log(GDPpart) 3.45* 3.07* 0.67 2.51 3.86* 4.02* 3.22* 2.86*
(10.72) (7.34) (0.21) (0.67) (16.54) (12.87) (6.23) (4.37)
log(Poprep) -0.79* -0.85* -2.02** -2.71*** -1.01* -1.26* -0.77* -1.45*
(-4.87) (-3.73) (-2.02) (-1.69) (-8.12) (-6.78) (-3.37) (-4.34)
log(Poppart) -1.95* -1.56* 0.89 -1.35 -2.81* -3.16* -2.02* -1.91*
(-5.51) (-3.37) (0.24) (-0.32) (-10.95) (-9.16) (-3.57) (-2.64)
colony 5.33* 4.15* 0.75 1.29 5.26* 4.33* 2.91* 0.60
(10.19) (5.75) (0.31) (0.45) (11.81) (6.68) (4.07) (0.59)
log(dist) -1.95* -2.00* -0.46 -0.61 -1.65* -1.71* -2.99* -3.00*
(-9.74) (-7.62) (-0.44) (-0.47) (-10.42) (-7.95) (-10.01) (-7.55)
language 1.58* 2.09* 1.29 2.60 0.28 0.48 3.61* 4.34*
(4.65) (4.68) (0.61) (1.02) (1.09) (1.32) (7.97) (7.07)
border -7.42* -9.87* -0.67 -3.87 -4.99* -6.70* 5.13 1.02
(-2.79) (-3.07) (-0.07) (-0.37) (-2.71) (-3.28) (0.66) (0.13)
1975 2.23* 2.81* 0.75 -2.69 1.59* 1.31** 2.62* 2.56**
(4.10) (3.68) (0.24) (-0.71) (4.10) (2.36) (3.61) (2.53)
1980 3.11* 3.39* 2.85 0.74 1.98* 1.40** 2.62* 2.17**
(5.74) (4.45) (0.91) (0.20) (5.10) (2.50) (3.56) (2.13)
1985 2.54* 3.03* -2.78 -4.31 0.75*** 0.34 1.79** 2.76*
(4.68) (3.96) (-0.84) (-1.10) (1.92) (0.60) (2.43) (2.70)
1990 4.08* 4.87* -3.02 -7.29*** 1.19* 0.83 0.55 1.15
(7.49) (6.34) (-0.89) (-1.74) (2.99) (1.46) (0.73) (1.10)
1995 4.19* 4.49* -1.10 -5.47 1.58* 1.69* 1.86** 2.05***
(7.62) (5.87) (-0.33) (-1.28) (3.97) (2.99) (2.45) (1.96)
2000 5.18* 5.98* 9.71* 7.10 1.38* 1.19*** 1.82** 2.56**





Constant -91.41* -91.53* -92.89* -112.12* -74.05* -61.35* -63.79* -42.46*
(-21.93) (-15.72) (-3.42) (-2.92) (-23.76) (-12.25) (-10.26) (-4.57)
N 6210 3631 543 418 7566 3880 5188 2793
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The comparison year
for the year dummies is 1970.
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861 861 862 862 891.1 891.1
log(IPR) 0.63** 0.47 0.84*** 0.61 1.41* 1.26**
(2.26) (1.20) (1.86) (0.97) (3.27) (2.09)
log(GDPrep) 1.97* 2.00* 1.87* 1.87* 1.63* 1.47*
(21.56) (13.83) (12.58) (7.87) (11.51) (6.51)
log(GDPpart) 4.80* 4.63* 3.13* 3.37* 3.01* 2.91*
(27.27) (19.60) (10.32) (8.44) (10.95) (7.94)
log(Poprep) -1.04* -1.29* -0.83* -0.95* -0.71* -0.62*
(-10.53) (-9.36) (-5.11) (-4.23) (-4.54) (-2.90)
log(Poppart) -4.11* -4.01* -1.72* -1.84* -2.12* -2.01*
(-21.03) (-15.22) (-5.17) (-4.20) (-7.06) (-5.03)
colony 4.45* 3.46* 5.54* 4.37* 5.06* 3.73*
(11.54) (6.57) (10.81) (6.34) (9.52) (5.05)
log(dist) -1.47* -1.49* -2.47* -2.33* -0.91* -1.69*
(-11.48) (-8.77) (-11.97) (-8.71) (-4.70) (-6.51)
language 0.40*** 0.57** 0.69** 1.33* 1.73* 2.01*
(1.94) (2.05) (2.00) (2.99) (5.58) (4.81)
border -7.02* -8.18* 9.88** 10.57** -3.79 -5.66**
(-4.40) (-4.63) -2.38 (2.19) (-1.62) (-2.16)
1975 1.22* 0.82*** 1.40* 1.02 1.86* 1.34**
(4.03) (1.88) (2.77) (1.45) (3.85) (1.98)
1980 1.63* 1.25* 2.44* 2.03* 2.68* 2.55*
(5.36) (2.88) (4.83) (2.89) (5.56) (3.77)
1985 1.08* 0.76*** 0.92*** 0.75 2.14* 2.41*
(3.54) (1.74) (1.81) (1.06) (4.46) (3.57)
1990 1.32* 1.05** 1.13** 0.63 1.44* 1.55**
(4.24) (2.33) (2.20) (0.88) (2.93) (2.22)
1995 1.55* 1.36* 0.99*** 0.63 1.75* 1.82*
(4.96) (3.08) (1.92) (0.89) (3.54) (2.65)
2000 1.26* 1.26** 0.52 -0.06 1.18** 1.28***
(3.78) (2.54) (0.94) (-0.08) (2.22) (1.66)
other 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.03) (1.04) (1.56)
Constant -68.03* -60.91* -61.69* -64.74* -62.98* -53.21*
(-28.15) (-17.73) (-15.58) (-11.77) (-16.65) (-9.87)
N 9009 4939 5801 3315 6410 3608
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗∗∗ = 90% significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The
comparison year for the year dummies is 1970.
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891.2 891.2 894.3 894.3 899.6 899.6
log(IPR) 1.42* 0.81 0.60 -0.23 -1.40* -1.97*
(3.34) (1.41) (0.88) (-0.25) (-2.78) (-2.96)
log(GDPrep) 1.88* 1.84* 1.54* 1.45* 2.92* 2.62*
(13.58) (8.42) (6.50) (3.72) (16.27) (9.42)
log(GDPpart) 1.27* 1.45* 0.18 -0.45 4.82* 4.72*
(4.58) (4.01) (0.33) (-0.68) (11.37) (9.18)
log(Poprep) -0.62* -0.69* -0.75* -0.91** -1.37* -1.34*
(-4.18) (-3.32) (-2.99) (-2.56) (-7.51) (-5.39)
log(Poppart) 0.08 -0.03 1.30** 2.00* -4.37* -4.46*
(-0.28 (-0.08) (-2.2 (2.70) (-9.79) (-8.23)
colony 5.23* 4.38* 5.45* 4.97* 5.79* 5.40*
(10.53) (6.55) (7.79) (5.29) (10.34) (7.52)
log(dist) -1.52* -1.94* -2.66* -2.30* -3.26* -3.03*
(-8.26) (-8.07)0 (-8.78) (-5.90) (-13.68) (-10.24)
language 1.98* 1.99* 0.68 0.74 1.14* 1.38*
(6.49) (4.99) (1.19) (0.99) (2.77) (2.70)
border -4.91** -6.56* 8.51 8.99 2.04 1.31
(-2.37) (-2.89) (1.35) (1.38) (0.50) (0.28)
1975 3.06* 3.01* 0.75 0.64 2.25* 2.65*
(6.08) (4.31) (1.00) (0.62) (3.62) (3.19)
1980 3.33* 3.37* 0.80 0.61 3.92* 4.90*
(6.59) (4.82) (1.06) (0.58) (6.38) (5.94)
1985 3.63* 3.87* -1.64** -1.31 3.27* 4.39*
(7.23) (5.52) (-2.12) (-1.23) (5.33) (5.32)
1990 6.09* 5.88* -2.63* -2.19*** 3.40* 4.90*
(12.02) (8.30) (-3.26) (-1.96) (5.44) (5.84)
1995 7.25* 7.47* -0.75 -0.54 3.15* 3.95*
(14.24) (10.62) (-0.93) (-0.50) (5.00) (4.72)
2000 7.99* 8.77* -2.36* -1.48 3.85* 5.61*
(14.78) (11.30) (-2.71) (-1.21) (5.73) (6.06)
other 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.36) (1.60) (1.00)
Constant -59.64* -56.39* -29.21* -22.76* -72.91* -64.52*
(-16.49) (-11.17) (-4.86) (-2.73) (-13.8) (-9.50)
N 6961 3967 3178 1922 4437 2666
Note: z-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance,
∗∗∗ = 90% significance. Standard errors are corrected using White’s correction. The
comparison year for the year dummies is 1970.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Essay Three
C.1 USPTO Patent Count Data
This appendix takes a deeper look into using patent counts as a proxy for innovation.
Specifically, this paper uses patent counts as reported by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) to approximate innovation appropriate for sale on the foreign
market. Patent counts are increasingly being used to approximate innovation. However,
this approximation for total domestic innovation is less than ideal as countries, especially
developing countries, may not apply for patents in the United States if they do not expect
to sell their product on that market. One such example is the wind-up Clockwork Radio,
which was developed in 1993, to be used in rural communities in developing countries that
have no access to electricity or batteries (WIPO 2006). Such an invention would have little
demand in the United States and so the inventor may never seek a patent from the USPTO.
Therefore, USPTO patent counts is a better approximation for innovation appropriate for
sale on the foreign market than for total innovation.
One benefit to using USPTO patent counts to approximate innovation, in general, is
that USPTO patent counts provide a standardized source of data. Collecting data on
patent counts from individual country data sources my not be comparable as individual
legal standards such as patent breadth my vary across countries. The World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) provides some data on patent application in the country
of origin, but the data is scarce, especially for developing countries. On a similar note,
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) established by WIPO allows members to seek patent
protection for an invention in many countries at one time by filing an “international” patent
application through WIPO. Although the PCT was first established in 1970, many current
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members (both developed and developing) did not sign the treaty until the early to mid
1990s. Today there are 137 member countries that have signed the PCT. Since the objective
of the PCT is take all domestic patent applications and file them internationally, it is
likely that patent counts from a single source, such as USPTO, will increasingly include all
non-resident innovations, thereby increasingly becoming a better approximation for total
innovation rather than innovation intended for the foreign market.
An additional flaw in using USPTO patent counts to approximate innovation is that
such patent counts are only noted for the country listed as the first inventor. Although
this specification is favorable in that it uses the residence of the inventor (rather than the
applicant) to classify the country filing the patent application, it is unfavorable in that it
does not provide data on patent grants for secondary or tertiary inventors, or the like. This
also means that innovation that occurs by way of joint ventures appear only as a patent
granted to the inventor listed as the “first” inventor.
Alternate measures of innovation for the most part have not tried to adjust for possible
mis-valued patent counts resulting from country’s failure to apply for patents abroad or
from the lack joint “ownership” of the patent. Instead, alternate measures of innovation
exist that try to weight patent counts by their “importance” (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).
Citations are often used to weight patent counts in order to derive an approximation for
the importance of innovations. This weighting allows for variability, while the use of patent
counts alone assigns a value of one to each patent.
Despite these many flaws, USPTO patent counts continue to be widely used as an ap-
proximation for innovation, and is particularly good at capturing innovation applicable to
foreign markets. The USPTO, European Patent Office (EPO), and Japanese Patent Office
(JPO) are the three patent offices receiving the greatest number of filings both domesti-
cally an internationally (OECD, 2004). Countries have the greatest likelihood of applying
for a patent in one of these three countries, particularly if the innovation is “valuable”
internationally.
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C.2 First Stage Results for Essay 3
Below are the first stage results for Table 4.2 (with Inward FDI in Current Period).
Table C.1: First Stage Results: Low & Lower-Middle Income Countries
log(Innovation) log(Inward FDI)
log(R&D Expenditures) 0.16* -0.61*
(9.69) (-18.49)
log(Business Environment) -1.32* 4.98*
(-17.63) (33.09)



























Adjusted R2 0.9801 0.9648
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. ∗ = 99% significance, ∗∗ = 95% significance, ∗∗∗ = 90%
significance. The comparison year is 1975. Country fixed effects are also found in empirical
estimation, but not reported.
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